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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
•	After	twenty-five	years	of	independence,	the	Republic	of	Moldova	is	show-
ing	signs	typical	of	so-called	failing	states.	 It	has	no	control	over	parts	of	
its	 territory	 and	 large	 sections	 of	 its	 border,	 no	 effective	 or	 responsible	
political	class,	no	functioning	political	and	legal	system,	no	coherent	and	
generally	accepted	concept	of	statehood,	and	no	stable	economy.	These	are	
persistent	problems	as	a	result	of	which	Moldova	has	not	been	able	to	effec-
tively	perform	many	of	the	basic	tasks	of	a	state	(especially	in	the	social	and	
institutional	dimension).	Even	more	importantly,	the	country	has	been	and	
remains	in	a	state	of	permanent	and	often	visionless	transition.	
•	Moldova’s	intellectual	elites	and	the	political	factions	which	have	been	in	
power	to	date	have	not	been	able	to	put	forward	a	coherent	national	vision	
capable	 of	 uniting	 its	 society,	 and	neither	 have	 they	 been	 able	 to	 reach	
a	consensus	on	 the	model	and	direction	of	Moldova’s	development.	This	
failure	to	develop	an	identity	model	that	could	be	attractive	to	all	Moldo-
vans	has	hindered	the	development	of	a	cohesive	society	in	Moldova,	as	its	
population	remains	divided	along	ethnic	and	 linguistic	 lines,	and,	even	
more	importantly,	divisions	also	persist	within	the	titular	majority	(be-
cause	of	the	absence	of	a	cohesive	Moldovan	identity).	This	absence	of	an	
attractive	and	inclusive	model	of	identity	has	rendered	it	difficult	(if	not	
impossible)	to	resolve	the	problem	of	Transnistrian	separatism	and	ease	
the	tensions	between	Chisinau	and	Gagauzia.	As	long	as	those	two	prob-
lems	remain	unsolved,	 it	appears	 that	 it	will	not	be	possible	 in	 the	 long	
term	 for	Moldova	 to	 function	normally,	 create	 an	 effective	 and	 respon-
sible	political	class	and	administration,	consolidate	society,	develop	civil	
society	structures	and	instil	a	sense	of	responsibility	for	the	character	of	
the	state	in	its	citizens.
•	Moldova’s	current	political	system	is	a	classic	example	of	a	post-Soviet	
oligarchic	model	in	which	the	wealthiest	and	most	powerful	persons	in	
the	 state	do	not	 so	much	 try	 to	 interfere	with	 the	 state’s	policy	by	us-
ing	their	economic	influence	as	seek	to	take	power	directly	in	order	to	
safeguard	their	interests.	If	for	any	reason	they	are	unwilling	or	unable	
to	 hold	 the	 highest	 state	 positions	 themselves,	 they	will	 appoint	 com-
pletely	dependent	persons	with	no	political	backing	–	the	recent	nomi-
nation	of	Pavel	Filip	(a	close	aide	of	Moldova’s	most	important	politician,	
the	oligarch	Vlad	Plahotniuc)	as	 the	prime	minister	 in	 January	2016	 is	
a	case	 in	point.	 In	 its	current	shape,	Moldova	 is	also	a	classic	example	
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of	a	captured state,	in	which	the	operation	of	key	state	institutions	(in-
cluding	the	administration,	the	judiciary	and	the	security	services)	has	
been	fully	subordinated	to	the	interests	of	a	narrow	political	and	busi-
ness	elite	led	by	Plahotniuc.	
•	Moldova’s	party	system	is	dominated	by	strong-leader	parties	which	do	not	
represent	the	interests	of	wider	sections	of	society	but	merely	serve	as	in-
struments	 in	 the	pursuit	of	 the	political	 and	business	objectives	of	 their	
leaders	and	sponsors.	The	Democratic	Party	is	an	example	of	such	a	politi-
cal	formation	–	in	late	2009	and	early	2010	it	was	taken	over	by	Vlad	Pla-
hotniuc	and	began	to	represent	the	oligarch’s	interests	on	Moldova’s	politi-
cal	scene.	Moldova’s	main	left-wing	parties	(Igor	Dodon’s	Party	of	Socialists	
and	Renato	Usatii’s	Our	Party,	 and	previously	also	 the	Party	of	Commu-
nists)	are	dependent	on	Moscow,	which	supports	them	financially,	politi-
cally	and	media-wise,	and	views	them	as	 instruments	serving	the	objec-
tives	of	its	own	policy	towards	Moldova.	
•	It	is	hard	to	find	a	party	with	a	classically	left-wing	or	right-wing	profile	
in	Moldova’s	party	system.	The	divisions	of	the	country’s	political	scene	do	
not	reflect	differences	of	ideology	or	economic	views,	but	rather	different	
attitudes	towards	geopolitical	and	historical	issues.	As	new	political	forma-
tions	emerge,	 they	do	not	try	to	compete	by	offering	attractive	economic	
or	social	programmes,	but	instead	strive	to	present	themselves	as	credibly	
as	possible	 as	 exponents	of	 specifically	understood	 “left-wing”	or	 “right-
wing”	political	ideology.	Such	divisions	are	very	convenient	from	the	point	
of	view	of	the	political	elites	because	they	make	it	easy	to	capture	particu-
lar	sections	of	the	electorate.	At	the	same	time,	Moldova	lacks	bottom-up	
parties	based	on	broad,	self-governing	structures.	It	was	only	recently	that	
attempts	were	made	in	Moldova	at	building	such	parties,	and	those	efforts	
have	not	produced	any	tangible	results	yet.
•	The	political	system	that	has	formed	in	Moldova	over	the	last	25	years	of	
independence	is	highly	unstable.	The	periods	of	stabilization	which	Mol-
dova	witnessed	in	recent	years	(especially	while	the	Communists	were	in	
power)	were	not	an	outcome	of	the	system’s	effective	functioning.	On	the	
contrary,	 they	stemmed	from	a	heavy	concentration	of	power	 in	a	single	
political	camp,	which	was	therefore	in	a	position	to	bypass	or	 ignore	the	
problems	generated	by	the	system.	Under	conditions	of	political	pluralism,	
on	the	other	hand,	Moldova’s	political	and	constitutional	system	has	almost	
always	generated	political	crises	because	of	its	immaturity.	
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•	The	weakness	 of	 the	 legal	 system	 is	 a	 fundamental	 structural	 problem	
that	the	Moldovan	state	faces.	Adopted	in	1994	and	modified	on	several	
occasions,	the	constitution	of	Moldova	is	imprecise	and	open	to	broad	in-
terpretations.	New	 laws	adopted	by	 the	Moldovan	parliament	are	often	
incompatible	with	 the	 constitution,	 and	 amendments	made	 to	 the	 con-
stitution	are	frequently	not	 followed	by	corresponding	modifications	to	
lower-level	legislation.	As	a	result,	Moldova’s	legal	system	is	inconsistent	
and	 internally	 contradictory,	 and	 therefore	 conducive	 to	 constitutional	
and	political	 crises.	Because	of	 the	 legal	 system’s	 imprecision,	 the	Con-
stitutional	Court	has	acquired	a	special	role	in	Moldova	–	it	is	regularly	
called	on	to	issue	(often	far-reaching)	interpretations	of	the	constitution.	
Under	the	circumstances	of	a	general	capture	of	 the	state	apparatus	by	
political	and	business	groups,	 the	Constitutional	Court	 lacks	 independ-
ence	 and	 regularly	 gets	 used	 to	 effectively	 enact	 new	 legal	 regulations	
that	do	not	pass	through	parliament.
•	Moldova	is	one	of	the	most	corrupt	countries	in	the	region.	Corruption	is	
widespread,	from	the	top	tiers	of	government	administration	down	to	the	
healthcare	system	or	education	system.	Meanwhile,	the	institutions	legally	
appointed	to	fight	corruption	tend	to	be	used	in	political	games,	to	combat	
political	rivals,	etc.	The	Moldovan	leadership	is	aware	that	if	it	genuinely	
curbed	corruption,	it	would	lose	some	of	its	influence	on	the	state	apparatus	
(including	the	administration	of	justice),	thereby	exposing	itself	to	consid-
erable	danger.	Consequently,	 the	measures	which	the	successive	govern-
ments	had	pledged	to	take	in	order	to	crack	down	on	corruption	have	not	
produced	any	tangible	results.
•	Moldova’s	 economy	 has	 been	 in	 permanent	 crisis	 since	 the	 early	 1990s.	
Over	the	last	quarter	of	a	century,	successive	governments	have	not	been	
able	 to	 create	 the	 foundations	 for	 stable	economic	development.	As	a	 re-
sult,	Moldova	remains	Europe’s	poorest	country,	with	an	economy	based	
on	relatively	unprocessed	agricultural	products	(with	as	much	as	30%	of	
the	country’s	population	working	in	agriculture),	completely	dependent	on	
external	energy	supplies	 (mainly	 from	Russia),	and	 largely	export-based	
(with	exports	susceptible	to	political	shocks).	Its	financial	sector	remains	
unstable	and	opaque,	of	which	the	recent	banking	affair	is	a	good	illustra-
tion:	in	late	2014	around	one	billion	US$	was	siphoned	off	from	the	Moldo-
van	banking	sector.	Twenty-five	years	after	independence,	the	country	has	
not	been	able	to	achieve	standards	of	living	comparable	to	those	it	enjoyed	
at	the	time	of	the	Soviet	Union’s	collapse.	In	2000	Moldova	started	to	report	
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steady,	if	modest,	year-on-year	economic	growth,	but	in	2015	that	trend	re-
versed	and	the	country’s	GDP	shrank	by	18%.	
•	The	bad	economic	situation	has	contributed	to	mass	job	emigration,	which	
may	affect	as	many	as	40%	of	working-age	Moldovans.	Official	foreign	cur-
rency	remittances	amount	 to	US$	 1.3	billion	a	year,	 accounting	 for	more	
than	20%	of	Moldova’s	GDP.	Emigration	has	been	exacerbating	Moldova’s	
demographic	problems.	During	the	25	years	of	Moldova’s	independent	ex-
istence,	the	country’s	population	(excluding	Transnistria)	has	shrunk	by	
some	20%.	Since	1998,	the	number	of	deaths	has	exceeded	the	number	of	
births	 every	year.	As	 a	 result,	Moldova	now	ranks	 third	 in	 terms	of	 the	
rate	of	population	decline	globally.	There	is	no	doubt	that	the	dramatically	
deteriorating	demographic	situation	(and	the	brain	drain	that	comes	with	
it)	will	have	a	very	negative	 impact	on	Moldova’s	economic	development	
indices.	In	the	coming	years	it	will	lead	to	a	decline	in	foreign	investments,	
hitherto	based	mainly	on	cheap	and	well-qualified	labour,	and	may	inca-
pacitate	the	state	apparatus,	which	will	not	be	able	to	function	effectively	
without	an	influx	of	new	people.	
•	Over	 the	first	 twenty	years	of	 independence	 there	have	hardly	been	any	
occasions	when	Moldova’s	elites	 (and	society	at	 large)	were	able	 to	reach	
consensus	about	a	 foreign	policy	orientation	 to	which	 the	 country	 could	
adhere,	irrespective	of	what	political	force	was	in	power	at	the	given	mo-
ment.	 Consequently,	Moldova’s	 foreign	 policy	 has	 been	 characterised	 by	
instability	 and	 variability.	 Chisinau’s	 international	 activities	 have	 been	
guided,	on	 the	one	hand,	by	 the	desire	 to	 strike	a	balance	between	Rus-
sia	and	the	West,	which	in	practice	involved	periodic	rapprochements	and	
cooling	down	of	relations	with	each	of	the	sides	according	to	current	needs,	
and	on	the	other,	by	internal	factors,	especially	the	political	elite’s	desire	
to	win	over	a	particular	section	of	 the	electorate	by	backing	 this	or	 that	
foreign	policy	orientation.	
•	Over	the	last	quarter	of	a	century,	Moldova	has	not	been	able	to	make	any	
real	progress	towards	resolving	the	Transnistria	conflict,	which	has	been	
frozen	since	1992.	Thanks	to	the	systematic	political,	military	and	economic	
assistance	from	Russia,	which	has	been	Transnistria’s	protector	and	spon-
sor	since	the	early	1990s,	the	breakaway	region	has	consolidated	its	unrec-
ognized	statehood.	Over	the	years,	the	actors	involved	in	the	negotiations	
process	have	taken	various	measures	(often	limited	to	the	level	of	declara-
tions)	with	a	view	to	resolving	the	Transnistria	issue	and	have	put	forward	
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various	proposals	to	foster	a	resolution.	However,	those	efforts	lacked	the	
political	will	necessary	to	make	them	effective,	and	alongside	that	in	many	
cases	 their	 real	 aim	was	 to	 further	 the	political	 interests	of	 a	particular	
party,	rather	than	to	actually	resolve	the	conflict.	There	are	some	serious	
reasons	 to	 believe	 that	 the	 existence	 of	 the	 unrecognised	 Transnistrian	
state	has	been	generating	profits	 for	some	sections	of	 the	Moldovan	elite	
and	 bringing	 substantial	 financial	 gains	 to	 its	members.	 Because	 of	 the	
political	impotence	of	the	West,	combined	with	the	divergent	interests	of	
Moscow	and	Chisinau	and	the	ever	more	deeply	ingrained	patterns	of	cor-
ruption,	enabled	by	the	existence	of	the	para-state	and	benefiting	the	po-
litical	elites	on	both	sides	of	the	Dniester,	a	resolution	of	the	Transnistria	
problem	would	appear	to	be	a	very	distant	prospect	today.	
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InTRodUCTIon
The	Republic	of	Moldova	is	an	exceptional	state.	It	was	the	only	Soviet	republic	
to	proclaim	independence,	on	27	August	1991,	in	order	to	become	part	of	an-
other	state,	i.e.	Romania,	rather	than	building	its	own	independent	political	
future.	After	the	civil	war,	the	break-up	of	the	common	state	and	the	de facto	
collapse	of	the	unification	project,	the	newly	established	Moldova	found	itself		in	
an	ideological	vacuum.	With	no	experience	of	statehood,	no	coherent	historical	
narrative	or	responsible	political	elites,	and	with	a	nation	that	was	unsure	of	
its	identity,	it	set	off	on	a	long	march	in	search	of	an	idea	that	could	define	the	
shape	of	its	statehood	and	the	direction	of	its	future	development.	
Twenty-five	years	on,	the	social	and	political	project	called	the	Republic	of	Mol-
dova	is	experiencing	a	grave	crisis.	The	Moldovan	statehood	remains	fragile	
and	seemingly	impermanent.	The	country’s	successive	governments	have	not	
been	able	to	build	effective	state	institutions	or	create	adequate	conditions	for	
economic	development,	which	could	satisfy	the	basic	needs	of	the	country’s	peo-
ple.	After	years	of	structural	and	economic	weakness,	today’s	Moldova	as	led	
by	Vlad	Plahotniuc,	the	country’s	most	powerful	politician	and	businessman,	
is	a	typical	post-Soviet	oligarchy	ruled	by	a	narrow	clique	interested	mainly	in	
protecting	its	own	political	and	business	interests.
Endemic	corruption	affecting	all	sections	of	society	and	all	spheres	of	life	re-
mains	a	key	problem.	As	many	as	86%	of	the	inhabitants	of	Moldova	believe	that	
the	country	is	heading	in	the	wrong	direction.	As	the	social	and	political	crisis	
lingers	on,	a	growing	number	of	people	openly	admit	that	they	miss	the	USSR.	
In	March	2016,	59%	of	Moldovans	believed	that	the	collapse	of	the	Soviet	Union	
had	been	a	bad	thing	(compared	to	the	29%	who	believed	the	opposite).1	This	
demonstrates	that	the	level	of	Soviet	nostalgia	is	higher	in	Moldova	than	in	Rus-
sia	(where	56%	of	respondents	declared	in	February	2016	that	they	regretted	the	
disintegration	of	the	Soviet	empire).2	Interestingly,	nearly	70%	of	respondents	
between	the	age	of	18	and	24	in	Moldova	are	of	the	opinion	that	life	in	the	Soviet	
Union	was	better	than	in	today’s	Moldova,	which	is	an	unprecedented	result	
in	the	entire	post-Soviet	area	(in	Ukraine,	18%	of	respondents	in	the	same	age	
bracket	share	this	opinion,	compared	to	25%	in	Russia	and	47%	in	Armenia,	the	
1	 http://www.iri.org/sites/default/files/wysiwyg/iri_poll_presentation-moldova-march_	
2016.pdf
2	 http://www.uawire.org/news/survey-suggests-56-of-russians-regret-the-collapse-of-the-ussr
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country	with	the	second-highest	result).3	At	the	same	time,	due	to	Moldovan	so-
ciety’s	growing	disillusionment	with	the	political	class,	the	economic	situation	
and	the	absence	of	a	credible	idea	to	guide	Moldova’s	development,	the	idea	of	
reunification	with	Romania	(tantamount	to	dismantling	Moldovan	statehood)	
has	been	gaining	popularity	as	a	way	of	resolving	the	problems	with	which	the	
country	is	struggling.	At	the	same	time,	popular	support	for	European	integra-
tion	(an	idea	increasingly	perceived	as	discredited,	despite	the	visible	achieve-
ments	in	the	form	of	a	visa-free	travel	regime	implemented	in	April	2014	and	
the	signature	of	an	Association	Agreement	in	June	2014)	reached	a	record	low	
of	slightly	more	than	30%	in	2015.
The	present	paper	is	an	attempt	at	summing	up	the	quarter	of	a	century	of	Mol-
dova’s	independence.	The	successive	chapters	are	devoted	to	the	most	pressing	
problems	with	which	Moldovans	are	still	struggling	after	twenty-five	years	
of	the	young	republic’s	existence.	Part	One	examines	the	problem	of	the	still	
underdeveloped	Moldovan	national	identity,	which,	in	the	author’s	view,	is	
not	only	a	key	issue	that	has	been	holding	back	the	development	of	Moldovan	
statehood	but	has	also	rendered	it	impossible	to	clearly	define	the	direction	
that	Moldova	should	take	and	has	been	conducive	to	the	degeneration	of	the	
political	class.	
The	next	chapter	presents	the	Moldovan	political	system	and	its	evolution	over	
the	last	twenty-five	years,	as	well	as	the	specifics	and	deficiencies	of	the	coun-
try’s	party	system,	and	the	mechanisms	whereby	the	state	apparatus	has	been	
periodically	captured	by	particular	interest	groups.	The	chapters	that	follow	
are	devoted	to	social	and	economic	issues.	The	author	focuses	mainly	on	the	
fundamental	problems	of	Moldova’s	economy,	which	has	been	in	permanent	
crisis	(with	its	dependence	on	exports	of	lightly	processed	goods,	a	low	volume	
of	foreign	investments,	an	inefficient	agricultural	sector	in	which	30%	of	the	
entire	workforce	is	employed,	etc.).	Because	of	the	weakness	of	its	economy,	
Moldova	has	remained	Europe’s	poorest	country	for	years,	which,	in	turn,	has	
kept	the	standards	of	living	low	and	has	negatively	affected	the	social	situation	
more	generally,	generating	unprecedented	levels	of	job-related	emigration	(up	
to	25%	of	the	country’s	inhabitants	have	emigrated	for	work).	
Further	 on,	 the	 author	 discusses	 the	 questions	 of	Moldova’s	 foreign	 poli-
cy,	pointing	to	its	instability	and	changeability	over	the	first	two	decades	of	
3	 http://enews.md/news/view/48063/
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independence,	and	tries	to	identify	the	causes	of	the	disillusionment	with	the	
idea	of	European	integration,	which	has	been	observed	in	Moldova	over	recent	
years.	The	final	chapter	discusses	the	Transnistrian	problem	and	the	reasons	
why	Chisinau	has	not	managed	to	come	any	closer	to	a	resolution	of	this	frozen	
conflict	over	the	quarter	of	a	century	of	independence.	The	paper	ends	with	
a	summary	of	the	current	situation	in	Moldova	and	a	tentative	forecast	of	what	
may	happen	during	the	next	twenty-five	years	of	its	existence	as	a	state.	
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I. WHo ARE THE MoLdoVAnS? TWEnTY-FIVE YEARS 
In SEARCH oF An IdEnTITY
The	inability	of	the	Moldovan	elites	to	develop	an	attractive	identity	model	to	
which	all	the	country’s	inhabitants	could	subscribe	(such	as	a	modern	supra-
ethnic	civil	identity)	or	a	national	idea	around	which	society	could	unite	has	
been	one	of	Moldova’s	most	consequential	failures.	The	identity	problem,	which	
still	remains	unresolved,	has	been	one	of	the	key	issues	affecting	the	cohesion	of	
Moldova’s	ethnically	diversified	society	(where	Moldovans/Romanians	account	
for	around	78%	of	the	population	of	right-bank	Moldova	(without	Transnistria),4	
Ukrainians	make	up	9%,	Russians	–	6%,	and	the	Gagauz	–	4%).5	The	titular	major-
ity	also	remains	fragmented	and	uncertain	of	its	ethnic	identity,	and	the	entire	
society	(including	the	minorities)	is	deeply	divided	and	torn	by	conflicts	over	
attitudes	towards	history,	national	symbols,	certain	values	and	the	language	(or	
even	the	name	of	the	language).	This	identity	problem	has	been	directly	affect-
ing	the	political	scene	and	the	party	system,	and	has	hindered	the	development	
of	an	effective	state	apparatus	in	Moldova.	It	has	also	severely	hindered	any	
attempts	at	instilling	a	sense	of	loyalty	towards	the	state	or	a	sense	of	patriot-
ism,	understood	as	a	willingness	to	work	and	make	sacrifices	in	the	name	of	the	
country’s	development,	among	the	people	of	Moldova.	
1. The historical background to the problem of identity 
The	roots	of	Moldova’s	identity	problem	are	historical	and	political.	Before	1812,	
the	lands	of	what	is	today	the	Republic	of	Moldova	(excluding	the	territory	of	
present-day	Transnistria	on	the	left	bank	of	the	Dniester)	were	part	of	the	Prin-
cipality	of	Moldova,	which	had	existed	since	the	14th	century.	In	the	aftermath	of	
the	Peace	Treaty	of	Bucharest,	signed	between	Turkey	and	Russia	in	1812,	those	
territories,	along	with	the	entirety	of	Bessarabia	(right-bank	Moldova	along	
with	Budjak	and	Khotyn	and	the	surrounding	lands)	were	separated	from	the	
Principality	and	formally	incorporated	into	the	Russian	empire.	At	that	time,	
the	population	of	the	incorporated	lands	(consisting	mostly	of	peasants	who	
identified	with	their	local	communities	but	did	not	have	any	broader	identity)	
became	separated	from	nation-	and	state-forming	processes	unfolding	in	the	
remaining	parts	of	the	Principality	of	Moldova	and	Wallachia,	which	united	in	
4	 According	to	the	2004	census	(conducted	by	the	separatist	government),	32%	of	the	popula-
tion	of	Transnistria	are	ethnic	Moldovans,	30%	are	Russians	and	29%	are	Ukrainians.	Bulgar-
ians,	another	ethnic	group	present	in	the	region,	account	for	2.5%	of	the	region’s	population.	
5	 http://www.statistica.md/pageview.php?l=ro&idc=295&id=2234
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1881	and	formed	what	is	today	the	Romanian	state.	The	indigenous	population	of	
Moldova	not	only	did	not	participate	in	the	formation	of	the	modern	Romanian	
nation	but	was	also	subjected	to	intensive	Russification.	As	early	as	1826	the	
use	of	the	Romanian	language	was	banned	in	local	administration,	Orthodox	
liturgy	and	education	in	the	territories	of	today’s	Moldova.	At	the	same	time	
a	policy	was	implemented	to	build	intellectual	and	economic	elites	in	the	new	
province	by	bringing	Slavic,	Jewish,	Armenian	and	German	settlers	to	its	ter-
ritory.	The	local	people,	most	of	whom	lived	in	villages	and	small	towns,	spoke	
Romanian	in	their	daily	activities	but	often	did	not	have	a	sense	of	being	part	of	
any	particular	nation.	The	situation	changed	with	World	War	I	and	the	October	
Revolution.	In	1918	Bessarabia	was	incorporated	into	the	Romanian	state	and	
its	population	was	subjected	to	an	intensive,	albeit	inefficient	and	awkward	
Romanianisation.	From	the	point	of	view	of	Bucharest,	reclaiming	Bessarabia	
was	an	act	of	historical	justice	which	offered	a	chance	to	re-Romanianise	the	
Russified	‘Bessarabian	Romanians’	(i.e.	the	autochthonous	inhabitants	of	to-
day’s	Moldova).	To	this	end,	administration	cadres	and	teachers	were	brought	
to	the	newly	acquired	province	from	other	parts	of	Romania.
At	the	same	time,	the	Soviet	government	created	the	Moldavian	Autonomous	
Socialist	Soviet	Republic	(MASSR)	in	the	territories	located	east	of	the	Dniester	
(an	area	comprising	today’s	Transnistria	and	parts	of	the	then	Ukrainian	SSR).	
Even	though	those	lands	had	never	been	part	of	the	Principality	of	Moldova	
and	Romanians/Moldovans	accounted	for	only	30%	of	their	population,	it	was	
there	that	the	idea	of	 ‘Moldovanism’	started	to	be	developed	and	promoted	
under	the	auspices	of	Moscow.	It	was	a	new	national	idea	that	was	supposed	
to	give	rise	to	a	new	Moldavian	national	identity	that	could	be	juxtaposed	
with	the	Romanian	identity.	The	Soviet	government	created	the	new	autono-
mous	republic	and	imposed	a	new	identity	model	on	its	inhabitants	in	prepa-
ration	to	reclaiming	the	territory	of	Bessarabia,	lost	in	1918,	from	Romania.	
The	‘Moldovanist’	ideology	was	expected	to	spread	to	the	entire	territory	of	
Bessarabia	 in	the	 longer	term	and	legitimise	the	planned	incorporation	of	
those	lands	into	the	Soviet	Union,	based	on	a	logic	according	to	which	a	terri-
tory	inhabited	by	a	separate	nation,	the	Moldovans,	had	the	right	to	live	in	its	
own	state	entity,	which	in	this	case	would	be	a	Soviet	republic,	in	accordance	
with	Moscow’s	plans.	In	1940,	in	the	aftermath	of	the	Ribbentrop-Molotov	
Pact,	Bessarabia	was	incorporated	into	the	Soviet	Union,	merged	with	a	west-
ern	part	of	the	MASRR	and	transformed	into	the	Moldavian	Soviet	Socialist	
Republic	(MSRR).	Moldovanism	became	the	official	national	idea	of	the	entire	
republic.	A	decisive	majority	of	those	who	represented	the	pro-Romanian	op-
tion	(mostly	members	of	the	intelligentsia)	fled	abroad,	faced	repression	or	
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were	physically	exterminated.	As	a	result	of	intensive	Sovietisation	and	Mol-
dovanisation,	the	pan-Romanian	idea	(according	to	which	Moldovans	were	
in	fact	Romanians,	and	which	called	for	a	union	of	the	two	nations)	became	
deeply	marginalised.	However,	pan-Romanism	survived	among	members	of	
the	Moldovan	intelligentsia,	artists,	writers	and	academics.	
A	revival	of	the	pan-Romanian	idea	began	in	Moldova	at	the	time	when	a	wave	
of	change	swept	through	the	Soviet	Union	in	the	second	half	of	the	1980s.	In	
1989,	the	Popular	Front	of	Moldova	(FPM)	was	established.	It	was	a	movement	
of	intellectuals,	anti-communist	activists	and	pro-reform	organisations	from	
the	entire	republic	(in	the	initial	period	it	even	included	organisations	from	
Transnistria	and	Gagauzia).	Pro-Romanian	activists,	and	especially	academics,	
journalists	and	writers,	played	a	key	role	in	the	movement,	which	openly	called	
on	the	MSSR	inhabitants	to	revive	their	Romanian	identity.	A	pivotal	point	in	
the	Front’s	activity	came	on	27	August	1989,	with	a	rally	organised	in	the	central	
square	of	Chisinau,	which	later	came	to	be	known	as	the	Great	National	Assem-
bly	(Marea	Adunare	Națională	in	Romanian)	because	of	its	massive	size	(around	
300	thousand	people).	Under	pressure	from	the	crowd,	on	31	August	1989	the	
republic’s	government	adopted	a	law	which	changed	the	Moldovan	language’s	
script	from	Cyrillic	to	Latin.	One	year	later,	the	FPM	along	with	some	pro-reform	
communists	came	to	power	in	the	aftermath	of	the	first,	partly	free	elections	to	
the	republic’s	Supreme	Council.	The	new	pro-Romanian	government	started	to	
speak	openly	about	reunifying	Moldova	with	its	historical	motherland	Roma-
nia,	and	large	sections	of	society	became	involved	in	a	festival	of	pro-Romanian	
sentiment	which	manifested	itself	in	ever	more	frequent,	spontaneous	social	
initiatives	such	as	the	‘bridge	of	flowers’	on	6	May	1990.	On	that	day,	passport	
checks	and	the	visa	regime	were	suspended	for	several	hours	for	Romanians	
travelling	to	the	MSRR.	Up	to	one	million	Romanians	crossed	the	eight	border	
bridges,	bringing	flowers	which	they	threw	into	the	river.	A	similar	event,	this	
time	for	Moldavian	citizens	going	to	Romania,	was	organised	on	16	June	1991.	The	
will	to	reunite	with	Romania	was	also	articulated	quite	clearly	in	the	Declaration	
of	Independence	adopted	on	27	August	1991.	It	expressly	condemned	the	incor-
poration	of	Bessarabia	into	the	Russian	empire	in	the	19th	century	and	called	for	
“redressing	the	consequences	of	the	Ribbentrop-Molotov	Pact”,	i.e.	effectively	
for	Bessarabia	to	be	returned	to	Romania.	Framed	this	way,	the	Declaration	was	
clearly	based	on	the	assumption	that	independence	would	be	a	transitory	step	
towards	a	reunification	with	Romania.	At	the	same	time	some	steps	were	taken	
to	symbolically	initiate	the	process	of	reunification.	Romanian	rather	than	Mol-
dovan	was	proclaimed	the	country’s	official	language,	and	the	Romanian	flag	and	
anthem	were	adopted	as	the	symbols	of	the	newly	independent	republic.	
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However,	the	pro-Romanian	sentiment	quickly	started	to	wear,	firstly,	because	
Bucharest	showed	no	genuine	commitment	to	reunification,	and	secondly,	be-
cause	there	was	growing	opposition	to	the	idea	among	significant	parts	of	the	
public	(especially	the	Russian-speakers).	The	opposition	was	particularly	strong	
in	Gagauzia	and	Transnistria,	i.e.	the	two	regions	with	predominantly	Russian-
speaking	populations,	which	would	go	on	to	proclaim	independence	from	Mol-
dova	in	the	second	half	of	1990.	The	secession	of	the	two	regions,	and	especially	
the	highly	industrialised	Transnistria	located	on	strategic	trade	and	transport	
routes,	led	to	the	outbreak,	in	March	1992,	of	an	armed	conflict	between	the	Mol-
dovan	government	forces	and	Transnistrian	volunteers	supported	by	Russian	
troops	stationed	in	the	region.	After	five	months	of	fighting,	which	claimed	the	
lives	of	at	least	650	people	on	both	sides	of	the	conflict,	Chisinau’s	forces	were	
defeated.	Moldova	de facto	lost	control	of	the	territories	on	the	left	bank	of	the	
Dniester	and	the	town	of	Bender	(Tighina	in	Romanian)	on	the	right	bank.6	In	
the	aftermath	of	the	war	trauma	and	the	fiasco	of	the	reunification	idea,	FPM	
was	defeated	in	the	early	parliamentary	election	held	in	February	1994	(gar-
nering	a	mere	7.5%	of	the	vote),	and	a	new	government	was	formed	by	groups	
championing	the	Moldovanist	idea,	which	came	to	dominate	the	country’s	po-
litical	thought	for	the	next	fifteen	years.	
2. Two (and a half?) identities
The	historical	factors	discussed	above	led	to	the	formation	of	two	dominant	
models	of	 identity	within	Moldovan	society:	pan-Romanianism	and	Moldo-
vanism.
The	proponents	of	pan-Romanianism	differ	from	the	advocates	of	the	Moldo-
vanist	idea	in	that	they	do	not	consider	the	Moldovans	to	be	a	separate	nation,	
but	rather	part	of	the	historical	Romanian	nation.	In	this	context,	while	not	
denying	that	a	Moldovan	identity	exists,	they	see	it	as	merely	one	of	various	
Romanian	regional	identities,	similar	to	the	Wallachian	or	Transylvanian	iden-
tities.	They	also	believe	that	the	separation	of	Bessarabia	from	the	remainder	
of	the	Principality	of	Moldova	in	1812	(and	then	again	in	1940)	was	an	act	of	
historical	injustice	which	left	millions	of	Bessarabian	Romanians	outside	their	
homeland.	Most	(but	not	all)	of	those	who	advocate	pan-Romanianism	believe	
it	is	necessary	to	reunite	Romania	with	Moldova,	which	they	see	as	the	second	
6	 Unlike	in	the	case	of	Transnistria,	Moldova	managed	to	regain	control	of	Gagauzia	(which	
had	proclaimed	independence	from	Moldova	in	August	1990)	in	1994	with	the	formation	of	
the	Autonomous	Territorial	Unit	of	Gagauzia.
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Romanian	state.	From	this	vantage	point,	Moldovan	culture,	literature	and	arts	
are	inseparable	from	the	broader	Romanian	culture.	The	pan-Romanianists	also	
reject	the	notion	that	the	Moldovan	language	exists	separately	from	Romanian	
(a	basic	idea	for	the	advocates	of	Moldovanism),	and	at	best	consider	it	to	be	
a	dialect	of	Romanian.	While	the	adherents	of	pan-Romanianism	do	not	make	
that	argument	expressly,	the	pan-Romanian	identity	model	is	by	nature	exclu-
sive,	i.e.	the	members	of	the	ethnic	and	linguistic	minorities	living	in	Moldova	
may	only	adopt	it	through	assimilation	and	rejection	of	their	original	identity.	
The	pan-Romanians	do	not	harbour	an	aversion	towards	minorities	but	they	
emphasise	the	primacy	of	the	Romanian	culture	in	Moldova	and	believe	that	
the	country’s	political	choices	should	be	decided	primarily	by	its	autochthonous	
inhabitants.
In	contrast	to	the	essentially	homogenous	pan-Romanian	idea,	Moldovanism	
exists	in	at	least	two	variants.	One	comprises	the	ethnic	Moldovanism	con-
strued	in	the	Moldavian	Autonomous	Soviet	Republic	to	legitimise	Moscow’s	su-
premacy	over	Bessarabia,	which	continued	to	function	in	the	country’s	political	
life,	in	only	slightly	mitigated	form,	untill	2009.	In	contrast	to	the	pan-Romani-
ans,	its	adherents	believe	that	the	incorporation	of	Bessarabia	into	the	Russian	
Empire	saved	the	Moldavians	living	in	the	region	from	the	Romanianisation	
which	all	the	other	inhabitants	of	the	Principality	of	Moldova	had	to	endure	as	
a	result	of	the	unification	with	Wallachia	and	the	creation	of	the	Kingdom	of	
Romania.	Seen	in	this	way,	Moldova	is	therefore	the	legal	successor	of	the	Prin-
cipality	and	the	heir	to	its	history	dating	back	to	the	14th	century,	while	Stephen	
III	the	Great,	the	most	powerful	historical	leader	of	the	Principality,	is	the	most	
important	figure	in	its	history.	While	the	Moldovanists	do	not	deny	the	cultural	
affinity	between	present-day	Moldovans	and	Romanians,	they	firmly	believe	
that	these	are	separate	and	distinct	nations.	The	Moldovanists	like	to	emphasise	
that,	unlike	the	Romanians,	the	Moldovan	nation	formed	in	a	multi-ethnic	ter-
ritory	inhabited	in	large	part	by	Slavic	people,	thanks	to	which	it	developed	an	
inherent	tolerance	towards	multiculturalism	and	multilingualism,	which	today	
constitutes	one	of	its	key	distinctive	features.	The	Moldovanists	harbour	an	
aversion	to	the	pan-Romanian	ideology,	which	they	consider	a	threat	to	Moldo-
van	statehood	because	the	denial	of	the	existence	of	a	Moldovan	nation	distinct	
from	the	Romanian	nation	deprives	the	Republic	of	Moldova	of	its	title	to	an	in-
dependent	and	sovereign	existence	and	undermines	its	existence	as	a	state.	The	
Moldovanist	identity	model	has	not	been	particularly	inclusive	either,	because	
it	has	been	addressed	primarily	to	the	ethnic	Moldovans/Romanians	living	in	
the	republic.	However,	from	the	point	of	view	of	the	ethnic	and	linguistic	mi-
norities,	it	is	much	easier	to	accept	than	pan-Romanianism	since,	as	mentioned	
18
O
SW
 S
TU
D
IE
S 
 1
2/
20
16
previously,	it	expressly	accepts	their	presence	in	the	naturally	multicultural	
territory	of	Moldova,	welcomes	their	involvement	in	the	country’s	political	life	
and	recognises	their	contribution	to	Moldovan	culture.
Civic	or	state	Moldovanism,	which	has	been	developing	since	the	end	of	the	
2000s,	is	the	other	variant	of	the	Moldovanist	ideology.	It	started	being	pro-
moted	by	Vlad	Filat’s	Liberal	Democratic	Party	after	the	Alliance	for	European	
Integration	came	to	power	in	Moldova	in	2009.	It	was	conceived	as	the	first	
fully	inclusive	identity	model	for	the	citizens	of	Moldova,	and	was	expected	to	
enable	the	formation	of	a	Moldovan	political	nation.	Its	proponents	avoid	any	
references	to	ethnic	categories.	From	their	point	of	view,	ethnic	identity	(like	
religion)	is	a	private	matter	and	as	such	is	secondary	to	one’s	self-identification	
as	a	Moldovan	citizen,	which	is	considered	to	be	the	most	important	aspect	
of	identity.	Civic	Moldovanism	represents	the	Moldovan	state	as	a	common	
good	of	all	its	citizens,	irrespective	of	their	ethnic	background.	It	avoids	any	
historical	or	identity	debates	(which	also	applies	to	the	question	of	the	name	
of	Moldova’s	official	language).	In	the	context	of	foreign	policy,	it	strives	to	be	
pragmatic	and	while	it	is	pro-Western	in	principle,	it	emphasises	close	histori-
cal	links	to	both	the	West	(especially	Romania)	and	Russia.	However,	it	firmly	
advocates	independence	for	Moldova	and	rejects	the	notion	that	it	might	sup-
port	unionist	tendencies.	
Civic	Moldovanism	has	not	gained	wide	popularity	among	the	Moldovans	and	
remains	an	ideologically	imprecise	and	incomplete	niche	project.	However,	it	
should	be	stressed	that	even	after	twenty-five	years	of	Moldova’s	independent	
statehood,	there	are	many	people	in	the	country	who	do	not	identify	strongly	
with	any	of	the	identity	models	described	above	and	whose	self-identification	
remains	diffuse	and	relatively	shallow	(i.e.	based	on	very	basic	values,	such	as	
attitudes	towards	the	West	-	and	especially	Romania	-	or	towards	Russia,	and	
the	language	of	everyday	communication).	
In	a	poll	conducted	in	August	2016,	when	asked	about	their	identity,	75%	of	Mol-
dova’s	inhabitants	replied	that	they	were	‘citizens	of	the	Republic	of	Moldova’,	
and	more	than	50%	said	they	were	‘local’	(the	results	do	not	add	up	to	100%	
because	the	respondents	could	select	several	answers	and	rank	them	in	order	
of	significance).7	While	those	results	suggest	that	a	supra-ethnic	state	identity	
exists	in	Moldova,	this	identity	lacks	significant	substance.	Those	who	identify	
7	 http://imas.md/pic/uploaded/%5Bimas%5D%20libertatea%20de%20a%20fi%20liberi_
conferinta%20de%20presa.pdf
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as	‘citizens	of	the	Republic	of	Moldova’	differ	amongst	themselves	on	fundamen-
tal	issues	such	as	attitudes	towards	historical	events	of	crucial	importance	for	
the	perception	of	the	Moldovan	state,	symbols,	values	and	language	(including	
the	name	of	the	language).	As	a	result,	even	though	a	large	majority	of	the	in-
habitants	of	Moldova	identify	primarily	as	the	citizens	of	their	state	or	region,	
irrespective	of	their	national	or	ethnic	affiliation,	apart	from	that	they	do	not	
feel	that	they	have	much	in	common	with	the	other	inhabitants	of	the	country	
(and	especially	members	of	the	minorities).	So	much	is	clear	from	the	poll	men-
tioned	above,	where	nearly	40%	of	respondents	described	the	relations	between	
ethnic	Moldovans	and	Russians	living	in	the	republic	as	‘conflicted’	or	declared	
that	the	two	groups	simply	ignored	each	other.	33%	provided	the	same	answers	
when	asked	about	the	Moldovan-Gagauz	relations,	and	around	30%	expressed	
the	same	opinions	about	the	relations	between	Moldovans	and	Ukrainians.	
3. Consequences of the identity problem
The	failure	of	the	efforts	to	develop	an	identity	model	that	could	be	embraced	by	
everyone	living	in	Moldova	has	entailed	a	number	of	problems	for	the	Moldovan	
state	and	its	inhabitants.	It	has	hindered	the	efforts	to	build	a	cohesive	society,	
and	as	a	result	the	Moldovans	remain	divided	along	ethnic	and	linguistic	lines,	
and	divisions	exist	even	within	the	titular	majority	itself	(e.g.	between	the	ad-
vocates	of	pan-Romanianism	and	the	Moldovanists).	Because	of	the	absence	
of	an	inclusive	identity,	it	has	been	difficult,	if	not	impossible,	to	resolve	the	
problem	of	Transnistrian	separatism	or	ease	the	tensions	between	Chisinau	
and	Gagauzia.	
The	identity	problem	has	also	seriously	impaired	Moldova’s	ability	to	effectively	
promote	a	sense	of	loyalty	towards	the	state	and	a	spirit	of	modern	patriotism.	
That,	in	turn,	has	contributed	to	the	inefficiency	and	corruption	of	the	state	
apparatus,	exacerbated	economic	migration	and	stymied	the	development	of	
civil	society	or	indeed	any	grassroots	civil	activity.	It	has	also	discouraged	the	
country’s	inhabitants	from	getting	involved	in	political	activity	(including	pro-
tests).	The	political	elites	lack	a	sense	that	their	state	is	permanent,	feel	no	at-
tachment	to	it,	and	therefore	have	no	motivation	to	work	for	the	benefit	of	the	
state	and	generally	prefer	to	focus	on	the	protection	of	their	own,	often	much	
more	tangible	interests.	At	the	same	time	this	absence	of	a	consensus	about	self-
identification	has	enabled	Moldova’s	political	elites	to	easily	play	the	electorate	
by	exploiting	emotionally	charged	identity	divisions	(and	the	political	prefer-
ences	based	on	them).	This	has	deepened	the	divisions	that	exist	and	seriously	
impaired	public	debate	in	Moldova	by	effectively	suppressing	economic	issues	
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or	any	deeper	reflection	about	the	nature	of	the	state	and	the	necessary	reforms	
(see	the	chapter	on	Moldova’s	political	system	for	more	information).	
Family relations vs. politics
Uncertain of its identity, lacking previous experience of independent state-
hood and originating predominantly from the peasant classes, Moldovan 
society attaches a great significance to broadly defined family ties. In Mol-
dova, families are traditionally understood to include not only spouses and 
actual relatives, but also godchildren and godparents, wedding best men, 
etc. Being in a family involves very close relations and generates commit-
ments which are considered to be much more important than obligations 
towards the state or its institutions (given the absence of a civic identifica-
tion and the weakness of the Moldovan state, these are seen as ephemeral 
in comparison to the lasting institution of the family). As a result, what we 
see in Moldova is a variant of the phenomenon of clan relations found for 
instance in Central Asia. 
This phenomenon naturally also extends to the ruling elites, leading to 
nepotism and favouritism, which are rampant in Moldova, because it is 
considered natural to involve clan members in the activities of political 
leaders. Vlad Plahotniuc’s clan may serve as an example: it includes, among 
others, Andrian Candu, the oligarch’s godson who currently holds the posi-
tion of Parliament speaker, and Raisa Apolschii, who was a maid of honour 
at Plahotniuc’s wedding and now heads the Moldovan parliament’s com-
mittee for legal issues, nominations and immunities. 
Because	Moldovan	identity	is	both	nebulous	and	fragile,	the	idea	of	a	reunifica-
tion	of	Moldova	and	Romania	has	regularly	cropped	up	in	public	debate,	leading	
to	even	deeper	public	divisions	and	radicalising	the	anti-Romanian	sections	of	
the	public	(including	the	minorities).	The	political	elites	have	been	exploiting	it	
in	their	political	intrigues,	which	has	further	reinforced	the	impression	that	the	
Moldovan	state	is	impermanent,	undermining	citizens’	sense	of	loyalty	towards	
it.	Because	of	the	lack	of	a	strong	identity,	combined	with	the	deteriorating	so-
cial,	political	and	economic	situation	and	the	fact	that	the	Moldovan	political	
elite	has	become	increasingly	compromised	and	discredited	in	the	aftermath	
of	a	series	of	corruption	scandals	(especially	in	recent	months),	a	growing,	al-
beit	still	relatively	small	proportion	of	the	public	has	started	to	see	the	idea	of	
reunification	with	Romania	as	a	remedy	that	would	help	the	country	deal	with	
its	economic	problems	and	corruption,	achieve	real	integration	with	the	EU	
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and	avert	the	risk	of	a	political	turn	towards	Russia,	should	the	‘leftist’	parties	
come	to	power.	Currently	around	20–25%	of	Moldovans	declare	that	they	would	
vote	for	a	reunification	with	Romania;	in	previous	years	this	number	oscillated	
between	10	and	15%.8	It	should	be	noted	in	this	context	that	Bucharest’s	policy,	
pursued	since	the	1990s,	of	‘restoring’	Romanian	citizenship	to	former	citizens	
of	the	Kingdom	of	Romania	and	their	descendants,	has	also	hardly	been	condu-
cive	to	the	growth	of	a	Moldovan	state	identity.
8	 According	to	available	polls,	in	2011	around	10%	of	all	inhabitants	of	Moldova	‘fully’	sup-
ported	reunification.	Another	18%	supported	the	idea	‘to	some	extent’,	but	it	should	be	noted	
that	many	respondents	understood	that	this	would	involve	co-operating	more	closely	with	
Romanian		while	preserving	the	Moldovan	statehood.	The	real	number	of	the	supporters	
of	reunification	could	be	estimated	at	15%	at	best	(most	of	the	voters	favourably	disposed	
towards	 reunification	were	members	or	 supporters	of	 the	Liberal	party	whose	approval	
ratings	 did	 not	 exceed	 10%).	 See:	 http://www.iri.org/sites/default/files/2011%20June%20
6%20Survey%20of%20Moldova%20Public%20Opinion,%20January%2024-February%20
7,%202011.pdf
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II. THE STATE oF STRUCTURAL CRISIS
1. The evolution of the the political system over 25 years: between 
a façade of democracy and soft authoritarianism
Despite	its	numerous	deficiencies,	Moldova’s	political	system	has	been	regarded	
for	many	years	as	relatively	democratic,	in	comparison	with	the	other	states	
formed	in	the	aftermath	of	the	Soviet	Union’s	disintegration.	Moldova	was	one	of	
the	very	few	member	countries	of	the	Commonwealth	of	Independent	States	(CIS)	
that	did	not	slide	into	the	authoritarian	model	of	power	centred	on	the	president,	
with	a	subordinated	and	instrumentally	used	parliament,	which	was	typical	for	
the	region	in	the	1990s.	Attempts	at	introducing	a	presidential	system	in	Moldova,	
undertaken	in	the	early	2000s,	were	blocked	by	parliament	(with	the	support	
of	the	Constitutional	Court)	and	led	to	a	defeat	of	the	then	president	Petru	Lu-
cinschi,	who	had	pushed	for	the	change,	while	Moldova	became,	at	least	at	the	
legislative	level,	the	only	parliamentary-cabinet	republic	in	the	post-Soviet	area	
at	that	time.9	The	president’s	mandate	was	weakened	considerably	in	2000	when	
the	method	of	electing	the	head	of	state	was	changed,	i.e.	general	elections	were	
replaced	by	parliamentary	vote	(by	a	majority	of	3/5).	At	that	time	the	parliament	
also	gained	the	right	to	oust	the	president	by	a	majority	of	2/3	of	votes,	while	at	
the	same	time	the	president’s	prerogatives	were	substantially	curbed,	and	both	
the	parliament	and	government	were	given	considerably	stronger	powers.	
The	adoption	of	that	model	reinforced	the	perception	that	Moldova’s	political	
system	was	democratic.	This	image	was	further	boosted	by	the	relatively	effi-
cient	functioning	of	the	electoral	mechanisms	which	allowed	the	ruling	elites	
to	be	replaced	regularly	and	frequently.	During	the	first	decade	of	Moldova’s	
independence,	the	country	had	three	different	presidents,	and	each	had	come	
to	power	through	genuine	political	struggle	rather	than	its	pretence.	In	the	
same	period,	every	parliamentary	election	(in	1994,	1998	and	2001)	removed	
from	power	the	ruling	party	of	the	time.	On	the	one	hand,	this	testified	to	the	
weakness	and	instability	of	Moldova’s	young	political	system	but,	on	the	other,	it	
proved	that	the	system	was	genuinely	independent	by	demonstrating	that	none	
of	the	successive	ruling	groups	had	managed	to	consolidate	its	grip	on	power	
sufficiently	to	be	able	to	influence	the	election	process	using	administrative	
methods.	The	absence	of	a	political	monopoly	was	also	visible	in	the	pluralism	
of	the	media	scene	which	Moldova	enjoyed	in	the	1990s.	However,	even	though	
9	 A	parliamentary-cabinet	republic	has	also	been	in	place	in	Georgia	since	2013.
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the	political	system	at	that	time	enabled	a	wide	range	of	political	groups	to	par-
ticipate	in	political	life	and	as	such	bore	the	hallmarks	of	democracy	and	plu-
ralism,	most	people	in	Moldova	perceived	it	as	chaotic	and	inefficient.	This	was	
conducive	to	the	rise	of	nostalgia	for	the	mono-party	system	known	from	Soviet	
times.	In	2001,	57%	of	Moldova’s	inhabitants	declared	that	it	would	be	better	for	
the	country	if	just	one	party	was	present	on	the	political	scene.	Meanwhile,	the	
multi-party	system	was	very	clearly	associated	with	corruption:	nearly	80%	of	
Moldovans	believed	that	the	leaders	of	the	main	political	groups	were	guided	
solely	by	the	desire	to	protect	their	own	interests	and	prosperity.10	
Thus,	the	political	system	which	existed	in	Moldova	during	the	first	decade	of	
its	independence	in	principle	bore	the	characteristics	of	a	pluralist	democracy	
but,	as	Lucan	Way	rightly	observed,	it	was	“pluralism	by	default”11,	which	did	
not	stem	from	either	civil	society’s	or	the	elite’s	strong	attachment	to	democratic	
values	but,	on	the	contrary,	was	the	result	of	the	institutional	weakness	of	the	
state	and	the	party	system,	the	absence	of	political	and	statehood	traditions,	
the	persistence	of	identity	problems	and	the	absence	of	consensus	concerning	
the	country’s	geopolitical	orientation.	
The	year	2001	marked	the	beginning	of	the	end	of	that	era.	At	that	time	the	
Party	of	Communists	of	the	Republic	of	Moldova	(PCRM)	won	the	parliamentary	
elections	and	gained	a	decisive	majority	of	seats	in	parliament	(71	out	of	101).	By	
the	end	of	the	year	it	also	managed	to	independently	appoint	a	new	president	
and	the	party’s	leader	Vladimir	Voronin	became	the	new	head	of	state.	Voronin	
and	his	political	and	business	faction	immediately	proceeded	to	consolidate	
power	in	their	hands.	Even	though	the	president’s	powers	had	been	consider-
ably	curbed	by	that	time,	Voronin	had	full	control	of	the	PCRM,	which	was	loyal	
to	him	and	had	a	parliamentary	majority,	and	thus	he	became	the	most	influ-
ential	actor	in	the	political	life	of	Moldova.	Formally	a	parliamentary-cabinet	
republic,	Moldova	became	a	country	with	a	de facto	presidential	system	when,	
through	Voronin’s	dictate,	the	post	of	prime	minister	was	entrusted	to	Vasile	
Tarlev,	a	manager	with	no	political	backing	of	his	own,	who	was	fully	dependent	
on	the	president’s	decisions.	
In	 this	way	Voronin	came	 to	control	both	parliament	and	 the	government,	
while	occupying	the	post	of	the	head	of	state	himself.	He	used	his	untrammelled	
10	 http://www.ipp.md/libview.php?l=ro&idc=156&id=470
11	 Way	L.A.,	Pluralism	by	default	in	Moldova,	Journal of Democracy,	t	XIII,	nr	4,	Oct	2002,	s.	127.
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power	to	appoint	trusted	and	loyal	aides	to	key	ministries	and	positions	in	the	
uniformed	and	other	services.	He	also	initiated	the	process	of	subordinating	
the	administration	of	justice	to	the	ruling	elite,	by	appointing	trusted	people	to	
the	positions	of	prosecutor	general	and	judges	of	various	instances	(including	
the	Supreme	Court).	Thus,	within	a	short	time,	the	administration	of	justice	
became	fully	subservient	to	Voronin.	The	Communists	also	managed	to	take	
over	control	of	the	public	media	without	much	difficulty,	and	because	they	al-
ready	controlled	some	media	outlets	with	links	to	the	party	and	the	party	press	
organs,	they	now	occupied	a	dominant	position	in	the	country’s	information	
space.	An	important	move	on	the	way	towards	creating	a	fully	subordinated	
state	apparatus	consisted	in	stopping	the	development	of	the	nascent	local	gov-
ernment.	By	Voronin’s	decision,	the	administrative	divisions	modelled	on	the	
Romanian	system,	with	11	relatively	large	and	independent	regions	( judet	in	
Romanian)	were	replaced	by	a	system	dating	back	to	Soviet	times,	comprised	
of	much	smaller	districts	called	‘raions’.	The	raions	were	made	completely	finan-
cially	dependent	on	Chisinau,	which	forced	the	local	authorities	to	co-operate	
with	the	central	government.	The	latter	could	easily	influence	the	results	of	
local	elections	by	making	cuts	to	the	raions’	budgets.	Thus,	the	Communists	
quickly	managed	to	take	control	of	the	local	administration	structures.	While	
capturing	the	state	apparatus,	Voronin	and	his	associates	also	sought	to	subor-
dinate	Moldovan	commerce.	Taking	advantage	of	the	growing	influence	of	his	
father,	Oleg	Voronin	started	building	a	business	empire	which	could	expand	
unimpeded	thanks	to	public	contracts,	services	provided	to	state	institutions	
and	generous	preferences.	At	the	same	time	prominent	members	of	the	Commu-
nist	party	moved	to	take	over	profitable	private	companies,	to	which	end	they	
used	administrative	pressure	(e.g.	tax	audits)	or	acts	of	so-called	reiderstvo,	i.e.	
takeovers	of	companies	through	intimidation	or	court	decisions	based	on	graft.	
This	is	how,	within	8	years	of	his	rule,	Vladimir	Voronin	managed	to	effectively	
capture	the	state	apparatus.
Communist	rule	broke	down	in	April	2009.	Although	the	party	emerged	from	
the	parliamentary	elections12	with	an	absolute	majority	of	seats	in	the	parlia-
ment	(60	out	of	101),	the	number	of	mandates	was	insufficient	to	independently	
nominate	a	head	of	state	(the	appointment	of	president	requires	61	votes).	Vo-
12	 Even	though	PCRM	controlled	the	entire	state	apparatus	in	the	late	2000,	it	was	not	strong	
enough	to	be	able	to	rig	the	results	of	the	parliamentary	elections	on	a	large	scale	and	there-
fore	 could	 not	 ensure	 that	 it	would	 stay	 in	 power.	Major	 tampering	with	 the	 elections,	
including	court	 injunctions	preventing	main	competitors	 from	running	 in	 the	elections,	
started	only	in	the	following	years	(see	below).	
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ronin	had	reached	the	end	of	his	second	term,	and	because	the	constitution	
did	not	permit	him	to	run	for	president	for	a	third	time,	he	decided	to	take	the	
position	of	parliament	speaker	and	designate	Zinaida	Greceanîi,	who	was	fully	
loyal	to	him	and	had	hitherto	been	prime	minister,	as	president.	On	12	May	
2009	 the	Communist-controlled	 parliament	 appointed	 the	 president,	who	
was	still	in	office,	as	the	speaker	of	parliament	in	violation	of	the	constitution.	
However,	the	Communists	did	not	manage	to	have	Greceanîi	nominated	as	
president.	Contrary	to	Voronin’s	expectations,	the	opposition	had	remained	
united	and	the	Communists	did	not	get	the	single	extra	vote	they	needed	to	
appoint	the	head	of	state.	After	two	such	attempts,	Voronin	had	no	choice	but	
to	dissolve	parliament	and	call	a	snap	election.	The	election	took	part	in	July	
2009;	the	winners	were	four	pro-European	opposition	groups	which	together	
garnered	53	votes	and	formed	a	coalition	government	called	the	Alliance	for	
European	Integration	(AIE).	
The	rise	to	power	of	pro-Western	opposition	inspired	hopes	that	the	system	
created	by	the	Communists	would	be	democratised	and	that	Moldova	would	
undergo	a	structural	reconstruction.	Unfortunately,	with	every	successive	year	
of	the	new	coalition’s	rule	it	became	clearer	that	the	leaders	of	its	member	par-
ties	were	not	interested	in	dismantling	the	old	system,	but	rather	in	taking	it	
over	and	using	it	to	their	own	benefit.	Even	the	coalition	agreement	signed	on	
8	August	2009	included	a	confidential	protocol	creating	a	mechanism	accord-
ing	to	which	the	coalition	parties	would	divide	the	most	important	positions	in	
the	state	among	themselves.13	Importantly,	this	was	not	limited	to	the	positions	
of	prime	minister,	parliament	speaker	or	specific	ministries,	but	also	included	
positions	which	should	never	be	politicised,	such	as	prosecutor	general,	chief	
of	the	fiscal	service,	governor	of	the	National	Bank	of	Moldova	or	the	chief	of	
the	Central	Electoral	Commission.14
The	two	people	who	were	most	keenly	interested	in	sharing	influence	in	the	
state	apparatus	and	using	it	to	safeguard	their	own	political	and	business	in-
terests	were	the	leaders	of	the	two	largest	coalition	member	groups,	i.e.	Vlad	
Filat,	the	prime	minister	of	Moldova	in	2009-2013	and	leader	of	the	Liberal	
13	 http://moldnews.md/rus/news/41944
14	 For	more	information	on	the	process	of	the	state	apparats	capture	in	Moldova	by	the	lead-
ers	 of	 the	 Alliance	 for	 European	 Integration	 see:	 K.	 Całus,	 A	 captured	 state?	Moldova’s	
uncertain	 prospects	 for	 modernisation,	 OSW Commentary,	 https://www.osw.waw.pl/en/
publikacje/osw-commentary/2015-04-22/appropriated-state-moldovas-uncertain-pros-
pects-modernisation
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Democratic	Party	(PLDM),	and	the	oligarch	Vlad	Plahotniuc,	the	deputy	parlia-
ment	speaker	in	the	years	2010-2013,	who	formally	served	as	the	deputy	leader	
of	the	Democratic	Party	(PDM)	but	in	reality	financed	and	fully	controlled	the	
party.	Thus,	in	the	end	no	crucial	reforms	were	implemented,	a	failure	which	
the	government	explained	away	by	quoting	human	resource	shortages,	finan-
cial	problems	or	political	instability.	After	three	years	of	the	coalition’s	rule	
no	reforms	had	been	implemented	at	the	Ministry	of	the	Interior,	the	police	or	
the	administration	of	justice,	no	decentralisation	had	been	carried	out	(which	
could	have	made	the	local	governments	more	independent	of	the	centre),	and	
no	progress	had	been	made	in	eradicating	corruption.	The	reconstruction	of	
the	country’s	financial	institutions	also	ended	in	a	fiasco.	Progressive	changes	
were	made	only	in	those	areas	where	they	did	not	directly	undermine	the	rul-
ing	elite’s	interests	or	were	really	necessary	to	boost	the	government’s	approval	
ratings.	The	coalition	did	make	progress	on	civil	liberties	and	human	rights,	
reform	of	the	electoral	laws	and	implementation	of	the	regulations	required	
for	the	signature	of	the	Association	Agreement	with	the	EU	(along	with	the	
Deep	and	Comprehensive	Free	Trade	Area	[DCFTA]	and	liberalisation	of	the	
visa	regime	with	the	EU.	
It	became	increasingly	clear	that	a	new	consolidation	of	power	was	underway	
and	that	interest	groups	gathered	around	Filat	and	Plahotniuc	were	again	striv-
ing	to	capture	the	state.	At	the	same	time,	a	struggle	for	influence	was	gradually	
unfolding	between	the	two	leaders.	In	the	years	2009-2012	those	processes	were	
still	relatively	inconspicuous	as	the	government	made	a	conscious	effort	to	keep	
up	appearances	vis-à-vis	its	Western	partners	and	civic	society.	It	did	so	for	two	
reasons.	Firstly,	the	coalition	badly	wanted	to	succeed	on	matters	related	to	the	
ongoing	negotiations	concerning	the	Association	Agreement	and	the	liberalisa-
tion	of	the	visa	regime	with	the	EU	(which	ultimately	happened	in	mid-2014).15	
Secondly,	the	Moldovan	political	scene	was	very	unstable	during	the	first	three	
years	after	the	AIE	came	to	power.	The	Alliance	did	not	have	a	sufficient	majority	
to	nominate	the	president,	which	created	the	persistent	risk	of	an	early	election	
and	thus	forced	the	coalition	members	to	maintain	the	best	possible	image	vis-
à-vis	the	voters.	Even	though	tensions	mounted	between	Filat	and	Plahotniuc,	
they	avoided	an	open	confrontation	that	could	harm	popularity	of	them	or	their	
parties.	Likewise,	both	formations	tried	to	be	as	discreet	as	possible	in	exercis-
ing	their	control	of	the	state	apparatus.	
15	 The	Association	Agreement	between	Moldova	and	the	EU	was	signed	on	27	June	2014,	and	
the	European	Council	decision	to	abolish	the	visa	obligation	for	Moldovan	nationals	holding	
biometric	passports	and	travelling	to	the	Schengen	zone	entered	into	force	on	28	April	2014.	
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The	situation	started	to	change	after	Nicolae	Timofti	was	elected	as	president	
in	March	2012.	Once	the	political	scene	became	stabilised,	the	conflict	between	
Filat	and	Plahotniuc	erupted	with	renewed	force.	In	January	2013,	in	the	after-
math	of	the	so-called	“Pădurea	Domnească”	scandal,16	Vlad	Filat	made	an	unsuc-
cessful	attempt	at	reclaiming	the	control	of	the	General	Prosecutor’s	Office	from	
Plahotniuc.	Later	on,	in	March	2013,	Filat	lost	his	position	as	prime	minister.	
Since	then,	Plahotniuc’s	influence	has	only	been	expanding.	He	stepped	down	
as	deputy	speaker	of	the	parliament	only	to	appoint	his	godson	Andrian	Candu	
as	the	speaker	of	parliament.	After	Brussels	decided	to	abolish	the	visa	obliga-
tion	for	Moldovan	nationals	travelling	to	the	Schengen	zone	(in	April	2014)	and	
the	Association	Agreement	with	the	EU	was	signed	(in	May	2014)	the	coalition	
members	lost	their	primary	motivation	for	mitigating	their	behaviour.	
In	November	2014	it	turned	out	that	the	country’s	 leading	politicians	knew	
about	and	most	likely	had	been	involved	in	the	siphoning	of	around	US$	1	bil-
lion	(corresponding	to	around	15%	of	Moldova’s	GDP)	from	the	country’s	bank-
ing	system.	Meanwhile,	immediately	after	the	general	election	held	on	30	No-
vember	2014,	the	rivalry	for	control	of	the	state	apparatus	between	Filat	and	
Plahotniuc	entered	a	decisive	phase.	As	a	result,	Moldova	found	itself	in	a	new	
political	crisis	which	lasted	for	a	year,	during	which	time	the	country	had	five	
different	prime	ministers	(including	two	acting	prime	ministers).	Ultimately,	
in	October	2015	Plahotniuc	used	the	General	Prosecutor’s	Office,	which	he	con-
trolled,	and	his	growing	influence	in	parliament	to	successfully	strip	Filat	of	
his	immunity	and	get	him	accused	of	passive	corruption	and	involvement	in	the	
banking	scandal	mentioned	above.	As	a	consequence	Filat	was	arrested.	Dur-
ing	the	four	months	that	followed	the	former	prime	minister’s	party	split	into	
two	groups,	one	loyal	to	Filat,	the	other	willing	to	co-operate	with	Plahotniuc,	
and	shortly	became	marginalised.	The	Party	of	Communists,	which	was	in	op-
position	but	still	constituted	a	major	political	power	(with	21	deputies	in	the	
101-strong	parliament),	also	split	and	the	majority	(14)	of	its	MPs	declared	that	
they	would	co-operate	with	the	Democratic	Party.	At	the	same	time	it	became	
clear	that	the	pro-Romanian,	right-wing	Liberal	Party	led	by	Mihai	Ghimpu	
was	also	on	Plahotniuc’s	side.	In	this	way,	Plahotniuc	managed	to	gain	control	
of	a	parliamentary	majority	which	he	then	used	to	get	his	close	aide	Pavel	Filip	
appointed	as	prime	minister	in	January	2016.	The	final	chapter	which	sealed	
16	 In	late	December	2012	during	an	illegal	hunt	in	the	Pădurea	Domnească	nature	reserve,	a	close	
aide	of	Plahotniuc’s	and	chief	of	the	Plahotniuc-controlled	Prosecutor	General	Office,	alleg-
edly	shot	dead	the	Moldovan	entrepreneur	Sorin	Paciu	(probably	accidentally).	Filat	tried	to	
use	the	scandal	to	discredit	Plahotniuc	and	take	over	control	of	the	prosecution	authorities.	
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Plahotniuc’s	victory	over	Filat	came	with	the	conviction	of	the	former	prime	
minister	to	9	years	in	prison	in	late	June	2016.17
Who is Vlad Plahotniuc?
Born in 1966, Vlad Plahotniuc is a billionaire and the wealthiest man in Mol-
dova, with an estate estimated to be worth more than US$ 2 billion. He is 
also the key actor in Moldova’s political life. Plahotniuc started to build his 
business position in the mid-1990s. In the early 2000s he took a managerial 
position in Petrom Moldova, a daughter company of the Romanian fuels gi-
ant, and in this way he established a close relationship with Vladimir Vo-
ronin, the then president of Moldova and leader of the Party of Communists 
(which exercised full power in the country in the years 2001-2009), and his 
son Oleg, one of Moldova’s leading entrepreneurs. According to Plahotniuc’s 
opponents, he has used blackmail and his influence in the state structures 
(including the police, the fiscal services and the administration of justice), 
which he owed to his ties with Voronin, to take over profitable private com-
panies and destroy the competitors of his businesses, while building up his 
wealth thanks to opaque privatisations of state-owned assets. 
When Moldova’s Communists started losing power in 2009, Plahotniuc 
moved on to financially support the Democratic Party, then a marginal 
pro-European group, in order to avoid losing his political influence. Thanks 
to his money the party managed to become the second largest power in the 
governing coalition of the Alliance for European Integration established in 
the same year.
Thus,	seven	years	after	the	Communists	were	removed	from	power	and	nominal	
democratisation	began	in	Moldova,	the	country	has	reverted	to	the	pattern,	
known	from	the	time	of	Voronin’s	rule,	of	one	centre	of	power	capturing	the	
entire	state	apparatus.18	This	is	a	classic	post-Soviet	oligarchic	model	in	which	
the	wealthiest	and	most	powerful	persons	in	the	state	do	not	so	much	try	to	
interfere	with	the	state’s	policy	by	using	their	economic	influence	as	seek	to	
take	power	directly	in	order	to	safeguard	their	interests.	If	they	are	unwilling	
17	 https://point.md/ro/noutati/politika/vlad-filat-condamnat-la-9-ani-de-pushcarie
18	 For	more	information	on	the	consolidation	of	Plahotniuc’s	grip	on	power,	see:	K.	Całus,	Mol-
dova:	from	oligarchic	pluralism	to	Plahotniuc’s	hegemony,	OSW Commentary,	https://www.
osw.waw.pl/en/publikacje/osw-commentary/2016-04-11/moldova-oligarchic-pluralism-
to-plahotniucs-hegemony
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or	unable	to	hold	the	highest	state	positions	themselves	for	any	reasons,	they	
appoint	completely	dependent	persons	with	no	political	backing	(such	as	the	
current	prime	minister	of	Moldova	Pavel	Filip).	If	this	model	lasts,	it	will	lead	
to	the	re-creation	in	Moldova	of	the	soft	authoritarianism	known	from	the	era	
when	the	Communists	were	in	power.	This	time,	however,	at	least	in	the	short	
term,	the	authoritarianism	will	be	nominally	pro-European.	Plahotniuc	has	
much	larger	financial	resources	at	his	disposal	than	Voronin	did	(and	they	are	
set	to	grow	further	as	he	takes	over	control	of	institutions	previously	under	
Filat’s	influence),	and	a	much	more	effective	and	larger	media	apparatus	(see	
below	for	details).	He	also	has	more	room	for	political	manoeuvre	because,	while	
he	controls	the	Democratic	Party,	he	does	not	need	to	rely	on	that	one	formation	
only.	Having	subordinated	some	former	deputies	of	the	Party	of	Communists	
on	the	one	hand,	and	the	Liberal	Party	and	sections	of	the	PLDM	on	the	other,	
Plahotniuc	is	able	to	appeal	to	very	wide	sections	of	the	electorate	and	play	
different	groups	according	to	his	current	needs.	It	is	clearly	in	his	interest	to	
keep	the	control	he	has	of	the	state	apparatus,	which	means	that	he	will	not	be	
interested	in	any	genuine	reforms	that	could	undermine	that	control.	
2. Moldova’s political scene: disputes over identity and geopolitics
Even	though	Moldova’s	multi-party	system	has	been	developing	for	25	years	
already,	the	country	has	no	parties	with	a	classically	left-wing	or	right-wing	
profile.	The	divisions	in	the	country’s	political	scene	do	not	reflect	differences	
of	ideology	or	economic	views,	but	rather	different	attitudes	towards	geopoliti-
cal	and	historical	issues.	The	‘right	wing’	is	understood	in	Moldova	to	include	
all	the	parties	which	advocate	close	co-operation	with	Romania,	promote	(or	at	
least	refrain	from	challenging)	the	idea	of	close	affinity	between,	or	indeed	the	
unity	of,	the	Romanian	and	Moldovan	nations,	and	opt	for	as	close	as	possible	
co-operation	with	the	West	(including	integration	with	the	European	Union’s	
structures).	These	parties	hold	rather	negative	views	of	the	Soviet	times	and	
some	of	them	like	to	openly	remind	a	wider	public	of	how	the	Moldovans	suf-
fered	at	the	hands	of	the	USSR,	for	example	in	connection	with	the	persecution	
in	the	1940s	and	1950s,	the	great	post-war	famine	or	the	deportations.	Their	
attitudes	towards	Russia	range	from	distrust	to	open	aversion.	They	are	often	
(but	not	always)	distrustful	of	the	ethnic	minorities	living	in	Moldova,	and	as-
sume	that	the	ethnic	majority	should	play	the	main	role	in	the	country.	They	
also	tend	to	stress	the	role	of	the	Romanian	language,	which	they	argue	should	
be	promoted,	and	which	they	do	not	want	to	see	referred	to	as	‘Moldovan’.	The	
more	a	party	preaches	the	“Romanianness”	of	Moldova	and	the	more	it	calls	
for	deeper	co-operation	with	Romania	(and	more	broadly	with	the	West),	the	
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closer	it	will	locate	itself	to	the	right.	In	this	context,	the	PLDM,	which	in	its	
best	period	(2009-2014)	enjoyed	the	support	of	20-25%	of	the	electorate,	is	an	
example	of	a	moderate	right	party.	The	opposition	groups	which	have	emerged	
on	the	political	scene	in	the	course	of	last	year,	such	as	the	Dignity	and	Truth	
Platform	Party	(PDA)	and	the	Party	of	Action	and	Solidarity	(PAS)	also	have	
a	moderate	right	profile.	These	two	groups	have	taken	over	a	decisive	majority	
of	the	PLDM’s	electorate	and	today	boast	approval	ratings	of	around	20%.	The	
Liberal	Party,	led	by	the	openly	pro-Romanian	Mihai	Ghimpu	(who	considers	
himself	to	be	Romanian)	remains	the	most	right-wing	formation	among	Mol-
dova’s	mainstream	parties.	Until	2015	the	party	enjoyed	the	stable	support	of	
the	pro-Romanian	section	of	Moldova’s	society,	with	approval	ratings	of	8-10%.	
Despite	their	clear	leanings	towards	Romania,	the	Liberals	had	refrained	from	
directly	promoting	the	idea	of	Moldova’s	reunification	with	Romania	in	recent	
years.	However,	the	situation	changed	when	the	party’s	popularity	declined	
(after	2015).	Since	then,	Ghimpu	has	been	vocally	making	the	case	for	a	union	
of	the	two	states.
Moldova’s	left,	on	the	other	hand,	comprises	the	parties	whose	roots	are	in	the	
Moldovanist	ideology.	Those	parties	make	no	secret	about	their	nostalgia	for	the	
Soviet	era,	firmly	advocate	close	co-operation	with	Moscow	and	openly	support	
accession	to	the	Moscow-sponsored	Eurasian	Economic	Union	(previously	the	
Customs	Union).	They	perceive	Russia	as	the	guarantor	of	Moldova’s	independ-
ence,	to	which,	in	their	view,	Bucharest	poses	the	greatest	threat	as	it	aspires	
to	incorporate	Moldova	into	Romania.	Those	parties	are	very	open	towards	the	
Russian-speaking	minorities	living	in	Moldova	and	champion	broad	rights	for	
those	groups	(some	sections	of	the	left	even	call	for	Russian	to	be	proclaimed	
the	second	state	language).	At	the	same	time	the	Moldovan	left	rejects	the	pan-
Romanian	idea,	emphasising	the	separateness	of	the	Moldovan	nation	(and	lan-
guage).	Paradoxically,	Moldova’s	left-wing	groups	are	very	conservative.	They	
firmly	oppose	the	rights	of	sexual	minorities	and	closely	co-operate	with	the	
Orthodox	Church	in	defending	traditional	values.	The	left-wing	of	Moldova’s	
political	scene	is	currently	dominated	by	three	groups.	The	most	important	
one	is	the	Party	of	Socialists	led	by	Igor	Dodon.	In	the	2014	general	elections	
the	Socialists	got	20%	of	the	vote,	becoming	the	largest	force	in	the	Moldovan	
parliament.	The	Party	of	Communists	is	the	second	largest	left-wing	party	in	
Moldova.	For	nearly	a	decade	in	the	2000s,	the	group	enjoyed	sufficient	popu-
larity	to	rule	on	its	own	(see	the	previous	chapter	for	more	information).	While	
its	popularity	dropped	sharply	in	recent	years,	in	the	2014	elections	the	party’s	
share	of	the	vote	was	still	only	slightly	smaller	(around	17%)	than	the	showing	
of	the	Socialists.	However,	in	late	2015	the	party	broke	up	in	the	aftermath	of	
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a	political	crisis	in	Moldova.	As	a	result,	it	has	become	increasingly	margin-
alised	and	today	is	effectively	fully	controlled	(politically	and	financially)	by	
Vlad	Plahotniuc.	Our	Party,	led	by	Renato	Usatii,	the	mayor	of	Moldova’s	second	
largest	city	Bălți,	is	the	third	most	important	left-wing	group	in	Moldova,	even	
if	it	is	not	represented	in	parliament.	It	has	the	support	of	around	11%	of	voters.	
Thus	divided,	the	Moldovan	political	scene	also	has	a	kind	of	a	‘centre’,	repre-
sented	by	the	Democratic	Party	(PDM).	The	party,	controlled	and	financed	by	
the	oligarch	Vlad	Plahotniuc,	is	formally	led	by	a	former	member	of	the	Party	of	
Communists,	Marian	Lupu.	While	the	PDM	supports	the	idea	of	European	inte-
gration	(and	has	been	part	of	the	pro-European	coalition	since	2009),	ideologi-
cally	it	owes	quite	a	lot	to	the	Moldovanist	idea.	It	is	open	towards	the	Russian-
speaking	minorities	and	has	avoided	raising	sensitive	historical	topics.	While	it	
does	not	deny	the	cultural	affinity	between	the	Moldovans	and	the	Romanians,	
it	believes	these	are	two	separate	nations,	and	further	reinforces	this	stance	by	
arguing	that	Moldovan	is	a	separate	language	independent	of	Romanian.	
The	divisions	in	Moldova’s	political	scene	have	in	fact	been	construed	in	this	way	
since	the	beginnings	of	the	new	republic.	New	political	parties	in	Moldova	have	
never	competed	by	offering	attractive	economic	or	social	programmes	but	have	
primarily	striven	to	credibly	inscribe	themselves	into	the	specifically	under-
stood	notions	of	‘left-wing’	and	‘right-wing’,	as	described	above.	Such	divisions	
are	very	convenient	for	the	political	elite	because	they	enable	it	to	easily	take	
hold	of	particular	sections	of	the	electorate.	The	Russian	speaking	minorities	
vote,	for	the	most	part,	for	left-wing	groups,	which	they	see	as	defenders	of	their	
interest	(such	as	the	right	to	use	the	Russian	language)	and	the	main	bulwark	
against	the	dreaded	prospect	of	reunification	of	Moldova	and	Romania.	The	Rus-
sian-speaking	minorities	naturally	tend	to	favour	developing	closer	relations	
with	Russia	(because	of	the	ethnic	and	cultural	ties	and	the	influence	of	the	
Russian	media,	which	are	widely	available	in	Moldova	and	are	followed	by	the	
minorities	there),	which	gives	then	an	extra	stimulus	to	support	the	ideologi-
cally	pro-Russian	groups.	Of	course	the	electorates	of	those	parties	also	include	
ethnic	Moldovans	who	are	reserved	about	the	idea	of	European	integration	and	
rapprochement	with	Romania,	and	who	often	feel	nostalgia	for	the	USSR.	On	
the	other	hand,	people	who	identify	as	Romanians	or	for	whom	the	cultural	
and	historical	ties	between	the	Moldovans	and	the	Romanians	are	important,	
and	those	who	support	the	pro-Western	orientation	of	the	country,	constitute	
the	traditional	electorate	of	the	right.	It	should	be	noted	that	while	the	voters	of	
the	left	constitute	a	relatively	uniform	group,	there	are	some	differences	among	
those	who	vote	for	the	right.	This	group	includes	the	extreme	pan-Romanians	
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and	unionists,	who	account	for	around	15%	of	the	population	and	who	advocate	
as	deep	as	possible	integration	with	Romania,	up	to	the	incorporation	of	Mol-
dova	into	Romania.	However,	a	majority	of	the	right’s	electorate	is	not	interested	
in	dismantling	Moldovan	statehood,	even	if	they	feel	close	to	Romanian	culture.	
Because	of	these	differences,	the	supporters	of	rapprochement	with	the	West	
are	usually	represented	by	several	parties	in	Moldova’s	political	scene	(each	
representing	the	view	of	a	slightly	different	part	of	this	electorate),	while	the	
left	is	usually	dominated	by	one	big	party.	
The	persistence	of	those	divisions	has	effectively	impeded	debate	on	a	wider	
political	programme	among	Moldova’s	different	political	formations.	Indeed,	
the	electorate	does	not	seem	to	expect	the	political	class	to	engage	in	any	serious	
debate	on	economic,	social	or	security	issues	and	has	so	far	satisfied	itself	with	
the	particular	party’s	geopolitical/historical	positioning,	as	such	divisions	are	
more	understandable.	As	a	result,	Moldova’s	political	parties	are	very	populist,	
and	this	in	a	way	corresponds	to	the	electorate’s	needs.	They	are	focused	on	
highlighting	their	‘left’	or	‘right’	profile	(in	the	Moldovan	sense	of	these	terms),	
which	they	demonstrate,	for	instance,	by	ostentatiously	maintaining	good	rela-
tions	with	Russian	politicians	(in	the	case	of	the	left),	or	EU	politicians,	espe-
cially	those	from	Romania	(in	the	case	of	the	right),	and	displaying	their	feelings	
about	particular	historical	events	such	as	the	incorporation	of	Bessarabia	into	
Romania	in	1918	(seen	as	the	beginning	of	an	occupation	by	one	side,	and	as	
return	to	the	motherland	by	the	other),	or	the	9	May	Victory	Day	celebrations.
3. Parties in the service of their sponsors
A	great	majority	of	Moldovan	political	formations	are	strongman	parties	organ-
ised	around	charismatic	leaders.	Such	parties	naturally	turn	into	instruments	
serving	the	political	and	business	interests	of	their	leaders	and	sponsors,	instead	
of	understanding	and	articulating	the	interests	of	particular	sections	of	society.	
Attempts	at	building	bottom-up	parties	based	on	broad	self-governing	struc-
tures	capable	of	influencing	the	party	leadership’s	policy	have	been	undertaken	
only	recently	and	so	far	have	not	produced	any	tangible	results.19	Moreover,	it	
is	a	fairly	common	practice	in	Moldova	for	members	of	the	political-business	
19	 The	formations	built	based	on	a	horizontal	rather	than	vertical	model	are	mainly	pro-Eu-
ropean	parties	established	as	opposition	to	the	ruling	coalition,	such	as	the	Party	of	Action	
and	Solidarity	(PAS)	founded	by	the	former	education	minister	Maia	Sandu	and	the	Euro-
pean	People’s	Party	of	Moldova	(PPEM)	led	by	the	former	prime	minister	and	ex	member	of	
Filat’s	party	Iurie	Leancă.
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establishment	to	take	over	new	political	parties.	Such	people	invest	consider-
able	sums	of	money	in	their	chosen	parties,	thus	enabling	them,	for	instance,	
to	win	seats	in	parliament,	where	they	subsequently	become	an	instrument	
for	protecting	the	interests	of	their	patron.	The	takeover	of	the	PDM	by	Vlad	
Plahotniuc	in	late	2009	and	early	2010	is	a	case	in	point	–	the	party,	originally	
an	insignificant	group	without	parliamentary	representation,	grew	to	become	
the	second	largest	force	in	the	pro-European	coalition	and,	at	the	same	time,	
the	foundation	of	Plahotniuc’s	formal	presence	on	the	Moldovan	political	scene.	
There	are	reasons	to	believe	that	similar	processes	are	affecting	the	nascent	
forces	of	pro-European	opposition	in	Moldova,	which	have	been	developing	
on	a	bottom-up	basis	since	late	2014.	In	particular,	this	concerns	the	Dignity	
and	Truth	Platform	party,	which	emerged	several	months	ago	from	the	social	
movement	called	Dignity	and	Truth	Civic	Platform,	first	initiated	in	early	2015.	
The	Dignity	and	Truth	Civic	Platform	was	a	pro-European	informal	initiative	
launched	by	a	group	of	noted	Moldovan	social	activists,	journalists	and	lawyers,	
which	at	the	onset	was	not	linked	to	any	political	formation.	As	such,	it	did	not	
have	clear-cut	structures	or	one	leader.	The	movement	called	for	broad	reforms	
and	de-oligarchisation	of	the	state,	and	for	those	responsible	for	the	banking	
scandal,	including	Vlad	Plahotniuc,	to	be	brought	to	account.	As	the	movement	
developed,	some	of	its	participants,	most	notably	the	attorney	Andrei	Năstase,	
increasingly	started	to	argue	that	the	Platform	should	create	a	political	party	
which	could	take	part	in	the	next	election	or	designate	its	candidate	for	presi-
dent.	However,	a	considerable	group	of	the	movement’s	members	did	not	want	
it	to	become	politicised.	They	feared,	inter alia,	that	the	move	to	create	a	party	
led	by	Năstase	would	be	an	attempt	by	Victor	Țopa	and	Viorel	Țopa,	Plahotniuc’s	
business	rivals	living	in	Germany,	to	capture	the	movement	and	take	advantage	
of	its	popularity.	Those	fears	were	not	unfounded.	Andrei	Năstase	had	been	the	
lawyer	of	Victor	and	Viorel	Țopa	at	the	time	of	their	conflict	with	Plahotniuc	
in	2011,	and	the	Jurnal	TV	station	owned	by	the	two	entrepreneurs	was	openly	
supporting	the	movement’s	activities	and	promoting	the	idea	of	creating	a	politi-
cal	party.	As	a	result,	the	movement	underwent	a	split.	The	Dignity	and	Truth	
Platform	party,	which	was	ultimately	established	in	December	2015	and	has	
been	led	by	Năstase,	has	links	to	the	Civic	Platform	but	is	formally	independent	
of	it.	There	are	also	serious	reasons	to	believe	that	the	party	has	been	receiv-
ing	financing	from	abroad,	most	probably	from	Victor	and	Viorel	Țopa.	In	this	
context	it	is	worth	noting	another	problem,	i.e.	the	continuing	financial	and	
political	dependence	of	the	Moldovan	left	on	Russia.	Moldova’s	main	left-wing	
forces	(formerly	the	Party	of	Communists	and	currently	Igor	Dodon’s	Party	of	
Socialists	and	Renato	Usatii’s	Our	Party)	receive	financial,	political	and	media	
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backing	from	Moscow,	which	perceives	them	as	instruments	of	its	policy	to-
wards	Moldova.20	As	a	result,	they	too	focus	more	on	representing	the	interests	
of	their	patron,	in	this	case	the	Kremlin.	
Because	of	this	instrumentalisation	of	political	parties	in	Moldova	and	the	regu-
lar	political	crises	it	has	engendered	(stemming	from	the	conflicting	interests	of	
the	different	party	leaders-owners),	combined	with	the	generally	poor	quality	
of	the	country’s	ruling	elites	and	the	absence	of	genuine	dialogue	with	the	vot-
ers,	the	people	in	Moldova	not	only	distrust	their	political	class	but	also	harbour	
an	open	aversion	towards	it.	This	is	visible	in	the	polls	in	which	more	than	92%	
of	Moldovans	are	dissatisfied	with	the	quality	of	political	life	in	their	country.	
Nearly	90%	also	believe	that	the	republic	is	not	being	governed	in	accordance	
with	the	nation’s	will.	The	state	institutions	occupy	the	lowest	positions	in	cred-
ibility	rankings.	In	April	2016,	the	president,	the	parliament,	the	government	
and	the	political	parties	were	trusted	by	5.9%,	6.8%,	7.4%	and	7.9%	of	respond-
ents,	respectively.21	In	the	same	poll,	every	second	person	in	Moldova	distrusted	
all	key	political	figures.	It	is	symptomatic	of	the	scale	of	the	Moldovans’	disil-
lusionment	with	their	political	elite	that	foreign	politicians	rank	much	higher	
in	credibility	rankings.	While	Igor	Dodon,	who	tops	the	credibility	ranking	for	
Moldovan	politicians,	reported	a	showing	of	8.2%	in	2016,	Vladimir	Putin	was	
trusted	by	63%	of	respondents	in	the	same	poll,	the	Romanian	president	Klaus	
Iohannis	reported	a	showing	of	33.2%,	and	Angela	Merkel	and	Barack	Obama	
were	trusted	by	25	to	30%	of	respondents.22
4. The legal system and the administration of justice: politicised 
and riddled by contradictions
The	weakness	of	the	legal	system	is	a	very	serious	structural	problem	of	the	
Moldovan	state,	which	could	not	be	resolved	over	the	last	twenty-five	years.	
Adopted	in	1994	and	amended	on	several	occasions,	the	constitution	of	Moldova	
is	imprecise	and	open	to	broad	interpretations.	New	laws	adopted	by	the	Moldo-
van	parliament	are	often	incompatible	with	the	constitution,	and	amendments	
20	 A	typical	way	for	the	Kremlin	to	show	political	support	for	the	left-wing	groups	consists	in	
meetings	of	the	leaders	of	those	parties	with	top-ranking	Russian	politicians,	most	notably	
with	Vladimir	Putin.	The	leader	of	the	Socialists,	Igor	Dodon,	held	such	a	meeting	less	than	
a	month	before	the	parliamentary	elections	in	November	2014.	A	photograph	showing	Do-
don	conversing	with	Putin	was	then	used	as	the	main	element	in	all	campaign	billboards	of	
the	socialists.
21	 http://www.ipp.md/public/files/Barometru/BOP_04.2016_prima_parte_finale-r.pdf
22	 Ibidem.
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made	to	the	constitution	are	frequently	not	followed	by	corresponding	modi-
fications	to	lower-level	legislation.	As	a	result,	the	Moldovan	legal	system	is	
incoherent	and	riddled	by	internal	contradictions,	and	thus	conducive	to	con-
stitutional	and	political	crises.	In	one	example,	there	is	a	contradiction	between	
the	constitution	and	the	bill	on	the	special	status	of	Gagauzia,	i.e.	the	‘constitu-
tion’	of	the	Gagauz	autonomy.	Before	2003,	in	keeping	with	the	region’s	statutes	
and	the	bill	on	the	special	status	of	Gagauzia,	the	Autonomy’s	authorities	had	
the	right	to	declare	independence,	should	Moldova	lose	its	independence	(for	
instance	as	a	result	of	reunification	with	Romania).	However,	Gagauzia	was	
effectively	stripped	of	that	right	when	the	constitution	was	amended	in	2003.	
The	new	wording	of	the	constitution	referred	to	Gagauzia	as	an	“inseparable	
constituent	part”	of	Moldova	and	referred	to	its	territories	and	resources	as	
assets	of	the	Moldovan	nation.	However,	the	bill	regulating	the	status	and	pre-
rogatives	of	Gagauzia	has	not	been	amended	correspondingly,	which	has	led	to	
regular	tensions	between	Chisinau	and	the	local	authorities	of	the	Autonomy.	In	
another	example,	the	constitution’s	provisions	on	a	citizens’	referendum	have	
not	been	adjusted	following	the	2003	administrative	reform,	which	has	effec-
tively	blocked	the	possibility	of	calling	such	a	referendum	in	Moldova	(for	more	
information,	see	the	section	on	the	judiciary	in	Moldova).	Another	problem	
concerns	the	very	structure	of	the	constitution,	which	is	imperfect	and	likely	to	
generate	protracted	political	crisis.	For	instance,	because	of	the	constitutional	
provisions	Moldova	experienced	a	political	crisis	lasting	two	and	a	half	years	
when	its	parliament	could	not	elect	a	new	head	of	state	between	September	
2009	and	March	2012.	
With	such	an	erratic	legal	system,	the	Constitutional	Court	has	come	to	play	
a	special	role	in	Moldova,	as	it	has	frequently	been	called	upon	to	resolve	dis-
putes	stemming	from	the	system’s	internal	contradictions.	However,	 in	the	
context	of	a	state	apparatus	captured	by	political-business	groups	(currently	
Vlad	Plahotniuc’s	camp),	the	Constitutional	Court	could	not	remain	independ-
ent	either.	Control	of	the	Court,	which	has	the	power	to	lay	down	irrevocable	
interpretations	of	the	constitution,	is	one	of	the	key	instruments	in	the	exer-
cise	of	power	in	Moldova,	enabling	those	who	hold	it	to	effectively	pass	laws	
even	without	a	parliamentary	majority.	A	number	of	verdicts	meted	out	by	the	
Constitutional	Court	over	the	last	three	years	demonstrate	that	the	court	has	
indeed	been	used	by	Plahotniuc	to	serve	his	own	purposes.	For	instance,	the	
Court	issued	a	verdict	which	blocked	Vlad	Filat’s	return	to	the	position	of	prime	
minister	in	2013,	made	it	possible	for	the	appointment	of	Pavel	Filip	as	prime	
minister	to	be	imposed	on	the	president	in	January	2016,	and	effected	a	change	
in	the	method	of	electing	the	president	by	replacing	indirect	elections	(through	
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parliament)	with	general	elections	(a	decision	in	which	parliament	had	no	say).23	
Thus,	the	institution	which	could	potentially	mitigate	the	problems	stemming	
from	the	flaws	in	Moldova’s	constitutional	foundations,	if	it	upheld	the	stand-
ards	of	professionalism	and	independence,	has	been	deeply	politicised.	This	
situation	constitutes	a	major	obstacle	to	Moldova’s	development	as	a	modern	
lawful	state.
The	administration	of	justice	in	Moldova	has	been	prone	to	corruption	and	has	
demonstrated	servile	attitudes	towards	political	and	business	groups	since	the	
beginning	of	independence.	This	is	due,	in	equal	degrees,	to	the	country’s	dete-
riorating	economic	situation	and	to	the	tradition,	dating	back	to	Soviet	times,	
of	the	courts’	obedience	to	the	government.	However,	in	the	early	years	of	the	
Republic	of	Moldova,	control	of	the	judiciary	was	not	concentrated	in	the	hands	
of	one	single	political	camp.	That	changed	in	the	early	2000s,	when	the	judiciary	
became	largely	subordinated	to	the	political	elite	forming	president	Voronin’s	
circle	and	started	to	serve	as	a	means	of	intimidating	Voronin’s	political	and	
business	rivals	and	facilitating	asset	grabs	targeting	profitable	enterprises.	Af-
ter	the	Communists	were	removed	from	power	in	2009	the	judiciary	became	
partly	de-politicised	but	then	it	again	became	subordinated	to	Vlad	Plahotniuc.	
Plahotniuc	now	has	a	decisive	influence	on	the	General	Prosecutor’s	Office,	the	
Supreme	Court	of	Justice,	the	Supreme	Judiciary	Council	(SCM),	anti-corruption	
bodies	(including	the	National	Anti-Corruption	Centre)	and	–	indirectly	–	most	
judges	throughout	Moldova.	After	Filat	was	removed	from	the	political	scene,	
Plahotniuc	continued	to	consolidate	his	grip	on	the	judiciary,	despite	social	pro-
tests.	For	instance,	on	9	February	2016	his	trusted	judge	Mihai	Poalelungi	was	
re-appointed	as	president	of	the	Supreme	Court	of	Justice.24	The	judiciary’s	obe-
dience	to	the	government	has	been	enforced	using	corrupt	practices,	business	
and	clan	ties,	and	intimidation.	The	case	of	judge	Dominica	Manole	is	a	glaring	
example	of	how	politicians	subordinate	judges:	after	Manole	had	issued	a	ver-
dict	favourable	to	anti-Plahotniuc	opposition	in	early	2016,	she	had	to	face	an	
investigation	initiated	against	her	by	the	prosecution	authorities	(see	below).
23	 K.	 Całus,	Mołdawia:	 Sąd	Konstytucyjny	 zmienia	 tryb	wyboru	 prezydenta,	Analizy OSW,	
9.09.2016,	 http://www.osw.waw.pl/pl/publikacje/analizy/2016-03-09/moldawia-sad-kon-
stytucyjny-zmienia-tryb-wyboru-prezydenta
24	 It	is	worth	noting	that	Poalelungi	was	the	only	candidate	for	president	of	the	Supreme	Court	
of	 Justice.	The	decision	of	 the	Supreme	 Judiciary	Council	appointing	Poalelungi	as	presi-
dent,	taken	on	9	February	2016	was	approved	on	27	April	2016	by	the	Moldovan	parliament.	
http://www.realitatea.md/mihai-poalelungi--sustinut-de-parlament-la-functia-de-pre-
sedinte-csj--deputatii-au-mai-numit-alti-patru-judecatori_38337.html
37
O
SW
 S
TU
D
IE
S 
 1
2/
20
16
The case of judge dominica Manole
On 30 March 2016 the Central Electoral Commission of Moldova rejected 
a petition, signed by more than 400,000 people, for a referendum to change 
the manner of electing the president and the number of members of parlia-
ment, which would have been inconvenient for the Moldovan leadership. 
In its justification, the Commission argued that even though the petition 
had been signed by twice the required number of people (the constitution 
required 200,000 signatures), the opposition had not met the second condi-
tion required for the petition to be valid, according to which the collected 
signatures needed to represent at least half of the second-tier administra-
tive units of Moldova, with not less than 20,000 signatures collected in each 
of the units. While the constitution does indeed include such a require-
ment, meeting it in the present conditions is extremely difficult or even 
impossible in some administrative units. The constitution was written at 
a time when Moldova’s administrative divisions were different, with only 
eleven second-tier administrative units (the so-called judet). As a result of 
the administrative reform, the number of units, now renamed as raion, in-
creased three-fold, and the new units had much smaller populations. Con-
sequently, in many raions the number of eligible voters is under or barely 
above 20,000 people.
In this connection, the opposition decided to appeal the Central Elector-
al Commission’s decision at the Appellate Court, where judge Dominica 
Manole overturned the Commission’s decision on 14 April 2016. Her verdict, 
however, was appealed at the Supreme Court, which upheld the Central 
Electoral Commission’s decision. At the same time measures were under-
taken against the insubordinate judge. The Central Electoral Commission 
filed a complaint against Manole’s verdict at the SCM, arguing that it had 
been “blatantly incompatible with the law” and “deliberately generated 
a negative public reaction”. Acting general prosecutor Eduard Harunjen 
then requested the SCM to authorise an investigation into suspected “abuse 
of power” by Dominica Manole, allegedly consisting of the usurpation of 
the right to interpret the constitution. On 31 May 2016 the SCM granted 
Harunjen’s request. At the time this paper was completed, judge Manole 
was facing loss of her judge’s immunity, a fine, up to five years in prison and 
loss of the right to serve as a judge.
The	 subordination	 of	 the	 Moldovan	 administration	 of	 justice	 to	 Plahot-
niuc	means	 that	 the	system	is	extremely	politicised	and	regularly	used	 in	
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Plahotniuc’s	political	jockeying	with	his	rivals.	His	political	competitors	risk	
being	blackmailed	with	threats	of	criminal	proceedings	(based	on	genuine	or	
fabricated	evidence),	or	encouraged	to	collaborate	with	promises	of	immunity	
for	themselves	or	their	business	with	bribes	on	top	of	that.	The	detention	of	
Vlad	Filat,	as	mentioned	before,	is	one	of	the	most	glaring	examples	of	the	ju-
diciary	being	used	for	political	purposes.	Another	example	concerns	the	case	
of	the	Taraclia	mayor	Serghei	Filipov,	who	in	April	2016	was	sentenced	by	the	
appellate	court	for	“abuse	of	power”	and	for	causing	“considerable	damage	to	
the	public	interest”.	His	offence	reportedly	consisted	in	illegally	cutting	down	
around	a	dozen	trees	in	the	city.	The	court	sentenced	him	for	a	fine	of	EUR	
7,500	and	removed	him	from	office	for	two	years.	The	case	was	interpreted	as	
clearly	political	and	triggered	protests	(Pirkka	Tapiola,	the	head	of	the	EU	del-
egation	in	Chisinau,	and	the	ambassadors	of	the	United	States	and	several	EU	
countries	raised	serious	concern	about	the	verdict).	According	to	Filipov,	the	
ruling	had	been	punishment	for	his	unwillingness	to	co-operate	with	repre-
sentatives	of	the	Democratic	Party.	Filipov	had	also	been	the	main	rival	of	the	
Democrats’	candidate	for	the	mayor	of	Taraclia	in	the	most	recent	local	elec-
tions.	Under	internal	pressure	(and	because	Plahotniuc	did	not	want	too	much	
damage	to	his	image),	the	Supreme	Court	overturned	the	Appellate	Court’s	
verdict	on	9	August	2016	and	restored	Filipov	to	his	position.25
Control	of	the	administration	of	justice	has	also	enabled	the	ruling	groups	(i.e.	
Plahotniuc’s	camp	at	present)	to	hold	on	to	power	by	restraining	the	activities	
of	the	opposition.	Apart	from	the	previously	mentioned	case	where	an	incon-
venient	referendum	was	suppressed,	the	ruling	parties	have	also	been	able	to	
eliminate	one	of	their	main	political	rivals,	Renato	Usatii,	from	the	2014	parlia-
mentary	elections	just	three	days	before	the	vote	in	2014	thanks	to	their	control	
of	the	Central	Electoral	Commission	and	the	judiciary.	Their	grip	on	the	judici-
ary	has	also	made	it	possible	to	intimidate	opposition	political	activists,	of	which	
the	case	of	Grigore	Petrenco	is	an	example.	Petrenco,	an	openly	anti-Plahotniuc	
politician	associated	with	the	Party	of	Communists	before	2014,	was	detained	
during	anti-government	protests	in	September	2015.26	The	investigation	against	
him	dragged	on	for	several	months,	during	which	time	Petrenco	was	kept	in	
solitary	confinement,	which	led	to	protests	on	the	part	of	the	Council	of	Europe,	
the	United	States	and	some	EU	states,	among	others.	It	seems	quite	certain	that	
25	 http://newsmaker.md/rus/novosti/ko-vsem-tuyam-vsp-otmenila-prigovor-po-skandal-
nomu-delu-mera-taraklii-26645
26	 http://protv.md/stiri/actualitate/cate-30-de-zile-de-arest-pentru-petrenco-si-amer-
berg---1128151.html
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while	Petrenco	himself	did	not	pose	any	real	threat	to	Plahotniuc,	he	was	tar-
geted	because	he	could	set	an	example	for	other	opposition	leaders.
There	is	little	indication	that	the	Moldovan	administration	of	justice	could	be	
genuinely	reformed	or	depoliticised	in	the	near	future.	In	its	current	shape,	it	is	
too	powerful	an	instrument	for	the	political	elites,	and	they	will	not	voluntar-
ily	give	up	control	of	it	or	risk	its	takeover	by	their	political	rivals.	The	current	
Plahotniuc-controlled	government	has	undertaken	some	ersatz	measures	to	
demonstrate	its	commitment	to	thoroughly	rebuilding	the	system.	To	this	end,	
the	parliament	passed	a	new	bill	on	the	reform	of	the	prosecution	authorities	
in	February	2016.27	However,	its	implementation	will	require	a	constitutional	
amendment,	and	Plahotniuc	does	not	have	the	two-thirds	majority	needed	to	
amend	the	constitution.	It	is	therefore	almost	certain	that	the	bill	will	not	go	
through,	and	the	Moldovan	leadership	will	be	able	to	blame	its	failure	on	the	
opposition’s	resistance.	On	its	part,	the	judicial	system	does	not	seem	to	be	capa-
ble	of	effectively	fighting	for	its	political	independence.	As	the	example	of	judge	
Manole	demonstrates,	any	struggles	for	independence	launched	from	within	
are	severely	punished.	
5. The media: edging closer to a monopoly
After	the	brief	period	of	freedom	which	followed	the	removal	from	power	of	the	
Communists	in	2009,	Moldova’s	media	scene	has	become	largely	subordinated	
to	the	country’s	major	political	and	business	groups	in	recent	years.	While	the	
relatively	numerous	television	channels	(of	which	there	are	around	70	in	Mol-
dova),	radio	stations,	newspapers	and	news	portals	represent	different	points	
of	view,	in	practice	their	line	is	always	determined	by	their	owners’	interests.	
Consequently,	a	decisive	majority	of	the	mainstream	media	in	Moldova	are	not	
objective.	Yet	they	possess	substantial	financial	resources	and	are	dominant	in	
Moldova’s	information	space,	as	a	result	of	which	it	has	not	been	possible	for	in-
dependent	journalism	to	reach	wider	audiences.	Another	problem	concerns	the	
monopolisation	of	the	media	by	the	oligarch	Vlad	Plahotniuc,	which	has	been	
progressing	for	at	least	six	years.	Plahotniuc	currently	owns	four	out	of	the	five	
national	TV	stations	(and	a	number	of	cable	television	channels,	whose	reach	
is	limited	to	the	large	cities)	as	well	as	three	radio	stations.	He	also	directly	
or	indirectly	controls	a	number	of	newspapers	and	news	portals.	The	share	of	
27	 http://ru.publika.md/zakon-o-reforme-prokuratury-prinyat-v-finalnom-chtenii_1804251.
html
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Plahotniuc’s	media	in	Moldova’s	total	media	market	is	estimated	at	60-70%.28	
In	addition	to	constantly	expanding	his	media	portfolio,	Plahotniuc	has	also	
been	combatting	independent	mass	media	using	his	influence	in	the	Radio	and	
Television	Coordination	Council	(the	state	media	regulator)	and	at	the	cable	
operators.	At	the	same	time,	Plahotniuc’s	holding	has	monopolised	a	large	part	
of	the	advertising	sector	(around	60-80%	of	the	market),	gaining	an	additional	
tool	to	influence	his	competitors,	who	largely	depend	on	advertising	revenue.	
Combatting rival media – the case of TV7
The series of steps taken against TV7, one of Moldova’s large television sta-
tions controlled by Chiril Lucinschi (son of Petru Lucinschi, the former 
president and high ranking PLDM politician with links to Vlad Filat) is an 
example of how the media independent of Plahotniuc are being targeted in 
Moldova. In February 2016 Moldtelecom (Moldova’s state-owned telecoms 
operator controlled by Vlad Plahotniuc) changed the matrix of cable chan-
nels, as a result of which stations owned by Plahotniuc’s holding were as-
signed positions in the top ten channels, while other televisions, includ-
ing TV7, were moved to positions between 10 and 20. Several weeks later 
a similar decision was taken by Moldova’s largest cable operator, SunCom-
munications. Moreover, Plahotniuc’s holding took steps to limit TV7’s share 
in the advertising market under its control. As a result, TV7, which used to 
be Moldova’s second most viewed channel just a few years ago, started to 
rapidly lose its audience share. By December 2015 it had dropped to 5th posi-
tion, and by April 2016 to 13th.
Thanks	to	his	control	of	the	cable	operators,	Plahotniuc	has	also	been	able	to	
block	 inconvenient	 content.	 For	 instance,	 on	20	 January	2016	Moldtelecom	
blocked	the	signal	of	all	the	TV	stations	which	were	covering	a	protest	taking	
place	in	Chisinau	against	the	formation	of	the	government	led	by	Pavel	Filip,	
Plahotniuc’s	close	aide	(officially	for	technical	reasons).	Previously,	in	January	
2014,	Moldtelecom	unexpectedly	temporarily	stopped	transmitting	the	signal	
of	two	openly	anti-Plahotniuc	channels,	Jurnal	TV	and	Accent	TV.	As	Plahot-
niuc	consolidated	his	grip	on	power,	he	has	also	taken	over	control	of	public	
broadcasters,	including	Moldova	1,	the	premier	channel	of	Moldovan	public	
television,	which	until	recently	had	been	the	last	national	channel	independent	
of	Plahotniuc.	The	oligarch’s	growing	influence	on	Moldova	1	is	visible	in	the	
28	 http://media-azi.md/sites/default/files/Raportul%20situatia%20presei%202015%20
rusa_3.pdf
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fact	that	the	television	stopped	its	live	coverage	of	the	celebrations	of	the	25th	
anniversary	of	independence	(on	27	August	2016)	as	soon	as	anti-government	
protesters	showed	up.29
The	deteriorating	situation	of	Moldova’s	media	is	also	reflected	in	the	annual	
rankings	compiled	by	Reporters	Without	Borders.	In	2009	(the	last	year	of	the	
Communists’	rule)	Moldova’s	media	freedom	score	was	33.75	points.	When	the	
Alliance	for	European	Integration	came	to	power,	the	situation	changed	radi-
cally.	In	2010	and	2011	Moldova	scored	19	and	16	points,	respectively	(the	score	
is	inversely	proportional	to	the	degree	of	media	freedom).	In	the	years	that	fol-
lowed,	however,	Moldova’s	scores	deteriorated	gradually.	In	2016	the	country	
scored	28.83	points,	a	showing	worse	than	at	any	time	during	the	Communist’s	
eight-year	rule	except	for	the	year	2009.
29	 http://newsmaker.md/rus/novosti/slezotochivyy-prazdnik-kak-vlasti-otmetili-25-letie-
nezavisimosti-moldovy-26985
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III. THE EConoMY: FRoM CoLLAPSE To FRAGILE STABILITY 
1. Struggling for stability
The	disintegration	of	the	Soviet	Union	delivered	a	severe	blow	to	Moldova’s	small	
economy,	which	was	totally	dependent	on	the	Soviet	Union	market.	Another	
blow	came	with	the	secession	of	the	highly	industrialised	Transnistria,	which	
had	accounted	for	40%	of	Moldavian	SSR’s	GDP,	33%	of	its	industrial	output	and	
90%	of	its	electricity	production.	In	the	aftermath	of	those	two	developments,	
between	1990	and	1992	the	GDP	of	the	young	Republic	of	Moldova	shrank	by	as	
much	as	35%	(see	Chart	1).	As	the	political	situation	stabilised	in	the	following	
years,	the	shrinking	of	Moldova’s	economy	slowed	down,	but	the	downward	
trend	could	not	be	reversed.	In	fact	the	Moldovan	elites	remained	unable	to	ef-
fectively	restore	growth	until	the	early	2000s.	The	financial	crisis	in	Russia	in	
1998	made	matters	even	worse,	causing	Moldova’s	economy	to	shrink	again	by	
15%.	The	country’s	GDP	continued	to	decline	rapidly	(with	two	relatively	small	
rises	in	1995	and	1997)	until	1999,	at	which	point	it	corresponded	to	a	mere	33%	
of	the	1990	figure.	Moldova	was	also	struggling	with	a	serious	inflation	problem,	
which	in	1999	climbed	to	the	highest	levels	since	the	end	of	the	Transnistria	
war	(39.3%).	
Chart 1. Moldova’s GDP dynamics in 1990-2015 - current prices (US$ million)
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Chart 2. Moldova’s GDP per capita dynamics in 1990-2014 - purchasing power 
parity (2011 constant prices in international dollars)
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After	the	government	of	prime	minister	Ion	Sturza	took	office	in	1999	and	ini-
tiated	the	necessary	reforms,	and	as	the	situation	gradually	improved	in	the	
Russian	market,	Moldova’s	economy	started	to	develop,	although	its	growth	was	
relatively	slow.	The	Communists	who	took	full	power	in	Moldova	in	2001	were	
interested	mainly	in	stabilising	the	social	and	economic	situation	in	order	to	
win	the	support	of	an	electorate	made	weary	by	a	decade	of	raging	crisis,	and	
did	not	intend	to	aim	for	widescale	liberalisation	of	economy.	In	addition,	the	
new	leadership’s	main	focus	was	on	subjugating	the	state	apparatus,	consolidat-
ing	its	grip	on	power	and	taking	over	profitable	companies	(both	state-owned	
and	private).	Another	factor	which	undercut	the	government’s	motivation	to	
implement	deep	economic	reforms	concerned	the	constantly	growing	volume	
of	remittances	from	the	ever	larger	group	of	Moldovan	emigrants	living	abroad.	
Their	remittances	contributed	to	a	visible	improvement	in	the	standards	of	liv-
ing,	as	they	were	(and	still	remain	today)	the	main	source	of	financing	for	do-
mestic	consumption.	In	2014,	Moldova	ranked	4th	in	terms	of	the	proportion	of	
remittances	to	GDP	globally.30
30	 http://monitorul.fisc.md/editorial/moldova_zanimaet_4-e_mesto_v_mire_po_sootnoshe-
niyu_obema_denezhnyh_perevodov_trudovyh_migrantov__k_vvp_s_pokazatelem_v__	
25.html
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Chart 3. Moldova’s GDP per capita dynamics in 1990-2014 - purchasing power 
parity (current constant prices in international dollars)
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Despite	the	absence	of	thorough	reforms,	the	times	when	the	Communists	were	
in	power	were	nonetheless	a	period	of	relative	stability,	during	which	Moldova’s	
economy	developed.	Between	2001	and	2008	Moldova’s	GDP	increased	fourfold,	
exceeding	US$	6	billion	(see	Chart	1).	At	the	same	time,	while	Moldova’s	economy	
remained	dependent	on	foreign	trade,	the	shares	of	the	EU	and	post-Soviet	markets	
in	its	export	balance	reached	parity	between	the	years	2005	and	2006	(see	Chart	5).	
Chart 4. Moldova’s export dynamics in 1997-2015 (US$ million)
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Source: National Bureau of Statistics of the Republic of Moldova 
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2. Structural weaknesses of the Moldovan economy 
The	years	during	which	Moldova	has	been	under	the	rule	of	the	pro-Europe-
an	groups,	which	came	to	power	in	2009	and	still	hold	power	today	(albeit	in	
a	changed	configuration),	have	shown	how	the	Moldovan	economy	is	fragile	and	
susceptible	to	external	impacts	and	political	changes.	Exports	play	a	huge	role	
in	Moldova’s	economy.	The	domestic	market	is	very	small	and	internal	demand	
largely	determined	by	the	level	of	remittances.	As	a	result,	Moldova’s	economy	
in	its	present	shape	depends	on	access	to	external	markets	for	its	goods	(exports	
in	the	2010s	have	accounted	for	30%	of	the	country’s	GDP)	and	external	labour	
markets.	Any	restrictions	on	access	to	those	markets	quickly	generate	crises,	
of	which	Moldova’s	deteriorating	economic	performance	in	the	last	two	years	
is	the	latest	example.	
Chart 5. Dynamics of Moldova’s exports to countries of the former USSR and 
to the EU in 1997-2015 (US$ million)
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In	the	years	2014-2015	Moldova	experienced	a	deep	decline	of	its	exports	to	
post-Soviet	states	(down	by	33%),	especially	to	Russia,	which	had	been	the	main	
recipient	of	Moldovan	exports	before	2014,	(down	by	43.2%)	and	to	Ukraine	
(down	by	58%).	The	most	affected	sectors	in	terms	of	trade	with	post-Soviet	
states	in	2015	included	animal	products	(down	by	71%,	i.e.	US$	30.7	million),	
plant	products	(down	by	26%,	at	US$	36	million),	as	well	as	alcohol	and	tobacco	
products	(down	by	34%,	or	US$	62.5	million).	External	factors	were	responsible	
for	this	deep	decline.	Firstly,	Russia	imposed	an	embargo	on	Moldovan	agricul-
tural	products	(fruit,	vegetables	and	meat)	and	alcoholic	products	in	response	
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to	the	initialling	(in	November	2013)	and	signature	(in	June	2014)	of	the	Asso-
ciation	Agreement	and	the	Deep	and	Comprehensive	Free	Trade	Area	(DCFTA)	
with	the	EU.	Secondly,	the	crisis	was	exacerbated	by	the	deteriorating	political	
and	economic	situation	in	the	region	and	its	consequences	such	as	the	deep	
depreciation	of	the	Russian	rouble	and	the	Ukrainian	hryvnia,	and	the	deep	
adverse	impact	that	had	on	the	capacity	of	the	Russian	and	Ukrainian	markets	
to	absorb	imports	(in	the	case	of	Ukraine,	demand	was	further	suppressed	by	
the	ongoing	conflict	in	Donbas).	Because	of	those	factors,	Moldova’s	exports	
dropped	to	the	lowest	level	in	five	years	in	2015.	The	total	volume	of	commodity	
exports	in	2015	was	US$	1,966	million	and	was	15.9%	lower	than	in	2014.	Such	
a	deep	slump	in	exports	had	an	impact	on	the	condition	of	the	entire	economy.	
In	2015	Moldova’s	GDP	(US$,	current	prices)	decreased	in	comparison	to	2014	
by	18%.	This	was	not	by	any	means	helped	by	the	dwindling	remittances	from	
Moldovan	emigrants	working	in	Russia	that	were	caused,	on	the	one	hand,	by	
the	depreciation	of	the	rouble	and,	on	the	other,	by	the	stricter	immigration	
rules	adopted	by	Russia,	as	a	result	of	which	fewer	Moldovan	nationals	could	
work	in	its	territory.	In	2015,	total	remittances	decreased	by	nearly	one-third	
from	US$	1.6	billion	to	US$	1.1	billion.31	
It	should	also	be	noted	that	even	though	exports	are	hugely	important	for	Mol-
dova,	the	governments’	efforts	to	gain	wider	access	to	external	markets	have	
been	constantly	stumbling	over	various	difficulties.	Moldova’s	exports	to	the	
European	Union	did	not	increase	considerably	after	the	EU	granted	Moldova	Au-
tonomous	Trade	Preference	in	2008.32	Today	the	situation	is	similar.	Even	though	
the	Deep	and	Comprehensive	Free	Trade	Area	(DCFTA)	deal	with	the	EU	entered	
into	force	on	1	September	2014,	granting	wider	access	to	the	EU	market	for	Mol-
dovan	exports,	the	volume	of	those	exports	in	fact	decreased	(by	2.3%)	in	2015.	
Even	though	the	EU’s	share	of	Moldova’s	exports	increased	by	8.6	percentage	
points	in	2015	to	61.9%,	compared	to	25%	for	the	CIS	countries	(exports	to	which	
dropped	by	8.1	percentage	points),	this	change	had	actually	been	caused	solely	
by	the	previously	mentioned	dramatic	decline	of	exports	to	the	CIS.	One	of	the	
most	important	factors	holding	back	an	increase	in	Moldovan	agricultural	and	
food	exports	to	the	EU	despite	the	existence	of	the	DCFTA	concerns	the	problems	
that	Moldova	has	been	experiencing	in	implementing	the	phytosanitary	norms	
31	 http://newsmaker.md/rus/novosti/denezhnye-perevody-moldavskih-migrantov-sokratil-
is-na-tret-22047
32	 The	Autonomous	Trade	Preferences	regime,	which	was	in	place	between	2008	and	end	of	
2015,	enabled	Moldovan	producers	to	export	their	products	(excluding	some	agricultural	
products)	to	the	EU	market	on	a	duty-free	and	quota-free	basis.	
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provided	for	in	the	Association	Agreement.33	The	country	has	also	faced	problems	
implementing	the	standardisation	norms	required	by	the	EU.
Another	very	serious	weakness	of	the	Moldovan	economy	concerns	the	lack	of	
transparency	in	its	financial	sector,	including	the	politicisation	of	the	National	
Bank	of	Moldova	(NBM).	The	weight	of	this	problem	is	best	illustrated	by	the	
financial	scandal,	one	of	the	biggest	of	its	kind	in	the	entire	post-Soviet	area,	
which	was	uncovered	in	November	2014.	At	that	point	it	became	clear	that	a	sum	
of	around	US$	1	billion	had	been	siphoned	off	from	three	major	Moldovan	banks:	
Banca	di	Economii,	Banca	Socială	and	Unibank.	The	banks	had	previously	grant-
ed	multi-million	loans	to	companies	associated	with	Ilan	Shor	(a	Moldovan-Is-
raeli	entrepreneur),	Vlad	Filat	and	probably	also	Vlad	Plahotniuc.	A	great	major-
ity	of	those	loans	were	from	the	start	rated	as	‘unpayable’.	The	loans	could	not	be	
recovered	because	the	borrowers	had	transferred	their	debt	to	other	companies,	
usually	registered	outside	Moldova	in	tax	havens,	had	filed	for	bankruptcy	or	
had	turned	out	to	be	shell	companies.	The	banks	involved	were	unable	to	enforce	
repayment	and	soon	started	losing	financial	liquidity	as	a	result.	In	order	to	save	
them,	in	November	and	December	2014	the	National	Bank	of	Moldova	(NBM)	
put	the	three	banks	under	state	supervision	and	decided	to	provide	them	with	
hundreds	of	millions	of	euros	in	assistance	funding	from	the	state’s	currency	
reserves.	It	is	clear	that	the	banks’	machinations	would	not	have	been	possible	
without	the	involvement	of	high-ranking	coalition	politicians.	Also	the	NBM,	
which	controls	financial	flows	in	Moldova’s	banking	sector,	must	have	been	
aware	of	the	dubious	operations	conducted	by	the	three	banks.	Its	failure	to	
stop	those	practices	and	preserve	the	banks’	financial	liquidity	was	most	prob-
ably	due	to	political	pressure	from	the	ruling	elite.	The	Moldovan	authorities	
have	now	launched	a	formal	inquiry	into	the	banking	scandal	and	have	hired	
the	US	Kroll	company	to	audit	the	banking	sector,	but	because	of	the	involve-
ment	of	members	of	the	elite	in	the	scandal	it	does	not	seem	likely	that	these	
measures	will	help	the	banks	recover	the	money.	Meanwhile	the	government,	in	
its	capacity	as	the	guarantor	of	banking	loans,	has	had	to	issue	treasury	bonds	
worth	around	US$	700	million	(with	an	annual	interest	rate	of	5%	and	twenty-
five-year	maturity	periods)	in	order	to	bail	out	the	NBM	after	it	had	to	pump	
33	 The	decline	of	Moldova’s	total	exports	to	the	EU	was	also	partly	due	to	the	drop	in	exports	
of	industrial	products	and	raw	materials	(textiles,	clothes,	chemical	products,	products	of	
the	timber	and	machine-building	industries,	metals)	to	the	EU	states	by	around	10%	from	
US$	804,652,600	 in	2014	 to	729,311,800	 in	2015.	The	underlying	causes	also	 included	 the	
worsening	situation	in	those	sectors	and	the	absence	of	any	significant	investments	in	the	
Moldovan	economy	in	2015	(which	otherwise	could	have	stimulated	the	growth	of	produc-
tion	and	exports).
48
O
SW
 S
TU
D
IE
S 
 1
2/
20
16
such	huge	sums	into	the	banking	sector	to	preserve	its	liquidity.34	As	a	result,	
according	to	the	government’s	forecasts,	Moldova’s	internal	debt	will	increase	
nearly	three-fold	in	2016,	from	MDL	7.075	billion	in	late	2014	to	MDL	21	billion.	
In	addition,	the	twenty-five-year	maturity	periods	and	the	interest	rate	mean	
that	the	Moldovan	government,	i.e.	effectively	Moldovan	taxpayers,	will	have	
to	repay	more	than	twice	the	amount	borrowed.	The	banking	scandal,	combined	
with	the	region’s	general	geopolitical	situation,	has	also	rapidly	driven	down	
the	exchange	rate	of	the	Moldovan	currency.	The	Moldovan	leu	lost	more	than	
20%	to	the	US	dollar	in	2014	and	another	26%	in	2015.	
In	this	context	it	should	be	emphasised	that	Moldova	is	also	deeply	dependent	
on	direct	external	financial	assistance.	And	yet,	because	of	the	lack	of	transpar-
ency	and	instability	of	the	financial	system	(brought	to	the	fore	by	the	banking	
scandal),	in	early	June	2015	the	International	Monetary	Fund	notified	Chisinau	
that	it	was	suspending	the	negotiations	concerning	a	new	loan	programme.	In	
mid-June	2015,	the	World	Bank	announced	that	it	was	withholding	the	payment	
of	a	US$	45	million	loan	to	Moldova,	and	on	5	July	2015	the	EU	decided	to	freeze	
its	programme	of	financial	assistance	to	Moldova	worth	EUR	40–50	million.	In	
all	three	cases,	the	justifications	were	the	same,	pointing	to	Chisinau’s	failure	
to	take	effective	action	to	restore	the	health	of	the	national	banking	system.	
Because	of	the	freeze	on	lending,	Chisinau	did	not	receive	a	total	of	around	
US$	230	million,	which	corresponded	to	more	than	10%	of	the	planned	public	
spending	in	2015.	The	banking	scandal	in	conjunction	with	the	Russian	embargo	
on	Moldovan	agricultural	and	food	products,	the	depreciation	of	the	country’s	
currency	and	the	drop	in	external	financing	caused	a	reversal	of	the	continuous	
upward	trend	in	Moldova’s	economy	observed	since	2000.	The	country’s	GDP	
(in	US$)	decreased	by	as	much	as	18%	in	2015	compared	to	the	previous	year,	
falling	back	to	the	levels	observed	between	2010	and	2011.	
Access	to	foreign	investments	has	also	been	a	persistent	problem	for	the	Mol-
dovan	economy,	exacerbated	in	recent	years	by	the	unstable	political	situation	
and	doubts	concerning	the	stability	of	the	Moldovan	financial	system.	In	theory,	
some	steps	have	been	taken	over	the	last	six	years	to	improve	Moldova’s	invest-
ment	climate.	For	example,	six	special	economic	zones	have	been	established,	
which	offer	preferential	conditions	for	doing	business	(including	VAT	and	cus-
tom	duty	breaks)	and	three	industrial	parks	have	been	created.	Foreign	com-
panies	registered	in	Moldova	are	entitled	to	preferential	tax	rates	linked	to	the	
34	 https://monitorul.fisc.md/editorial/pravitelstvo_napravilo_v_parlament_proekt_zakona_o_
vypuske_gosobligaciy_na_135_mlrd_leev.html
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scale	of	their	investments.	Thanks	to	those	measures,	Moldova	climbed	to	83rd	
position	in	the	Doing	Business	ranking	after	three	years	of	the	pro-European	
coalition’s	rule	(up	by	11	positions	from	where	it	was	in	June	2009).	It	also	made	it	
to	the	top	ten	in	the	Most	Improved	in	Doing	Business	ranking.	In	2016	Moldova	
improved	further,	reaching	52nd	position.	
While	those	results	would	in	theory	point	to	an	improvement	of	the	investment	
climate	in	Moldova,	the	actual	volume	of	investments	coming	to	the	country	
does	not	bear	this	out.	Moldova	reports	the	lowest	total	foreign	direct	invest-
ments	per	capita	in	the	entire	region	(around	US$	1,010	in	2015).35	For	compari-
son,	this	value	is	nearly	twice	as	high	in	Albania	and	Belarus,	nearly	four	times	
as	high	in	Romania,	and	ten	times	as	high	in	Hungary.36	Figures	suggest	that	
after	the	reforms	initiated	in	2009,	foreign	investors	did	start	to	show	more	
interest	in	Moldova,	but	the	growth	was	disproportionately	lower	than	in	the	
last	years	of	the	Communists’	rule	(see	Chart	6).
Chart 6. Moldova: net inflow of foreign direct investments (FDI) in 1992-2014 
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Source: the World Bank
Thus,	while	some	attempts	have	been	made	to	improve	things,	the	economic	
reforms	implemented	in	recent	years	in	Moldova	should	largely	be	regarded	
as	fruitless.	Issues	of	investment	regulations	and	property	rights	protection	
continue	to	be	a	problem.	As	a	result,	Moldova	has	seen	an	outflow	of	foreign	
35	 http://unctad.org/sections/dite_dir/docs/wir2016/wir16_fs_md_en.pdf
36	 https://www.bnm.md/en/content/foreign-direct-investments-regional-competitiveness-
republic-moldova-0
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investments,	with	the	investors	complaining	about	problems	with	the	fiscal	
authorities,	corruption,	the	customs	services	or	the	prosecution	authorities.	
Examples	include	the	US	Lear	Corporation,	Germany’s	Draexlmaier	and	Aus-
tralia’s	Shan	Lian	Group.	In	late	2012	and	early	2013	those	companies	abandoned	
their	plans	to	invest	in	Moldova,	citing	serious	problems	with	the	Moldovan	tax	
authorities	and	customs	services.	Moldova’s	investment	climate	also	suffers	as	
a	result	of	the	acts	of	so-called	‘reiderstvo’,	i.e.	illegal	takeovers	of	companies	
based	on	corrupt	court	decisions.	Reiderstvo	is	possible	thanks	to	loopholes	
in	Moldova’s	laws	and	corruption	among	its	judges.	Its	persistence	means	that	
Moldova	has	seen	no	significant	change	in	terms	of	property	rights	and	the	
fight	against	corruption.	It	also	demonstrates	yet	again	that	the	success	of	eco-
nomic	reforms	in	Moldova	depends	directly	on	the	effectiveness	of	reforms	in	
the	judiciary.
Moldova’s	labour	market	has	also	been	a	problem	for	the	Moldovan	economy.	
While	statistics	show	that	unemployment	is	relatively	low	in	Moldova	(around	
5%),	this	does	not	mean	that	Moldovans	face	no	problems	finding	work.	The	low	
unemployment	figure	is	due	to	two	factors.	The	first	one	is	crucial	and	concerns	
the	mass	migration	which,	on	the	one	hand,	suppresses	the	number	of	people	
looking	for	jobs	in	Moldova,	and,	on	the	other,	boosts	the	purchasing	power	of	
those	who	stay	in	Moldova	thanks	to	remittances,	thus	stimulating	growth	and	
generating	jobs	in	the	services	and	commerce	sectors	(in	which	50%	of	work-
ing	Moldovans	are	employed).	The	second	factor	concerns	the	fact	that	a	large	
part	of	the	population	of	Moldova,	i.e.	around	30%	of	people,	are	still	employed	
in	the	agricultural	sector	or	run	independent	farms.	This	is	one	of	the	highest	
figures	in	Europe	(for	comparison,	in	Romania	the	number	is	26%,	in	Ukraine	
–	20%,	and	in	Poland	–	12%).37	In	the	case	of	the	independent	farms,	their	own-
ers	are	seen	as	independent	entrepreneurs	even	if	the	farms	are	unprofitable	
or	generate	losses,	and	are	not	taken	into	account	in	unemployment	statistics.	
At	the	same	time	Moldova’s	society	is	ageing	very	rapidly,	with	the	number	of	
working	age	people	decreasing	dramatically.	In	2000	working-age	people	ac-
counted	for	nearly	50%	of	the	population	of	Moldova	but	by	2015	this	percentage	
had	dropped	to	around	35%.	This	situation	has	not	only	been	a	drag	on	Moldova’s	
development	potential	but	has	also	been	a	burden	on	the	Moldovan	pensions	
fund,	which	has	been	running	a	deficit	since	2009.	
37	 World	Bank	figures	for	2013.	
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3. Permanent energy dependence on Russia 
Since	the	beginning	of	its	independence,	Moldova	has	been	practically	en-
tirely	dependent	(97%)	on	imports	of	energy	and	energy	resources.	Russia’s	
Gazprom	has	been	the	only	provider	of	natural	gas	to	Moldova	for	the	last	25	
years	(gas	accounts	for	nearly	40%	in	Moldova’s	energy	mix).38	The	country’s	
electricity	is	80%	imported,	mainly	from	Russian	sources.	All	of	Moldova’s	
liquid	fuels	are	imported	from	a	number	of	states	(Romania,	Russia,	Belarus,	
Austria	and	others),	with	70-80%	of	petroleum	and	diesel	fuel	imports	coming	
from	Romania.	Energy	resources	and	electricity	account	for	around	a	20-25%	
or	Moldovan	imports.39	
The	successive	governments	in	Chisinau	have	not	been	able	to	ensure	energy	
security	for	Moldova,	either	in	terms	of	gas	supplies	or	in	terms	of	electricity.	
Serious	steps	to	limit	the	dependence	on	Russian	sources	were	taken	only	after	
the	Alliance	for	European	Integration	came	to	power	in	2009,	and	while	the	
successive	coalitions	have	continued	to	work	in	this	direction,	the	measures	
taken	have	been	very	ineffective	and	will	not	undermine	the	Russian	monop-
oly	in	the	coming	years.	A	prime	example	of	such	ineffective	action	concerns	
the	construction	of	the	Iaşi-Ungheni	interconnector	in	order	to	enable	imports	
of	gas	from	Romania.	While	the	interconnector	itself	was	put	into	operation	
in	August	2014	(two	years	later	than	planned),	its	current	capacity	is	merely	
symbolic	(it	carried	around	1	million	cubic	metres	of	gas	in	2015,	correspond-
ing	to	0.1%	of	the	country’s	needs).40	In	order	to	enable	supplies	of	Romanian	
gas	in	quantities	that	would	cover	Moldova’s	needs,	a	gas	pipeline	would	have	
to	be	built	 from	Ungheni	to	Chisinau	(where	most	of	the	gas	consumption	
takes	place),	and	the	compression	infrastructure	would	have	to	be	expanded	
on	the	Romanian	side	(the	pressure	in	gas	pipelines	in	Romania	is	lower	than	
in	Moldova).	An	additional	problem	concerns	the	fact	that	Russia’s	Gazprom	
still	holds	a	controlling	block	of	shares	(50%	plus	1	share)	in	MoldovaGaz,	the	
main	gas	operator	in	Moldova	and	the	owner	of	the	transmission	network.	
Gazprom	also	administers	an	additional	13.44%	stake	in	MoldovaGaz,	formally	
owned	by	Transnistria.	This	means	that	even	if	the	gas	pipeline	were	extended	
38	 https://www.energy-community.org/portal/page/portal/ENC_HOME/ENERGY_COM-
MUNITY/Overview
39	 http://www.moldovagaz.md/userfiles/file/presa-2014/presa_06-10-2014_business-
class.pdf
40	 http://www.economica.net/gaze-romania-moldova-conducta-iasi-ungheni-export-gaze-
moldova_109936.html
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to	Chisinau,	MoldovaGaz	would	probably	not	agree	to	distribute	gas	coming	
from	sources	other	than	Russia.41
Moscow	has	repeatedly	used	Moldova’s	energy	dependence	to	exert	political	
pressure	on	Chisinau.	Since	2011,	when	the	multi-year	contract	for	gas	supplies	
to	Moldova	expired,	the	country	has	been	buying	the	fuel	on	the	basis	of	short	
term	annexes	signed	each	year.	The	Russian	side	has	consistently	refused	to	
sign	a	new	long-term	agreement,	saying	it	would	do	so	if	Moldova	decided	not	
to	implement	the	EU’s	third	energy	package,	which	Chisinau	committed	itself	
to	implementing	as	it	joined	the	Energy	Community	in	May	2010.	Under	the	
provisions	of	the	package,	the	distribution,	sale	and	extraction	of	gas	should	be	
performed	by	separate	and	independent	companies.	Thus,	its	implementation	
would	have	to	entail	a	division	of	MoldovaGaz	into	two	separate	companies	or	
the	establishment	of	a	transmission	system	operator	independent	of	Gazprom,	
as	a	result	of	which	the	Russian	monopoly	would	lose	its	control	of	transit	gas	
pipelines.	The	dependence	on	Russian	gas	supplies	also	contributes	to	the	growth	
of	Transnistria’s	gas	debt,	which	currently	amounts	to	around	US$	4-5	billion.	
That	debt	was	created	as	a	result	of	deliberate	and	de facto	Russian-approved	
actions	by	the	Transnistrian	authorities,	which	for	years	have	failed	to	pay	for	
the	gas	consumed	in	the	separatist	region	but	supplied	under	the	contract	with	
Moldova.	Even	though	the	debt	is	not	formally	Moldova’s,	it	is	suspected	that	
the	protocol	signed	by	the	Moldovan	government	with	Gazprom	in	December	
2006	most	probably	includes	provisions	on	government	guarantees	covering	
MoldovaGaz’s	debt.42	If	that	is	the	case,	Russia	may	use	this	liability	at	any	con-
venient	moment,	as	it	has	reminded	Moldova	on	several	occasions.43	
The	situation	of	Moldova’s	electricity	sector	is	only	marginally	better.	In	the	
territory	it	controls,	Moldova	does	not	have	a	single	power	plant.	The	only	lo-
cal	sources	of	electricity	are	the	three	obsolete	and	ineffective	heat	and	power	
41	 For	more	information	on	the	problems	concerning	the	operation	of	the	Moldovan-Roma-
nian	interconnector,	see:	K.Całus,	The	Iasi-Ungheni	pipeline:	a	means	of	achieving	energy	
independence	from	Russia?	Moldova’s	attempts	at	gas	supply	diversification,	OSW Commen-
tary,	 https://www.osw.waw.pl/en/publikacje/osw-commentary/2013-10-11/iasi-ungheni-
pipeline-a-means-achieving-energy-independence
42	 W.	Rodkiewicz,	Moldova	 signals	 that	 it	may	withdraw	 from	 implementing	 the	 third	 energy	
package,	Analyses OSW,	11.07.2012,	http://www.osw.waw.pl/en/publikacje/analyses/	2012-07-11/
moldova-signals-it-may-withdraw-implementing-third-energy-package
43	 The	declaration	made	in	April	2012	by	Dmitry	Rogozin,	Russia’s	deputy	prime	minister	and	
special	representative	for	Transnistria,	who	said:	“Chisinau	does	not	recognise	Transnis-
tria	as	an	equal	partner,	therefore	Transnistria’s	gas	debt	is	 in	fact	Moldova’s	debt”.	See:	
http://www.rbc.ru/rbcfreenews/20120418060404.shtml
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plants	which	only	cover	around	20%	of	the	country’s	needs	(excluding	Trans-
nistria).	Because	they	are	gas-fired,	their	operation	also	depends	on	supplies	
from	Russia.	In	the	absence	of	its	own	sources	of	electricity	that	could	cover	the	
country’s	needs,	Moldova	has	to	import	electricity.	The	existing	grids	enable	
supplies	from	two	sources.	One	is	the	Moldavskaya	GRES	power	plant	located	in	
separatist	Transnistria	and	owned	by	Russian	state	energy	holding	Inter	RAO	
UES.	However,	buying	electricity	from	that	plant	is	problematic	for	Chisinau	for	
political	and	economic	reasons.	Moldavskaya	GRES,	for	whom	Moldova	is	the	
only	customer,	is	one	of	the	biggest	taxpayers	in	Transnistria.	By	buying	elec-
tricity	from	it,	Chisinau	effectively	helps	to	support	the	separatist	government	
in	Tiraspol.	Moreover,	the	power	plant	uses	natural	gas	supplied	by	a	Trans-
nistrian	intermediary,	the	Energokapital	company,	which	re-sells	the	unpaid	
gas	obtained	from	Gazprom.	As	a	result,	Moldova	contributes	to	the	growth	of	
the	Transnistrian	gas	debt	it	has	reportedly	underwritten,	and	in	practice	pays	
twice	–	for	the	electricity	purchased	from	the	Transnistrian	power	plant	and	
(in	the	form	of	mounting	debt)	for	the	gas	consumed	by	the	power	plant.	
The	other	potential	source	of	electricity	is	Ukraine,	and	specifically	the	DTEK	
Power	Trade,	a	company	owned	by	Rinat	Akhmetov.	Because	of	the	ongoing	
conflict	in	eastern	Ukraine,	in	2014	DTEK	discontinued	electricity	supplies	to	
Moldova,	making	the	country	completely	dependent	on	supplies	from	Trans-
nistria	and	contributing	to	the	development	of	a	particular	pattern	of	corruption	
between	the	governments	in	Tiraspol	and	Chisinau,	which	now	poses	a	major	
political	and	economic	problem	for	Moldova	(see	the	section	on	the	Transnis-
trian	conflict	for	more	information).	Consequently,	even	though	energy	supplies	
from	Ukraine	are	again	possible,	Moldavskaya	GRES	remains	the	sole	provider	
of	electricity	to	Moldova.	
Moldova	has	been	making	efforts	 for	many	years	 to	develop	electrical	grid	
connections	with	Romania,	which	could	end	its	dependence	on	the	politically	
uncertain	sources	 in	Transnistria	and	make	 the	market	more	competitive.	
However,	those	efforts	have	never	led	to	any	tangible	results,	and	it	seems	that	
one	of	the	key	reasons	concerns	the	fact	that	some	sections	of	the	Moldovan	
political	and	business	elite	derive	concrete	financial	benefits	from	the	corrupt	
arrangement	of	co-operation	with	the	leadership	of	Transnistria,	Moldova’s	
energy	provider.
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IV. MoLdoVAn SoCIETY
The	low	standards	of	living	in	Moldova,	which	has	been	Europe’s	poorest	state	
since	the	1990s,	are	a	key	problem.	Moldova	has	not	been	able	to	attain	the	rela-
tive	standards	of	living	it	enjoyed	at	the	time	of	the	Soviet	Union’s	break-up.	
While	its	GDP	(in	real	market	prices)	has	increased	more	than	two-fold	since	
1990	(see	Chart	1),	GDP	per capita	based	on	purchasing	power	parity	in	constant	
prices	(which	gives	an	estimation	of	the	evolution	of	real	purchasing	power	over	
the	last	25	years)	was	only	74%	of	its	1990	value	in	2014	(see	Chart	2).	
Consequently,	92%	of	Moldovans	are	dissatisfied	with	their	government’s	eco-
nomic	policy,	96%	are	unhappy	with	the	level	of	wages,	and	94%	are	dissatisfied	
with	the	labour	market	situation	and	the	level	of	pensions.44	In	2015,	the	average	
wage	in	Moldova	was	just	over	MLD	4.6	thousand	(around	EUR	200)	and	was	the	
lowest	in	Europe	(except	for	Ukraine	which,	nonetheless,	had	reported	average	
wages	nearly	twice	as	high	as	in	Moldova	before	the	outbreak	of	the	conflict	
in	the	eastern	part	of	the	country).45	The	average	pension	in	Moldova	is	just	
MLD	1,100	(around	EUR	50).46	Those	low	incomes	are	not	matched	by	equally	low	
prices	of	consumer	goods.	Even	though	Moldova	is	a	predominantly	agricultural	
country,	due	to	the	weakness	of	its	food	processing	sector	it	has	to	import	most	
of	its	processed	foods,	which	are	relatively	expensive	as	a	result.	More	than	
37%	of	Moldovans	declare	that	their	earnings	are	insufficient	to	cover	even	the	
most	basic	needs,	and	41.4%	admit	that	they	can	cover	their	basic	needs	but	not	
more.	Only	0.5%	declare	that	they	can	afford	everything	they	want	and	have	
no	need	to	restrain	their	spending.47	In	the	UNDP’s	studies	on	the	HDI	(Human	
Development	Index),	Moldova	has	scored	roughly	the	same	number	of	points	
since	the	beginning	of	its	independence	(0.652	in	1990,	0.693	in	2015),	which	in	
practice	means	that	its	standards	of	living	have	not	improved	in	any	significant	
way	during	that	period.48	As	a	result	the	country,	which	ranked	61st	in	1990	in	
terms	of	HDI,	found	itself	in	107th	position	in	2015	(alongside	countries	such	as	
Egypt,	Botswana	or	Turkmenistan).	For	comparison,	other	post-Soviet	countries	
44	 http://www.ipp.md/public/files/Barometru/BOP_04.2016_prima_parte_finale-r.pdf
45	 http://statbank.statistica.md/pxweb/pxweb/en/30%20Statistica%20sociala/30%20
Sta	tistica%20sociala__03%20FM__SAL010__serii%20lunare/SAL015000.px/table/
tableViewLayout1/?rxid=d1dbf033-34ac-49e2-9ef9-947abe5b19e2
46	 https://point.md/ru/novosti/ekonomika/v-moldove-minimaljnaya-pensiya-odna-iz-
samih-nizkih-v-evrope
47	 http://www.ipp.md/public/files/Barometru/BOP_04.2016_prima_parte_finale-r.pdf
48	 http://hdr.undp.org/sites/all/themes/hdr_theme/country-notes/MDA.pdf
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in	the	region	ranked	50th	(Belarus),	76th	(Georgia)	and	81st	(Ukraine	torn	by	the	
conflict	with	Russia).	Opinion	polls	reveal	that	the	people	in	Moldova	have	no	
hope	that	their	material	situation	will	improve.	As	many	as	69%	of	Moldovans	
declare	that	they	do	not	expect	the	economic	situation	to	improve	in	the	coming	
year,	or	indeed	they	expect	it	to	worsen.	The	people	blame	the	bad	situation	on	
the	government	(70%	believe	that	a	change	of	leadership	would	improve	things),	
or	on	the	endemic	corruption	(66%	declare	that	the	social	and	economic	situa-
tion	would	improve	if	corruption	were	eradicated).49	
The	disastrous	economic	situation	which	has	persisted	in	Moldova	since	the	
beginning	of	independence	has	engendered	a	number	of	other	social	problems,	
of	which	the	most	important	ones,	with	the	deepest	impact	on	the	functioning	
of	the	state	and	the	lives	of	its	citizens,	concern	the	demographic	crisis,	mass	
emigration,	brain	drain,	the	rise	of	human	trafficking	and	rampant	corruption.
1. The demographic crisis and mass emigration
Since	1991,	Moldova	has	been	rapidly	depopulating.	In	1993,	i.e.	after	the	end	of	
the	Moldovan-Transnistrian	war,	the	Chisinau-controlled,	right-bank	part	of	
the	country	had	a	population	of	around	3,650,000	people,	but	according	to	the	
partly	disclosed	results	of	the	2014	census	its	population	has	now	shrunk	by	as	
much	as	20%	to	around	2,900,000.50	In	tandem	with	this,	Moldova’s	fertility	rate	
has	decreased	dramatically.	While	in	1989	the	average	fertility	rate	was	2.5,	by	
2014	it	had	dropped	to	just	1.28.	In	the	year	Moldova	gained	its	independence,	
the	number	of	births	was	nearly	twice	as	high	as	the	number	of	deaths	(72,000	
to	45,000),	but	this	ratio	started	to	shift	very	rapidly	soon	afterwards.	Since	
1998,	the	number	of	deaths	per	year	has	consistently	and	significantly	exceeded	
the	number	of	births	in	every	single	year.	Consequently,	today	Moldova	is	the	
world’s	third	country	in	terms	of	the	rate	of	population	decline	(after	war-torn	
Syria	and	the	Cook	Islands).51	
The	demographic	problem	has	been	exacerbated	by	the	emigration	of	work-
ers	from	Moldova.	 It	 is	a	phenomenon	which	started	to	gain	momentum	in	
the	second	half	of	the	1990s,	stimulated	by	the	sudden	worsening	of	the	eco-
nomic	situation	in	a	small	country	without	natural	resources	or	an	industrial	
49	 http://www.ipp.md/public/files/Barometru/BOP_04.2016_prima_parte_finale-r.pdf
50	 www.statistica.md/public/files/Recensamint/Recensamint_pop_2014/Nota_informati-
va_Preliminare_Recensamint_2014.pdf
51	 http://www.worldatlas.com/articles/countries-with-the-biggest-population-decline.html
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base.	According	to	various	sources,	as	many	as	15-25%	of	Moldovans	(i.e.	up	to	
800,000	people)52	currently	work	abroad.	This	means	that	the	country’s	work-
ing	age	population	has	been	reduced	by	up	to	40%.53	One	in	three	families	in	
Moldova	admits	to	having	at	least	one	relative	who	has	had	to	emigrate	to	find	
work	because	of	the	economic	situation.	Most	Moldovans	emigrate	to	Russia	
(more	than	50%)	or	the	EU,	especially	Italy	(around	25%),	as	well	as	France,	
Portugal,	the	UK,	Greece	or	Romania	(each	of	those	countries	accounting	for	be-
tween	1%	and	3%	of	the	total	number	of	migrants).54	Some	Moldovans	go	to	work	
in	Turkey,	the	US,	Israel	or	the	United	Arab	Emirates.	Because	of	the	very	low	
wages	and	the	relatively	high	cost	of	living,	the	migrants’	remittances	are	a	cru-
cial	contribution	to	household	budgets,	without	which	many	families	would	find	
it	hard	to	support	themselves.	
Romania’s	policy,	pursued	since	1991,	of	granting	(or	restoring,	according	to	the	
Romanian	terminology)	Romanian	citizenship	to	Romanians	who	lost	it	against	
their	will,	and	their	descendants,	has	been	facilitating	economic	migration	from	
Moldova.	The	policy	is	addressed	to	the	inhabitants	of	territories	which	belonged	
to	Romania	before	1940,	i.e.	Moldova	(excluding	Transnistria)	and	northern	Bu-
kovina	and	Budjak	in	present-day	Ukraine.	From	the	point	of	view	of	the	Roma-
nian	government,	the	intention	of	this	policy	is	to	redress	the	‘historical	injustice’	
which	forcefully	stripped	the	inhabitants	of	Bessarabia	of	Romanian	citizenship	
after	the	region	was	annexed	by	the	USSR.	As	a	result	of	this	policy,	between	
1991	and	2013	the	number	of	Moldovans	holding	Romanian	passports	increased	
to	around	400,000-500,000.55	Importantly,	the	regulations	governing	the	resto-
ration	of	Romanian	citizenship	do	not	require	the	applicants	to	renounce	their	
current	citizenship	or	move	to	Romania.	The	Moldovan	holders	of	Romanian	pass-
ports	can	legally	work	in	the	entire	EU	on	the	same	footing	as	Romanian	citizens.
While	the	mass	migration	has	had	some	positive	impact	on	the	standards	of	
living	in	Moldova	in	the	short	term,	it	entails	very	negative	consequences	for	
52	 According	to	figures	of	the	Moldovan	Ministry	of	Foreign	Affairs,	in	August	2016	around	
805,000	Moldovan	citizens	were	living	abroad.	It	is	estimated	that	seasonal	migrants	ac-
count	for	around	half	of	this	number.	Source:	http://www.noi.md/md/news_id/89997
53	 Author’s	own	calculations	based	on	figures	of	the	National	Bureau	of	Statistics	of	the	Re-
public	of	Moldova	 “Structura	populaţiei	 stabile	a	Republicii	Moldova	pe	 sexe	 şi	vîrste	 la	
1	ianuarie	2016”,	http://www.statistica.md/newsview.php?l=ro&idc=168&id=5210
54	 http://www.iom.md/attachments/110_faqiomeng2014.pdf
55	 The	number	comes	from	research	conducted	in	2013	by	the	Soros	Foundation,	http://www.
fundatia.ro/o-politic%C4%83-ce-cap%C4%83t%C4%83-viziune-redob%C3%A2ndirea-
cet%C4%83%C8%9Beniei-rom%C3%A2ne-0
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both	Moldovan	society	and	the	economy	over	the	longer	term.	It	has	created	
a	growing	number	of	so-called	emigration	orphans,	i.e.	children	in	the	care	of	
more	distant	relatives,	whose	parents	have	had	to	find	employment	abroad,	has	
undermined	family	ties	and	led	to	the	breakup	of	families,	and	has	reduced	the	
number	of	workers	available	in	the	local	labour	market,	depriving	Moldova	of	
one	of	the	foundations	of	economic	development.	Its	negative	consequences	also	
include	brain	drain	as	a	result	of	the	emigration	of	the	best-educated	and	most	
experienced	specialists.	
Impact of mass emigration on the situation of families in Moldova
The number of emigration orphans and half-orphans in Moldova is esti-
mated at 140,000 (around 25% of all children in the country). While UNICEF 
research suggests that children whose parent or parents work abroad have 
better access to quality healthcare and education, at the same time such 
children are much more prone to experience behavioural issues related 
to socialisation and internalisation of social norms. This is visible, for in-
stance, in police statistics showing that one in four juvenile delinquents 
comes from a family in which at least one parent is working abroad. 
Job-related emigration also often leads to divorce, with further adverse im-
pacts on the situation of the children. According to figures of the National 
Bureau of Statistics, since the early 2000s, every second marriage in Moldova 
has broken up. If a mother working abroad divorces her husband, custody of 
the children is often awarded to the father, thus forcing him to emigrate for 
work to support the family. As a result, children are put in the care of more 
distant relatives. Meanwhile, it is known that children raised by relatives 
other than parents or by single parents are more likely to become victims of 
human trafficking than children from two-parent families.
The	mass	migration,	combined	with	the	deepening	demographic	crisis,	has	had	
a	very	negative	impact	on	the	economy	of	Moldova.	The	human	resources	into	
which	the	local	labour	market	can	tap	have	been	shrinking	rapidly.	In	the	years	
2003-2013,	the	proportion	of	working-age	people	in	the	population	of	Moldova	de-
creased	from	45%	to	33%.56	As	a	consequence,	private	employers,	the	public	sector	
and	the	state	administration	started	experiencing	mounting	problems	with	the	
recruitment	of	young	people.	The	situation	is	expected	to	worsen	further	in	the	
56	 Unless	indicated	otherwise,	all	demographic	figures	are	taken	from	the	National	Bureau	of	
Statistics	of	the	Republic	of	Moldova.
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coming	years	according	to	forecasts.	That,	in	turn,	will	adversely	affect	Moldova’s	
economic	development	indices,	hold	back	foreign	investment	(which	largely	re-
lies	on	Moldova’s	cheap	qualified	labour)	and	may	paralyse	the	state	apparatus	
which	will	not	be	able	to	function	effectively	without	an	influx	of	new	people.	
Another	problem	concerns	the	growing	burden	on	Moldova’s	pensions	system.	
In	2015	Moldova	had	1.8	working	persons	for	every	pensioner,	but,	according	to	
an	IMF	estimate,	over	the	next	15	years	the	proportion	of	working	age	people	in	
the	population	will	decrease	by	1%	every	year.57	At	the	same	time	the	proportion	
of	people	over	60	will	increase	from	15%	currently	to	more	than	30%	in	2050.	The	
changes	will	pose	a	very	serious	challenge	to	the	state	budget,	which	even	today	
is	incapable	of	providing	adequate	pensions	to	Moldova’s	retirees.	As	mentioned	
previously,	in	2015	the	average	pension	in	Moldova	was	a	mere	US$	50	USD	(the	
retirement	age	in	Moldova	is	57	years	for	women	and	62	years	for	men).
2. Brain drain 
The	emigration	of	workers	is	accompanied	by	a	brain	drain,	a	very	unfavourable	
phenomenon	from	the	point	of	view	of	the	economy	and	the	state	apparatus.	The	
problem	concerns	two	categories	of	people:	highly	qualified	specialists	(doctors,	
engineers,	IT	specialists,	etc.)	and	university	students.	The	mass	emigration	of	
specialists	has	stymied	Moldova’s	potential	to	develop	high-technology	sectors	
and,	what	is	even	worse,	has	had	a	highly	detrimental	impact	on	the	opera-
tion	of	some	public	sectors,	especially	healthcare.	According	to	Mihail	Ciocanu,	
Moldova’s	minister	for	health,	around	40%	of	the	country’s	doctors	have	given	
up	their	jobs	since	Moldova	gained	independence,	and	most	of	them	have	gone	
abroad.	Because	of	this	outflow	of	specialists,	combined	with	the	persistently	
insufficient	financing	of	healthcare	and	the	shortages	of	modern	equipment	
and	medicines,	Moldova	today	is	struggling	with	problems	such	as	growing	
mortality	rates,	growing	incidence	of	tuberculosis	and	relatively	high	maternal	
mortality	rates.	Research	by	the	Moldovan	Academy	of	Sciences	shows	that	the	
mortality	rate	of	Moldova	in	2014	was	44%	higher	than	in	1990	for	men,	and	
30%	higher	for	women.	The	incidence	of	tuberculosis	has	increased	two-fold	
since	1990	to	182	cases	per	100,000	inhabitants	(for	comparison,	TB	incidence	
in	Ukraine	is	below	100	cases	per	100,000	inhabitants,	and	in	Poland	it	is	a	mere	
20	cases	per	100,000	inhabitants).	Maternal	mortality	in	Moldova	is	44.5	cases	
per	100,000	childbirths	and	is	more	than	twice	as	high	as	the	average	in	the	
CIS,	and	more	than	seven	times	as	high	as	in	the	EU.
57	 http://omg.md/index.php?newsid=12186
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University	students	are	the	second	category	of	emigrants.	Currently	around	
20%	of	them	study	abroad.	A	decisive	majority	of	that	group	(around	90%)	study	
at	universities	in	Romania,	which	is	due,	on	the	one	hand,	to	the	cultural	and	
linguistic	proximity	of	the	two	nations,	and,	on	the	other,	to	the	extensive	schol-
arship	programmes	offered	by	Bucharest	to	young	Moldovans.	While	there	are	
no	credible	statistics,	it	is	safe	to	assume	that	most	of	those	who	study	abroad	
will	decide	to	stay	abroad	or	emigrate	further,	given	the	prospect	of	low	wages	
and	low	living	standards	in	Moldova.	
The	Moldovan	authorities	have	been	totally	unable	to	limit	emigration.	While	
some	measures	have	been	taken	to	bring	the	emigrants	back	to	Moldova	or	at	
least	preserve	their	ties	to	the	homeland,	in	the	absence	of	economic	incen-
tives	the	efficacy	of	those	actions	has	been	and	will	remain	very	low.	The	gov-
ernment	has	offered	young,	Western-educated	Moldovans	jobs	in	the	adminis-
tration,	albeit	with	standard	salaries	of	around	MLD	2000	(US$	100-150),	plus	
a	monthly	motivation	allowance	of	EUR	100,	paid	for	a	period	of	six	months.	
Meanwhile,	an	average	Moldovan	emigre	working	in	the	West	can	expect	to	
earn	around	EUR	1000	a	month.	The	weakness	of	the	national	sense	of	iden-
tity	and	the	loose	attachment	to	the	Moldovan	state	are	also	hardly	helpful	
in	encouraging	the	emigres	to	come	back.	On	top	of	that,	it	seems	that	from	
the	point	of	view	of	the	Moldovan	leadership,	emigration	is	a	good	thing	as	it	
helps	vent	the	social	frustration	caused	by	the	poor	economic	situation,	keeps	
unemployment	down	and	provides	extra	income	to	families	in	Moldova,	thus	
boosting	domestic	consumption.	Also,	while	the	fact	that	it	is	predominantly	
the	young	and	active	who	decide	to	emigrate	which	has	an	extremely	adverse	
social	impact,	at	the	same	time	it	lowers	the	risk	of	a	major	anti-government	
protest	or	upheaval.	
Since	the	1990s,	the	Moldovan	authorities	have	also	been	unable	to	tap	into	the	
economic	potential	of	the	emigres	which,	if	properly	managed,	could	boost	the	
country’s	economic	development.	Remittances	amount	to	US$	1.3	billion	a	year	
on	average	(these	are	official	figures	for	the	last	5	years,	according	to	unofficial	
estimates	the	figure	may	be	twice	as	high),	i.e.	account	for	more	than	20%	of	
Moldova’s	GDP,	but	they	are	used	almost	entirely	to	finance	current	consump-
tion	rather	than	investment.	As	a	result,	while	remittances	do	stimulate	domes-
tic	consumption	and	help	improve	the	standards	of	living,	they	do	not	create	
the	foundations	for	Moldova’s	stable	economic	development.	
Meanwhile,	there	is	a	large	group	of	Moldovan	long-term	emigres,	especially	
in	the	EU,	who	have	founded	successful	companies	in	recent	years	and	have	
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gained	business	knowledge	and	experience	which	they	could	put	to	good	use	in	
their	homeland,	if	only	adequate	incentives	and	legal-administrative	conditions	
were	found	there.	In	this	way	they	could	contribute	to	the	country’s	economic	
development	and	create	jobs,	while	also	introducing	Western	standards	of	doing	
business	to	Moldova.	That	prospect	seems	even	more	interesting	if	one	takes	
into	account	the	fact	that,	according	to	2013	figures,	emigrants	save	as	much	as	
37%	of	their	earnings	outside	Moldova	(usually	in	the	countries	where	they	live	
and	work).	The	total	value	of	those	savings	is	currently	estimated	at	EUR	6	bil-
lion	or	more.58	If	these	emigrants	could	be	effectively	encouraged	to	invest	in	the	
Moldovan	economy,	they	would	provide	a	very	significant	stimulus,	boosting	
its	development.	
The	Moldovan	government	has	taken	some	measures	in	recent	years	to	en-
courage	Moldovan	economic	migrants	to	invest	in	their	home	country.	The	
flagship	 initiative	was	 the	PARE	 1+1	 programme	 launched	 in	 2010,	 under	
which	the	state	budget	offered	to	support	migrants’	investments	in	Moldo-
va	with	payments	equal	to	the	value	of	the	original	 investment.	However,	
the	programme	imposed	some	major	restrictions	and	a	ceiling	on	the	value	
of	the	subsidy,	which	could	not	be	higher	than	MLD	200,000	(around	US$	
10,000).	The	programme	has	already	been	extended	twice	(most	recently	to	
2018),	but	its	effects	have	been	negligible.	During	the	five	years	of	its	opera-
tion,	581	contracts	for	business	subsidies	have	been	signed,	which	is	a	paltry	
amount,	considering	the	fact	that	Moldovan	emigrants	have	started	nearly	
4,000	companies	in	Italy	alone	between	2010	and	2013	(according	to	figures	of	
the	Italian	immigration	services),	and	did	so	without	any	additional	support	
from	the	state.	Since	its	launch,	the	programme	managed	to	attract	around	
US$	10	million	of	investments	to	Moldova	(around	US$	2	million	a	year),	which	
is	clearly	an	underwhelming	result.59
It	seems	that	liberalising	and	depoliticising	the	economy,	making	it	more	com-
petitive,	radically	cracking	down	on	corruption	(especially	in	the	tax	and	in-
spection	bodies)	and	radically	reforming	the	judiciary	would	be	much	more	
effective	as	a	way	to	encourage	Moldovan	migrants	(as	well	as	other	foreign	
investors)	to	invest	in	Moldova.	Without	such	measures	the	prospects	of	en-
couraging	Moldovans	living	abroad	to	invest	in	their	home	country	look	dim.
58	 http://www.ipn.md/ru/arhiva/64135
59	 https://point.md/ru/novosti/obschestvo/praviteljstvo-prodlilo-programmu-pare-quot-
11quot
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3. Human trafficking
Human	trafficking	is	a	phenomenon	directly	related	to	mass	migration	and	with	
similar	underlying	causes	(the	low	standards	of	living).	In	the	case	of	Moldova,	it	
has	escalated	to	become	one	of	the	most	serious	social	problems.	Its	scale	is	best	
illustrated	by	the	fact	that	in	the	years	2001-2012	La	Strada,	the	most	impor-
tant	non-governmental	organisation	dealing	with	human	trafficking,	received	
nearly	6000	reports	from	trafficking	victims	or	people	believing	that	their	rela-
tives	may	have	been	trafficked.60	For	many	years,	the	victims	used	to	be	mostly	
young	women	under	25,	coming	from	small	towns	and	villages.	They	would	be	
sold	to	Turkey,	the	United	Arab	Emirates	or	the	Republic	of	Northern	Cyprus,	and	
forced	into	prostitution.	Over	the	last	two	years,	following	the	abolition	of	the	visa	
obligation	for	Moldovan	nationals	entering	the	Schengen	area,	new	destinations	
started	gaining	prominence,	including	the	Czech	Republic,	France,	Germany	and	
Greece.	The	proportion	of	children	in	the	total	number	of	trafficking	victims	has	
also	grown	recently,	rising	from	10%	in	the	years	1999-2004	to	20%	in	the	years	
2005-2009.	As	many	as	80%	of	trafficked	children	end	up	forced	into	prostitu-
tion,	15%	do	physical	work,	and	5%	are	forced	to	beg.	The	phenomenon	of	workers’	
emigration	is	conducive	to	the	trafficking	of	children	because	children	in	the	care	
of	relatives	other	than	parents	or	raised	by	single	parents	are	much	more	likely	to	
be	affected.	People	exploited	for	slave	physical	labour	also	account	for	a	growing	
proportion	of	all	trafficking	victims	(44%	of	all	victims	currently,	compared	to	
29%	in	2011).61	Most	of	them	are	men	who	end	up	doing	forced	labour	in	agricul-
ture	and	the	construction	sector,	mainly	in	the	Russian	Federation.	
During	the	first	decade	of	independence,	the	government	of	Moldova	took	hard-
ly	any	action	to	combat	human	trafficking.	When	some	institutional	measures	
were	finally	taken	to	address	the	issue,	it	turned	out	that	some	of	the	police	
structures,	parts	of	the	administration	of	justice	and	sections	of	the	political	elite	
had	been	directly	implicated	in	human	trafficking,	and	had	derived	financial	
gains	from	it.62	Thus,	political	pressure	had	effectively	hindered	the	operation	of	
the	institutions	established	to	combat	modern	slavery.	While	the	situation	has	
60	 V.	Ganta,	Carim	East,	Human	trafficking	 in	Moldova,	CARIM	East,	2013,	http://www.ca-
rim-east.eu/media/exno/Explanatory%20Notes_2013-56.pdf
61	 Report	 concerning	 the	 implementation	 of	 the	 Council	 of	 Europe	 Convention	 on	 Action	
against	 Trafficking	 in	 Human	 Beings	 by	 the	 Republic	 of	 Moldova,	 https://rm.	coe.	int/	
CoERMPublicCommonSearchServices/DisplayDCTMContent?documentId=09000	016-
80	665339
62	 According	to	some	sources,	Vladimir	Plahotniuc	was	actively	involved	in	human	trafficking	
as	far	back	as	the	1990s.	See:	http://moldnews.md/rus/news/78571	and	http://www.jurnal.
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improved	to	some	extent	(especially	since	2009),	it	is	still	far	from	satisfactory.	
State	officials,	judges	or	public	functionaries	accused	of	involvement	in	human	
trafficking	schemes	still	seldom	face	trials	and	if	they	do,	they	often	get	acquit-
ted	or	get	lenient	suspended	sentences.	
The	ineffective	operation	of	the	public	system	of	assistance	to	victims	of	human	
trafficking	also	remains	a	problem,	partly	because	of	the	sluggishness	of	the	
Moldovan	authorities	and	bureaucratic	apparatus,	and	partly	because	of	the	
chronic	underfinancing.	There	are	seven	public	institutions	providing	assis-
tance	to	victims	in	Moldova,	which	together	can	offer	only	around	150	places.	
Given	the	scale	of	the	problem,	that	number	cannot	cover	the	existing	needs	
even	partly.	Moreover,	the	institutions	are	underfinanced,	which	considerably	
lowers	the	efficacy	of	their	interventions.	The	pan-European	hotline	to	report	
unaccounted	for	missing	children	has	yet	to	be	put	into	operation	in	Moldova.	
Because	of	the	lethargy	of	the	Moldovan	state	institutions,	the	government	has	
delegated	some	of	the	tasks	concerning	assistance	to	human	trafficking	victims	
to	non-governmental	organisations	but	they,	too,	have	been	facing	problems.	
For	example,	in	2015	La	Strada	complained	about	long	delays	in	the	disburse-
ment	of	state-budget	funds	with	which	it	finances	its	activities.	
4. Endemic corruption
Corruption	is	also	a	key	problem	for	Moldova.	Its	main	underlying	cause,	apart	
from	the	continuous	tradition	of	corruption	dating	back	to	the	times	of	the	Rus-
sian	Empire	and	perfected	in	Soviet	times,	concerns	the	low	standards	of	liv-
ing.	Corruption	is	endemic	in	Moldova,	affecting	all	spheres	of	life	and	all	so-
cial	groups.	It	is	rife	in	healthcare,	education	(where	buying	grades	is	a	common	
practice)	and	in	the	highest	echelons	of	the	administration,	of	which	the	banking	
scandal	is	a	prime	example.	Both	the	poverty-affected	general	population	and	the	
political	elites	detached	from	the	state	and	uncertain	about	its	existence	in	the	
longer	term,	are	extremely	susceptible	to	becoming	mired	in	corruption	schemes.	
Moldova	ranked	103rd	(out	of	168	states)	in	the	Transparency	International	cor-
ruption	perceptions	index	in	2015.	In	2016,	55%	of	the	country’s	inhabitants	
pointed	to	corruption	as	one	of	the	country’s	three	most	urgent	problems	(after	
low	living	standards	and	the	economic	situation).63	In	1012,	37%	of	Moldovans	
md/ru/politic/2016/2/3/spektakl-kuklovoda-ili-podcinenie-politiceskoj-elity-moldovy-
byvsemu-suteneru-i-rabotorgovcu/
63	 http://www.ipp.md/public/files/Barometru/BOP_04.2016_prima_parte_finale-r.pdf
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declared	that	they	had	experienced	corruption	personally.	It	is	estimated	that	
each	year,	Moldovans	spend	around	MLD	730	million	on	bribes,	which	corre-
sponds	to	around	US$	20	per	person.64	In	2016,	93%	of	Moldovans	declared	that	
they	were	not	satisfied	with	the	government’s	anti-corruption	measures.	Those	
results	are	hardly	surprising.	The	actions	which	the	successive	governments	
pledged	to	take	over	the	last	25	years,	purportedly	to	eradicate	corruption,	have	
not	produced	any	noticeable	results.	The	main	obstacles	have	been	the	lack	of	
political	will	on	the	one	hand,	and	the	politicisation	of	state	institutions	on	the	
other.	As	a	result,	the	organisations	formally	established	to	fight	corruption	
have	been	and	continue	to	be	used	in	political	games,	to	undermine	political	
rivals,	etc.	The	Moldovan	leadership	is	well	aware	that	by	genuinely	curbing	
corruption	it	would	lose	some	of	its	influence	on	the	state	apparatus	(includ-
ing	the	administration	of	justice),	and	that	would	be	extremely	dangerous	for	
those	in	power.	
Meanwhile	the	general	public	holds	an	unequivocally	negative	view	of	corrup-
tion,	but	at	the	same	time	treats	the	phenomenon	as	‘part	of	life’.	This	is	the	
reason	why	in	around	50%	of	cases	the	proposal	to	take	a	bribe	comes	from	the	
one	who	will	pay	it.	This	is	probably	also	why	people	usually	do	not	report	cor-
ruption	to	the	authorities.	In	2012	the	National	Anti-corruption	Centre	received	
only	197	calls	from	people	wishing	to	report	a	case	of	corruption.	At	the	social	
level,	the	phenomenon	is	driven	mainly	by	the	low	level	of	incomes,	for	which	
people	try	to	compensate	with	proceeds	from	corruption.	Another	factor	driving	
corruption	concerns	the	limited	access	to	social	services	(including	healthcare),	
which	forces	people	to	pay	bribes.	Consequently,	bribes	are	paid	most	frequently	
in	connection	with	public	healthcare	services	(27%),	followed	by	education	(23%)	
and,	as	mentioned	before,	the	administration	of	justice	(21%).65
5. Prospects
The	independent	Moldovan	state	has	demonstrated	its	inability	to	solve,	or	at	
least	mitigate,	its	most	urgent	social	problems.	It	has	been	unable	to	improve	
the	economic	situation	and	the	people’s	standards	of	living,	or	even	mitigate	the	
scale	of	the	problems	resulting	from	economic	difficulties,	some	of	which	have	
been	discussed	above.	There	is	nothing	to	suggest	that	the	economic	conditions	
in	Moldova	could	improve	significantly,	and	that	the	negative	phenomena	could	
64	 http://www.kp.ru/daily/26030/2947829/
65	 Ibidem.
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abate	as	a	result.	Consequently,	in	the	coming	decades	Moldova’s	demographic	
crisis	is	likely	to	worsen	dramatically.	According	to	available	research,	the	coun-
try’s	population	will	decline	to	around	2.5	million	by	2050	(excluding	seasonal	
migrants).66	The	brain	drain	observed	currently	will	continue	and	its	impact	
upon	society	will	become	increasingly	severe	as	the	country’s	remaining	special-
ists	(i.e.	mostly	people	educated	back	in	Soviet	times,	who	have	been	much	less	
likely	to	emigrate	than	young	educated	Moldovans)	will	start	to	retire.	
66	 https://point.md/ru/novosti/obschestvo/k-2050-godu-moldova-poteryaet-million-zhitelej
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V. FoREIGn PoLICY
Moldova’s	foreign	policy	during	the	first	two	decades	of	independence	was	char-
acterised	by	constant	instability	and	absence	of	a	distinct	long-term	vision.	Chis-
inau’s	international	activities	were	determined,	on	the	one	hand,	by	the	need	to	
find	a	balance	between	Russia	and	the	West,	which	involved	periodically	inten-
sifying	or	loosening	ties	with	one	or	the	other	side	according	to	needs,	and	on	the	
other	hand,	by	internal	factors,	notably	the	desire	of	those	in	power	at	any	given	
moment	to	win	the	support	of	a	particular	section	of	the	electorate	(the	supporters	
of	a	particular	foreign	policy	orientation).	Because	of	these	determining	factors,	
Moldova’s	foreign	policy	before	2009	was	extremely	dynamic	and	unpredictable.	
1. Two decades of geopolitical drift
During	the	first	years	of	independence,	the	Moldovan	elites	still	believed	that	
a	rapid	reunification	with	Romania	was	possible.	Consequently,	Chisinau	was	
not	actively	involved	in	international	co-operation	(especially	with	Russia)	and	
firmly	refused	to	participate	in	the	integration	projects	emerging	in	the	post-
Soviet	space	(such	as	the	Commonwealth	of	Independent	States).	When	in	1994	it	
became	clear	that	the	reunification	project	was	unrealistic,	the	Moldovan	elite	
had	to	define	some	fixed	foreign	policy	objectives	and	choose	its	foreign	policy	
orientation,	a	task	which	proved	too	big.	In	the	absence	of	a	clearly	defined	policy	
vision,	foreign	policy	slogans	started	to	be	used	for	short-term	political	ends.	In	
2001	the	Party	of	Communists	of	the	Republic	of	Moldova	won	full	power	in	the	
country	thanks	to	its	unequivocally	pro-Russian	rhetoric	(which	also	included	
calls	for	Moldova	to	join	the	Union	State	of	Belarus	and	Russia)	which	appealed	
to	the	Russian-speaking	minorities	and	those	voters	feeling	nostalgia	for	the	So-
viet	Union	and	disappointed	with	a	decade	of	stagnation.	The	same	party	then	
made	a	pro-Western	turn	in	the	years	2003-2004,	after	Moldova’s	relations	with	
Russia	deteriorated	suddenly	in	the	aftermath	of	Chisinau’s	rejection	of	the	Rus-
sian	proposal	to	resolve	the	Transnistrian	conflict	along	the	lines	laid	down	in	
the	so-called	Kozak	Memorandum.67	In	the	following	years,	the	Party	of	Com-
munists	strove	to	simultaneously	build	better	relations	with	Russia	and	develop	
ties	with	the	European	Union.	However,	in	both	cases	it	was	clear	that	Chisinau	
was	unwilling	to	fully	commit	to	genuine	co-operation	that	would	go	beyond	dec-
larations.	The	traditional	electorate	of	the	Communists	welcomed	the	mainte-
nance	of	good	relations	with	Russia.	At	the	same	time,	many	voters	believed	that	
67	 See	the	section	on	the	Transnistrian	conflict	for	more	information	on	the	Kozak	Memo-
randum.
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rapprochement	with	the	European	Union	offered	Moldova	a	chance	to	improve	
the	people’s	standards	of	living	(with	higher	wages	or	the	possibility	to	work	in	
the	EU),	curb	the	rampant	corruption	and	generally	improve	the	functioning	of	
the	state.	Those	expectations	were	largely	a	product	of	an	idealised	image	of	the	
EU	created	by	sections	of	the	political	elite	and	by	the	300,000	or	so	Moldovan	
economic	migrants	working	on	a	permanent	basis	in	the	EU,	who	shared	their	
point	of	view	with	relatives	and	friends	at	home.	Nonetheless,	the	result	was	that	
in	2007	up	to	three-quarters	of	Moldovans	supported	European	integration.	
2. The pro-European course: frustrated hopes
In	2009	a	coalition	of	four	parities	unequivocally	supporting	integration	with	the	
EU	came	to	power	in	Moldova.	The	parties	were	driven	to	victory	by	the	massive	
popularity	of	the	European	idea	(supported	by	65%	of	Moldovans	in	2009),	as	well	
as	the	voters’	fatigue	with	the	eight-year	rule	of	the	Communists,	who,	despite	
their	pro-European	rhetoric,	had	lost	the	trust	of	many	voters	who	wanted	real	
change	in	the	country	and	expected	the	leadership	to	define	a	stable	direction	for	
Moldova.	The	massive	social	support	for	rapprochement	with	the	EU	and	the	com-
mitted,	pro-Western,	new	governing	majority	offered	some	hope	that	Moldova’s	
foreign	policy	could	become	stabilised	and	genuinely	anchored	in	the	idea	of	Eu-
ropean	integration,	instead	of	that	idea	being	a	mere	pretence	used	for	internal	
political	objectives.	On	8	August	the	leaders	of	the	victorious	parties	signed	a	dec-
laration	establishing	a	majority	coalition	named	Alliance	for	European	Integra-
tion	(AIE).	The	document	stated	that	Moldova’s	integration	with	Europe,	and	first	
of	all	signature	of	the	Association	Agreement,	were	the	new	government’s	foreign	
policy	priorities.	As	soon	as	the	1st	of	December,	the	coalition	adopted	a	new,	four-
year	action	plan	for	the	government,	entitled	“European	Integration:	Freedom,	
Democracy,	Prosperity	2009-2013”.	Its	introduction	and	successive	chapters	in-
cluded	even	more	unequivocal	and	broader	provisions	than	the	coalition’s	dec-
laration,	stating	that	Moldova’s	integration	with	Europe	was	the	“fundamental	
guiding	objective	of	the	country’s	internal	and	external	policy”.	The	document	
pointed	at	the	European	integration	as	the	most	effective	way	to	modernise	the	
Moldovan	state	politically,	economically	and	socially.	It	also	indirectly	declared	
a	wish	to	join	the	Community	in	the	foreseeable	future.	
There	were	a	couple	of	reasons	why	the	new	Moldovan	leadership	adopted	Euro-
pean	integration	as	its	ideological	foundation.68	The	first	important	motivation,	
68	 More	details	concerning	the	reasons	why	the	successive	Moldovan	governments	decided	
to	promote	European	integration	as	its	ideological	foundation	in	the	chapter	dedicated	to	
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concerned	the	fact	that	backing	European	integration	was	a	traditional	way	
to	win	the	favours	of	the	pro-European	electorate,	which	comprised	a	sizeable	
portion	of	the	Moldovan	society	at	that	time.	Also,	the	group	which	came	to	
power	in	2009	saw	European	integration	as	a	way	to	end	the	economic	stagna-
tion	which	Moldova	had	been	experiencing	for	the	last	couple	of	years.	Another	
important	reason	why	the	coalition	made	European	integration	the	main	objec-
tive	of	its	policy	concerned	the	need	to	curb	Russia’s	political,	cultural	and	eco-
nomic	influence	on	Moldova.	The	last	reason	for	the	pro-European	turn	in	2009	
concerned	the	hope	that	integration	with	the	EU	would	help	Moldova	resolve	
the	problem	of	Transnistrian	separatism.	In	the	first	years	of	the	coalition’s	
rule	in	particular,	a	lot	of	effort	was	invested	in	promoting	the	view	that	an	
increasingly	prosperous	Moldova	modernising	according	to	European	models	
would,	in	the	foreseeable	future,	become	attractive	to	the	people	in	Transnistria	
(and	in	a	certain	way	also	to	the	Transnistrian	elites),	who	would	then	become	
interested	in	building	closer	economic	and	political	ties	with	Chisinau	and,	ul-
timately,	also	opt	for	formal	reunification.	That	idea,	however,	gradually	lost	its	
appeal	as	Moldova	remained	relatively	poorer	than	Transnistria,	which	was	
getting	economic	support	from	Russia,	and	hardly	appeared	like	an	attractive	
development	model.	In	the	end,	the	hopes	that	such	a	scenario	could	material-
ise	were	abandoned	altogether	as	Tiraspol	became	increasingly	interested	in	
integration	with	the	Russian-promoted	projects	of	the	Customs	Union	and	the	
Eurasian	Economic	Union.	
Ironically,	after	the	change	of	government	in	Chisinau	the	popularity	of	the	
European	idea	started	eroding.	After	six	years	of	the	pro-European	alliance’s	
rule,	in	April	2015,	support	for	European	integration	reached	a	historic	low	of	
32%.	That	was	due	to	four	basic	reasons:	firstly,	the	fact	that	the	nominally	pro-
European	elites	had	become	compromised	and	the	people	were	increasingly	
aware	of	how	corrupt	they	were;	secondly,	the	emergence	of	an	alternative	in-
tegration	project,	i.e.	the	Customs	Union;	thirdly,	the	intensive	media	offensive	
against	European	integration,	conducted	by	Russia	and	Moldova’s	pro-Russian	
groupings;	and	finally,	the	implementation	of	legal	changes	perceived	as	con-
troversial	by	the	conservative	Moldovan	society.	
The	key	reason	why	the	popularity	of	European	integration	waned	concerned	
the	Moldovans’	growing	disappointment	with	the	coalition	which	had	been	in	
EU-Moldovan	relations	by	K.Całus,	M.Kosienkowski	in	P.	Flenley,	M.	Mannin	(ed.),	The	Eu-
ropean	Union	and	its	Eastern	neighbourhood.	Europeanisation	and	its	21st	century	contra-
dictions,	Manchester	University	Press,	2016	(book	in	preparation).
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power	since	2009,	and	which,	despite	its	pro-European	and	pro-reform	rhetoric,	
had	not	been	able	to	structurally	rebuild	the	Moldovan	state,	still	largely	based	
on	Soviet	models,	eradicate	the	endemic	corruption	affecting	all	spheres	of	life,	
or	achieve	a	tangible	improvement	in	the	economic	situation.	The	Moldovans	
not	only	saw	how	ineffective	the	government	was	in	implementing	reforms	but	
also	increasingly	realised	the	scale	of	corruption	within	the	nominally	pro-
European	elite	in	the	aftermath	of	the	ever	more	frequent	corruption	scandals	
and	opaque	takeovers	of	state	assets	by	leaders	of	the	ruling	parties.	Over	time	
it	became	evident	that	the	ruling	parties	were	interested	primarily	in	protect-
ing	the	political	and	business	interests	of	their	leaders	and	their	inner	circles,	
rather	than	aiming	at	genuine	transformation.	
The	financial	scandal	in	late	2014,	as	a	result	of	which	around	US$	1	billion	disap-
peared	from	the	Moldovan	banking	system,	delivered	a	particularly	heavy	blow	
to	the	image	of	Moldova’s	pro-European	elites.	As	people	ceased	to	trust	the	pro-
European	government	and	its	approval	ratings	declined,	the	image	of	European	
integration	as	such	also	suffered.	Its	perceptions	were	also	adversely	affected	
by	the	stance	of	Brussels	and	by	many	politicians	from	EU	member	states,	who	
continued	to	officially	back	the	Moldovan	government,	meet	with	its	repre-
sentatives	and	emphasise	that	Moldova	was	on	the	right	path	of	reforms	and	
development,	all	despite	the	Moldovans’	eroding	trust	in	their	leadership	and	
the	fact	that	the	country’s	elites	were	increasingly	seen	as	discredited.	Many	
representatives	of	the	traditionally	pro-European	electorate	were	disappointed	
with	this	stance	of	the	EU.	Some	journalists	and	analysts,	as	well	as	members	
of	the	general	public,	started	to	accuse	the	European	Union	of	failing	to	voice	
justified	criticism	of	the	Moldovan	government’s	policy	and	in	this	way	contrib-
uting	to	the	slow	pace	of	reforms	and	encouraging	corruption.	An	additional	
problem	concerned	the	fact	that	a	decisive	majority	of	people	in	Moldova	did	
not	see	the	effects	of	the	financial	assistance	coming	from	the	EU,	while	at	the	
same	time	being	regularly	exposed	to	reports	about	the	unprecedented	scale	
of	EU	support.	Moldova	received	around	EUR	550	million	in	EU	assistance	in	
the	years	2010-2013	alone,	which	was	the	highest	per	capita	rate	in	the	entire	
Eastern	Partnership	and	one	of	the	highest	in	general.69	As	a	result,	it	became	
a	widespread	belief	in	Moldova	that	the	ruling	elites	were	appropriating	most	
of	the	EU	funds	coming	to	Moldova,	and	that	Brussels	was	not	reacting	to	it	(or	
even	that	it	was	approving	of	the	practice).	
69	 http://www.cepolicy.org/publications/2nd-moldova-reality-check-success-story-storm
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The	second	reason	why	support	for	European	integration	declined	in	2010	con-
cerned	the	emergence	of	an	alternative,	 i.e.	 the	Russian-promoted	Customs	
Union.	The	idea	to	join	the	organisation,	formally	established	in	January	2010,	
appealed	to	the	pro-Russian	electorate	and	voters	who	felt	nostalgic	about	the	
USSR.	The	popularity	of	the	Customs	Union	was	further	boosted	by	the	fact	
that	both	the	pro-Russian	political	parties	in	Moldova70	and	Russia	started	to	
intensively	promote	the	idea	of	integration	with	the	organisation.	The	campaign	
in	favour	of	integration	with	the	Customs	Union	pointed	mainly	to	measurable	
and	immediate	economic	benefits,	such	as	the	right	of	Moldovan	migrants	to	
work	in	Russia,	the	supply	of	cheap	gas	from	Russia,	guaranteed	access	to	the	
Russian	market	for	Moldovan	exports,	etc.	Moreover,	the	Customs	Union	was	
depicted	as	an	organisation	based	on	the	European	model	of	integration	but	at	
the	same	time,	in	contrast	to	the	European	Union,	closer	to	Moldova	cultur-
ally	and	religiously,	more	modern	and	less	susceptible	to	economic	shocks.	In	
consequence,	the	very	fact	that	the	Customs	Union	had	been	established	and	
the	intensive	promotion	it	received	led	to	a	noticeable	decline	in	the	popularity	
of	European	integration	within	just	over	a	year:	from	62%	in	2010	to	just	47%	
a	year	later.71	In	the	following	years,	the	image	of	the	European	Union	as	ephem-
eral	and	committed	to	abstract	principles	increasingly	took	hold	in	Moldova,	
while	the	Customs	Union	came	to	be	seen	as	offering	practical	and	immediate	
economic	benefits.	
The	third	reason	for	the	decline	in	the	popularity	of	the	idea	of	European	integra-
tion	(directly	linked	to	the	second	reason)	was	that	false	stereotypes	about	the	
European	Union	became	increasingly	widespread	and	took	root	in	people’s	minds.	
In	recent	years	many	Moldovans	came	to	believe	that	rapprochement	with	the	EU	
was	equivalent	to	losing	independence	or	was	merely	a	cover	for	the	reunification	
with	Romania.	It	has	been	a	common	concern	that	integration	with	the	European	
Union	would	lead	to	a	decline	of	domestic	agricultural	and	industrial	production,	
that	Moldova’s	food	market	would	be	flooded	with	genetically-modified	prod-
ucts,	etc.	Some	of	the	traditionally	conservative	and	religious	Moldovans	have	
also	come	to	see	the	EU	as	a	threat	to	moral	and	family	values,	fearing	that	the	
Union	would	promote	homosexuality	and	Catholicism	in	Moldova.	The	rise	of	
those	stereotypes	had	three	sources.	Firstly,	they	were	the	result	of	the	previ-
ously	mentioned	intensive	campaign	to	promote	the	Customs	Union,	conducted	
70	 The	Party	of	Communists,	whose	slogan	before	the	2009	parliamentary	elections	read	“For	
a	European	Moldova!”	made	integration	with	the	Customs	Union	the	foundation	of	its	po-
litical	programme	in	2011.	
71	 http://www.ipp.md/public/files/Barometru/2011/BOP_11.2011-nou.pdf
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by	Russia	(mainly	via	the	Russian	media	which	are	very	popular	in	Moldova)	and	
by	pro-Russian	groups	in	Moldova,	combined	with	a	campaign	to	discredit	the	
European	Union.	Those	involved	in	these	campaigns	often	resorted	to	lies	and	
half-truths	when	making	their	case,	but	many	Moldovans	accepted	those	claims	
as	truth,	largely	because	they	had	little	knowledge	about	either	the	European	
Union	or	about	the	Customs	Union,	and	because	of	the	absence	of	a	coherent	and	
broad	campaign	to	counter	the	disinformation,	which	could	have	been	conducted	
by	the	government	or	by	the	EU	delegation	in	Moldova.	Finally,	the	local	Orthodox	
Church	also	played	a	role	in	instigating	fear	of	the	EU.
The	fourth	factor	behind	the	decline	of	the	popularity	of	European	integration	
in	Moldova	concerns	the	fact	that	the	EU	had	consistently	promoted	a	certain	
worldview	and	pushed	for	cultural	changes	that	were	perceived	as	controver-
sial	in	Moldova.72	The	equal	opportunities	bill	adopted	in	May	2012	is	a	case	in	
point.	It	ensured	equal	legal	status	to	minorities,	including	sexual	minorities	
and	the	Roma	minority.	The	EU	had	insisted	that	such	a	bill	should	be	enacted	
in	Moldova	and	had	made	its	decision	to	abolish	the	visa	obligation	for	Moldo-
vans	entering	the	Schengen	area	conditional	on	its	adoption.	The	traditionally	
conservative	Moldovans	were	firmly	opposed	to	the	bill,	seeing	it	as	a	first	step	
towards	the	legalisation	of	same-sex	marriage.	The	Moldovan	government	did	
hardly	anything	to	change	the	public	perception	of	the	bill	or	explain	the	real	
intentions	behind	it.	As	a	result,	the	image	of	the	EU	suffered.
3. Prospects
While	the	popularity	of	the	idea	of	European	integration	reached	a	historical	
low	in	2015,	in	the	following	months	it	started	to	gain	traction	again	to	reach	
43%	in	2016	–	a	level	comparable	with	the	popularity	of	integration	with	the	
Eurasian	Union	(44%).73	The	reason	for	that	concerns	the	deep	polarisation	of	
the	public	in	Moldova	over	the	choice	of	geopolitical	orientation.	Even	people	
disillusioned	with	the	actions	of	the	EU	and	the	policies	of	the	nominally	pro-
European	government	of	Moldova	tend	to	support	the	idea	of	integration	with	
the	West,	fearing	that	if	they	remain	passive,	the	advocates	of	integration	with	
structures	endorsed	by	Russia	will	prevail.	That	polarisation	is	likely	to	con-
tinue	in	the	coming	years,	making	it	difficult	to	persuade	one	or	the	other	side	
of	the	debate	to	change	their	opinion.	
72	 P.	Flenley,	M.	Mannin	(ed.),	op. cit.
73	 http://www.iri.org/sites/default/files/wysiwyg/iri_poll_presentation-moldova-march_	
2016.pdf
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Meanwhile	Brussels,	which	has	by	now	realised	that	supporting	discredited	
political	groups	and	staying	silent	about	the	scandals	in	which	they	are	involved	
does	significant	harm	to	the	EU’s	image	and	the	level	of	public	support	for	in-
tegration,	has	adopted	a	more	assertive	stance	vis-à-vis	Chisinau.	Currently,	
EU	officially	supports	a	broadly	understood	‘pro-European	course’	but	not	any	
particular	political	group.	It	has	been	moving	awkwardly	though.	On	the	one	
hand,	it	has	been	cautious	not	to	declare	unequivocal	support	for	the	current	
government	and	has	focused	instead	on	highlighting	the	importance	of	reforms	
and	of	constant	monitoring	of	the	government’s	activities,	yet	on	the	other,	it	
has	been	very	restrained	in	showing	support	for	the	fledgling	pro-European	
opposition	(fearing	it	might	repeat	its	previous	mistakes).	In	addition	to	this,	
Romania,	an	EU	member,	wants	to	avoid	a	scenario	in	which	pro-Russian	groups	
in	Moldova	come	to	power	and	therefore	has	been	openly	co-operating	with	the	
current	government	and	almost	expressly	declaring	support	for	them.	As	a	re-
sult,	many	pro-European	Moldovans	have	become	even	more	deeply	convinced	
that	the	EU	policy	is	cynical	and	is	all	about	a	geopolitical	game	with	Russia	over	
influence	in	Moldova,	rather	than	democratisation	and	genuine	reforms.	That	
has	exacerbated	the	disillusionment	with	the	European	Union,	given	propa-
ganda	fuel	to	the	advocates	of	Russian	integration	projects	and	caused	growing	
apathy	within	the	pro-Western	electorate.
The	rigid	geopolitical	divisions	within	Moldovan	society	will	probably	per-
sist	in	the	foreseeable	future.	While	public	support	for	integration	with	the	
Eurasian	Union	is	unlikely	to	increase	radically,	there	is	a	serious	risk	that	
those	who	have	been	advocates	of	the	EU	will	lose	faith	in	the	feasibility	of	
Moldova’s	integration	with	Europe	and	its	deep	transformation	in	a	European	
spirit,	even	if	they	will	remain	Russia-sceptic	and	pro-Western	in	their	views.	
Consequently,	this	section	of	the	electorate	may	become	apathetic	(resulting	
in	weaker	social	pressure	on	the	government),	and	more	likely	to	seek	a	better	
life	outside	Moldova.
As	the	Plahotniuc	clan	has	consolidated	its	grip	on	power,	Moldova	has	visibly	
returned	to	the	policy	of	balancing	between	Russia	and	the	West,	familiar	from	
the	times	of	president	Voronin.	While	Chisinau	remains	firmly	pro-European	
at	the	level	of	declarations,	in	practice	it	will	presumably	refrain	from	overly	
close	co-operation	with	the	EU,	which	could	undermine	the	current	political	
and	business	arrangement.	It	seems	that	Plahotniuc	will	strive	to	maintain	suf-
ficiently	good	relations	with	the	European	Union	and	the	United	States	to	be	
sure	that	Moldova	continues	to	receive	external	financing	(including	via	the	
IMF	or	the	World	Bank),	while	at	the	same	time	working	to	rebuild	relations	
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with	Russia	(and	have	the	Russian	embargo	lifted).	One	of	the	basic	methods	
which	Chisinau	will	use	to	keep	the	West’s	support	will	consist	in	constantly	
highlighting	the	‘Russian	threat’	hanging	over	Moldova.74	This	strategy	will	of-
fer	Plahotniuc	a	chance	to	keep	power	while	preserving	the	oligarchic	system	
and	will	provide	a	foundation	to	gradually	build	up	the	electorate’s	support	
(starting	from	a	modest	level	for	the	time	being)	by	simultaneously	appealing	
to	the	supporters	of	integration	with	the	EU	and	the	sections	of	the	public	in-
terested	in	maintaining	good	relations	with	Russia.
74	 As	part	of	this	strategy,	prime	minister	Pavel	Filip	published	an	op-ed	in	the	US	daily	The 
Hill,	in	which	he	called	on	the	United	States	to	help	Moldova	counter	Russian	propaganda.	
http://infoprut.ro/44978-pavel-filip-editorial-in-the-hill-rep-moldova-are-nevoie-ca-sua-
sa-contracareze-propaganda-rusa.html
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VI. THE ConFLICT In TRAnSnISTRIA:  
no PRoGRESS And no PRoSPECTS 
During	the	last	quarter	of	a	century	or,	to	be	more	precise,	during	the	last	26	
years,	(Transnistria	‘declared	independence’	from	Moldova	in	September	1990)	
no	real	progress	has	been	made	towards	resolving	the	frozen	Transnistrian	
conflict.	On	the	contrary,	Transnistria	has	effectively	consolidated	its	unrecog-
nised	statehood,	for	instance	by	acquiring	the	status	of	a	party	(on	an	equal	foot-
ing	with	Chisinau,	Moscow	and	Kyiv)	in	the	multi-party	negotiations.	Over	the	
years	all	the	actors	involved	in	the	negotiation	processes	took	various	actions	
(usually	limited	to	the	level	of	declarations)	to	resolve	the	Transnistrian	issue	
and	came	up	with	various	proposals	to	that	end.	Those	efforts,	however,	lacked	
the	political	will	necessary	for	them	to	be	effective,	and	moreover,	they	were	
often	intended	to	serve	the	political	interests	of	the	parties	rather	than	resolve	
the	conflict.	Paradoxically,	the	relatively	mild,	non-violent	nature	of	the	frozen	
conflict	has	not	aided	the	efforts	to	solve	it.	Apart	from	the	recurrent	rhetorical	
tensions	and	legal	and	commercial	battles	between	Chisinau	and	Tiraspol,	no	
major	acts	of	violence	have	taken	place	between	the	two	sides	since	the	end	of	
the	Transnistrian	war	in	1993.	Because	of	that	fact	and	due	to	the	general	lack	
of	interest	in	Moldova	on	the	part	of	Western	public	opinion,	the	Western	par-
ticipants	of	the	negotiations	process	have	been	quite	indifferent	towards	the	
Transnistrian	problem.	As	a	result	of	the	West’s	political	impotence,	combined	
with	the	contradictory	interests	of	Moscow	and	Chisinau	and	the	increasingly	
consolidated	corruption	patterns	formed	thanks	to	the	existence	of	Transnis-
tria	(benefitting	the	political	elites	on	both	sides	of	the	Dniester),	the	resolution	
of	the	Transnistrian	problem	seems	as	distant	today	as	it	was	in	1990.75	
1. Contradictory interests and growing profits
Russia	undoubtedly	has	the	greatest	influence	on	the	situation	surrounding	the	
frozen	Transnistrian	conflict	and	is	the	key	political	actor	in	this	regard.	While	
the	tensions	mounting	since	the	1990s	and	the	civil	war	between	Chisinau	and	
Tiraspol	(1992)	were	largely	the	result	of	the	resistance	of	the	Transnistrian	elite	
and	society	to	the	expected	incorporation	of	Moldova	into	Romania,	Russia	had	
deliberately	stoked	up	those	fears	among	the	inhabitants	of	Transnistria	from	
the	very	beginning	and	had	politically	and	militarily	backed	the	aspirations	of	
75	 For	 extensive	 information	 on	 the	 situation	 surrounding	 the	 Transnistrian	 conflict	 20	
years	 since	 its	 onset,	 see	W.	 Rodkiewicz:	 http://www.osw.waw.pl/en/publikacje/osw-re-
port/2011-10-07/transnistrian-conflict-after-20-years	
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the	separatists	who	sought	to	gain	independence	from	the	right-bank	part	of	
Moldova.	The	emergence	of	a	breakaway	region	under	Russia’s	patronage	and	
not	controlled	by	Chisinau	brought	various	benefits	to	Moscow.	Most	notably,	
it	allowed	Russia	to	keep	a	constant	military	presence	in	the	unrecognised	re-
public	(represented	as	a	peacekeeping	force),	undermined	the	newly	established	
independent	Moldovan	state,	made	it	dependent	on	dialogue	with	Russia,	with	
whom	Chisinau	had	to	maintain	ties	with	a	view	to	resolving	the	Transnistrian	
problem,	and	offered	Moscow	an	additional	instrument	for	exerting	pressure	on	
Kyiv.	At	the	same	time,	the	existence	of	a	para-state	within	the	territory	of	Mol-
dova	and	the	presence	of	Russian	troops	there	created	a	hindrance	for	Moldova’s	
potential	accession	to	NATO	(or	indeed	rendered	such	accession	impossible).
The	existence	of	Transnistria	in	the	present	form	has	engendered	various	ben-
efits	for	Russia,	as	mentioned	above,	but	it	has	also	been	very	costly.	It	is	esti-
mated	that	Moscow	spends	around	US$	1	billion	each	year	to	sustain	the	para-
state	(in	the	form	of	direct	subsidies	and	free	supplies	of	resources).	For	this	
reason,	Russia’s	intention	in	the	longer	term	is	to	“determine	the	ultimate	status	
of	Transnistria	within	a	unified,	indivisible	and	neutral	Moldova”	in	the	words	
of	the	Russian	foreign	minister	Sergei	Lavrov.76	Russia	seeks	to	push	through	
a	federative	variant	in	which	right-bank	Moldova,	Transnistria	and,	option-
ally,	Gagauzia	(the	autonomous	region	in	southern	Moldova,	inhabited	by	a	pro-
Russian,	Turkish-speaking	but	Orthodox	Gagauz	minority)	would	form	a	joint	
state.	Such	a	solution	would	have	a	number	of	advantages	from	Moscow’s	point	
of	view.	In	the	federal	state,	the	deeply	pro-Russian	Transnistria	and	Gagauzia	
would	have	a	significant	influence	on	the	activities	of	the	central	government	
in	Chisinau,	and	especially	its	foreign	policy.	The	inhabitants	of	both	regions,	
as	well	as	their	leaderships,	are	firmly	opposed	to	the	idea	of	Moldova’s	inte-
gration	with	Western	structures	such	as	the	EU	or	especially	NATO.	They	also	
advocate	as	close	as	possible	co-operation	with	Russia,	including	the	accession	
to	the	Eurasian	Economic	Union,77	or,	in	the	case	of	Transnistria,	accession	to	
the	Russian	Federation.78	The	so-called	‘Kozak	Memorandum’	proposed	by	Rus-
sia	in	2003	revealed	the	Kremlin’s	vision	of	how	the	Transnistrian	problem	
should	be	resolved.	The	document	not	only	awarded	Transnistria	the	right	to	
76	 http://actualitati.md/ru/sng/lavrov-rf-vystupaet-za-sohranenie-pridnestrovya-v-sostave-rm
77	 In	a	referendum	held	on	2	February	2014	in	Gagauzia	(which	was	illegal	 from	Chisinau’s	
point	of	view)	98.5%	of	voters	were	 in	 favour	of	Moldova’s	 integration	with	the	Russian-
endorsed	Customs	Union	(transformed	into	the	Eurasian	Union	on	29	May	2014).	
78	 On	17	September	2006	a	referendum	was	held	in	Transnistria,	in	which	98%	of	voters	were	
in	favour	of	the	region’s	accession	to	the	Russian	Federation.	
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veto	Chisinau’s	foreign	policy	decisions,	but	also	legalised	the	presence	of	Rus-
sian	peacekeepers	in	the	unified	state	for	at	least	twenty	years	(as	guarantors	
of	the	new	agreement).	From	the	Kremlin’s	perspective,	a	federalisation	of	Mol-
dova	conducted	along	such	lines	would	be	a	guarantee	that	the	country	remains	
neutral,	and	would	effectively	block	any	attempts	on	the	part	of	Moldova	to	in-
tegrate	with	Western	structures	(whether	European	or	Euro-Atlantic).	It	would	
also	radically	increase	Russia’s	influence	on	Moldova’s	internal	situation,	most	
importantly	by	sanctioning	the	presence	of	Russian	armed	forces	in	Moldova’s	
territory.	This	take	on	the	Transnistrian	problem	explains	why	Russia	has	never	
decided	to	recognise	its	independence	–	because	federalisation	remains	a	feasi-
ble	option	only	as	long	as	Transnistria	legally	forms	part	of	the	Moldovan	state.	
The	Moldovan	stance	on	the	Transnistrian	problem	is	more	complex	and	has	un-
dergone	some	evolution	over	the	years.	During	the	first	decade	of	independence,	
or	more	precisely	up	until	2003,	Chisinau	undertook	a	number	of	steps	which	
effectively	conserved	the	status	quo,	while	officially	advocating	a	reunification	
of	the	country.	In	an	effort	to	maintain	positive	and	dialogue-enabling	relations	
with	Transnistria,	the	Moldovan	authorities	effectively	strengthened	Transnis-
tria’s	unrecognised	statehood.	It	was	then	that	Tiraspol	was	admitted	as	a	party	
to	the	international	negotiations,	which	constituted	a	form	of	recognition.	As	
a	result	of	the	signing,	in	1997,	of	the	Memorandum on the principles of normaliza-
tion of relations between the Republic of Moldova and Transnistria	by	the	Moldovan	
president	Petru	Lucinschi	and	the	Transnistrian	leader	Igor	Smirnov,	the	two	
governments	were	put	on	an	equal	footing	and	the	leadership	of	Transnistria	
became	a	party	in	the	international	multilateral	negotiations	format,	thus	ef-
fectively	gaining	recognition	as	a	legitimate	actor.	Moreover,	the	Moldovan	side	
even	agreed	to	recognise	the	documents	issued	by	the	separatist	government.	
At	the	same	time,	the	Moldovan	leadership	tried	hard	to	build	better	relations	
with	Moscow,	seeing	it	as	the	main	force	that	could	pressure	Tiraspol	and	push	
it	towards	a	resolution	of	the	Transnistrian	problem.	This	was	one	of	the	objec-
tives	of	the	signature,	in	1994,	of	an	agreement	between	Moldova	and	Russia,	
under	which	the	withdrawal	of	Russian	troops	from	Transnistria	was	made	
conditional	on	a	political	resolution	of	the	Transnistrian	issue.	
Around	the	year	2003,	the	then	president	Voronin	gave	up	on	the	talks	with	
Tiraspol,	which	had	proven	futile,	and	started	direct	negotiations	with	Moscow.	
The	process	ended	with	the	drafting	of	the	previously	mentioned	document	
known	as	the	Kozak	Memorandum	(named	after	the	Russian	negotiator).	Even	
though	the	Russian	side	managed	to	persuade	Smirnov	to	sign	it,	as	the	Mol-
dovan	leadership	had	hoped,	Voronin	ultimately	refused	to	sign	the	document	
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under	pressure	 from	protesters	 in	Moldova	and	his	Western	partners	who	
realised	what	the	consequences	of	reunification	on	Russian	terms	would	be.	
Consequently,	in	2005	the	Moldovan	parliament	adopted	a	law	“on	the	special	
status	of	Transnistria”	which	in	practice	ruled	out	federalisation	as	a	possi-
ble	solution.	Chisinau	also	started	to	pursue	a	much	more	assertive	policy.	The	
Moldovan	authorities	formally	abandoned	any	attempts	at	appeasing	Tiraspol	
and	Moscow,	and	took	measures	to	limit	the	separatist	region’s	political	and	
economic	freedom.	Voronin	managed	to	add	Western	partners	(the	EU	and	the	
United	States)	to	the	existing	negotiations	format	(which	until	then	included	
Russia,	Ukraine	and	the	OSCE	in	addition	to	Tiraspol	and	Chisinau),	in	order	
to	counterbalance	the	hitherto	immense	influence	of	Moscow.	This	is	how	the	
5+2	negotiations	format	came	to	be,	which	has	functioned	untill	the	present	day,	
with	some	interruptions	at	those	times	when	relations	between	Moldova	and	
Transnistria	temporarily	soured.	The	trading	freedoms	previously	awarded	to	
Transnistria	were	also	curbed	(since	2006,	Transnistrian	companies	wishing	to	
export	their	products	need	to	be	registered	in	Chisinau).	Finally,	the	European	
Border	Assistance	Mission	(EUBAM)	was	deployed	on	Ukraine’s	border	with	
Transnistria.	
It	seems	that	in	the	mid-2000s	Chisinau	lost	hope	that	Moldova	could	realis-
tically	be	reunited,	despite	formal	declarations	claiming	otherwise,	and	the	
ruling	elite	in	Moldova	realised	that	reunification	was	not	only	unfeasible	but	
would	also	threaten	their	various	interests.	As	a	consequence,	they	lost	both	
their	interest	in	genuine	reunification	and	their	political	will	to	work	towards	
it.	There	were	several	reasons	behind	this.	Firstly,	from	the	point	of	view	of	the	
current	Moldovan	leadership,	the	possible	reunification	of	Moldova	and	Trans	-
nistria	would	generate	huge	costs	economically	and,	especially	in	the	short	term,	
also	politically.	It	is	difficult	to	estimate	the	financial	effort	which	Chisinau	
would	have	to	make	to	effectively	integrate	Transnistria	into	the	economic	and	
administrative	systems	of	Moldova.	Because	the	economy	of	Transnistria	in	its	
current	shape	is	in	practice	completely	dependent	(maintaining	its	competitive-
ness,	low	as	it	is,	is	only	possible	thanks	to	the	various	subsidies,	including	the	
supplies	of	de facto	free	gas),	its	reconstruction	along	market	principles	would	
cost	millions	if	not	billions	of	US$	-	a	prohibitively	high	cost	for	Moldova,	even	
if	it	received	international	assistance.	Moreover,	the	incorporation	of	Transnis-
tria,	which	still	maintains	the	costly,	post-Soviet	welfare	system,	would	entail	
a	radical	increase	in	Moldova’s	budget	spending.	An	additional	burden	on	Mol-
dova’s	public	finances	would	come	from	the	inclusion	into	the	country’s	social	
security	system	of	the	more	than	140,000	Transnistrian	pensioners	(whose	
number	currently	exceeds	the	number	of	working-age	people	in	Transnistria	
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by	40,000).	Finally,	Moldova	would	also	have	to	commit	to	repaying	Transnis-
tria’s	gas	debt,	which	currently	stands	at	around	US$	4-5	billion.79	For	now	it	has	
been	able	to	avoid	delivering	on	that	commitment	because	it	does	not	control	
the	territory	of	Transnistria.	
The	economic	costs	would	directly	translate	into	political	costs.	The	need	for	
Moldova	to	bear	at	least	part	of	the	financial	burden	of	reunification	would	
undoubtedly	have	an	adverse	impact	on	the	standards	of	living	in	the	country,	
and	consequently	dent	the	popularity	of	the	government	that	carried	out	the	
reunification.	From	the	point	of	view	of	the	Moldovan	political	elite	it	is	also	
important	that	the	incorporation	of	Transnistria	would	entail	the	need	to	inte-
grate	around	220,000	Transnistrian	voters	into	the	country’s	political	system.	
That	would	radically	alter	the	structure	of	support	for	the	existing	political	
groups	and	considerably	increase	the	number	of	pro-Russian	voters	averse	
to	the	idea	of	European	integration.	That	does	not	mean,	however,	that	those	
people	would	be	willing	to	vote	for	the	Moldovan	pro-Russian	parties,	which	
they	do	not	trust.	It	is	feasible	that	with	the	incorporation	of	Transnistria,	the	
political	groups	now	represented	in	the	Moldovan	parliament	would	have	to	
face	new	competition	owing	to	its	parliamentary	representation	among	the	
Transnistrian	electorate.	
Another	reason	why	the	Moldovan	elites	have	not	been	interested	in	resolv-
ing	the	Transnistrian	problem	concerns	the	absence	of	social	pressure.	Today,	
the	people	of	Moldova	are	indifferent	towards	the	Transnistrian	issue.	Histori-
cally,	the	region	has	never	been	part	of	the	Principality	of	Moldova	or,	later,	of	
Bessarabia,	and	has	never	been	inhabited	in	any	significant	degree	by	ethnic	
Romanians/Moldovans.	Consequently,	it	inspires	no	historical	sentiments.	The	
people	in	Moldova	are	therefore	hardly	interested	in	the	negotiations	process	
between	Tiraspol	and	Chisinau.	The	only	thing	which	stirs	some	emotion	is	the	
recurrent	(and	usually	baseless)	suggestions	that	the	conflict	could	become	un-
frozen.	On	top	of	that,	the	already	low	level	of	interest	in	the	Transnistrian	issue	
has	been	waning.	While	in	April	2014	16%	of	Moldovans	considered	the	country’s	
division	to	be	one	of	the	three	key	problems	(although	only	2%	believed	it	was	
the	most	important	issue),80	by	April	2016	that	percentage	had	decreased	to	just	
over	6%	(with	1.8%	believing	its	resolution	was	a	priority).81
79	 http://www.3dcftas.eu/sites/default/files/Iasi-Ungheni_pipeline_to_Chisinau.pdf
80	 http://www.ipp.md/libview.php?l=ro&idc=156&id=681
81	 http://www.ipp.md/public/files/Barometru/BOP_04.2016_prima_parte_finale-r.pdf
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Another	important	factor	discouraging	the	Moldovan	elite	from	taking	action	
to	resolve	the	Transnistrian	problem	concerns	the	web	of	corruption	and	busi-
ness	links	that	have	formed	over	the	last	25	years	between	the	political	and	
business	elites	of	Moldova	and	Transnistria.	From	the	point	of	view	of	those	
elites,	the	very	fact	that	Transnistria	exists	outside	the	international	legal	or-
der	and	beyond	the	control	of	external	organisations,	creates	very	favourable	
conditions	for	various	forms	of	illicit	activity,	such	as	smuggling.	Co-operation	
of	this	sort	between	Moldova	and	the	breakaway	region	throve	under	president	
Voronin	(2001-2009),	and	there	are	many	indications	that	it	still	continues	to-
day	and	constitutes	a	major	source	of	profits	for	political	decision	makers	(see	
below	for	more	information	on	the	patterns	of	corruption	between	Moldova	
and	Transnistria).
The	Moldovan	elites	are	not	interested	in	resolving	the	Transnistrian	problem.	
However,	neither	can	they	afford	to	recognise	Transnistria’s	independence,	as	
that	would	create	a	number	of	political	and	technical	problems	(such	as	the	need	
to	delimit	the	still	indefinite	and	disputed	border),	and	would	undermine	the	
legitimacy	of	the	Moldovan	state,	which	would	be	seen	as	renouncing	its	title	
to	an	area	which	belongs	to	it	under	its	constitution	and	the	200,000	Moldovan	
citizens	living	in	it.	Opposition	to	such	a	move	from	external	actors	would	pose	
a	separate	problem.	As	discussed	previously,	Moldova’s	recognition	of	Transnis-
tria’s	independence	would	be	seen	by	Russia	as	the	loss	of	an	important	instru-
ment	to	pressure	Chisinau	with,	and	by	the	West	–	as	another	factor	destabilis-
ing	the	region.	
2. Consequences of the Transnistrian problem for the Moldovan state
Meanwhile,	as	the	Transnistrian	problem	drags	on,	it	has	given	rise	to	a	num-
ber	of	threats	for	Moldovan	statehood	which	have	had	and	will	continue	to	have	
a	negative	impact	on	the	republic’s	still	incomplete	state-building	processes,	even	
if	they	are	unlikely	to	lead	to	a	complete	collapse	of	the	state.	The	existence	of	
Transnistria	in	its	present	form	means	that	Chisinau	is	effectively	unable	to	con-
trol	more	than	30%	of	the	total	length	of	its	borders	(around	450	km).	There	are	
no	Moldovan	border	service	or	customs	service	posts	on	the	so-called	admin-
istrative	line	separating	the	territories	controlled	by	Chisinau	and	by	Tiraspol	
(although	Transnistrian	posts	have	been	deployed	there).	This	means	that	the	
Moldovan	government	is	unable	to	control	the	movement	of	people	in	its	territory	
(which	people	are	able	to	enter	and	exit	without	any	checks),	and	this	situation	
undermines	the	country’s	security.	It	also	enables	Transnistrian	and	Russian	
services	to	infiltrate	and	operate	in	Moldovan	territory.	Furthermore,	it	creates	
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ideal	conditions	for	smuggling,	which	every	year	generates	massive	losses	for	the	
Moldovan	budget.	Smuggling	also	entails	a	security	threat,	not	only	for	Moldova	
but	for	the	international	community,	too:	for	instance,	in	2010	and	2011	Moldo-
van	authorities	uncovered	transports	of	uranium-238	(which	could	be	used	for	
nuclear	weapons	or	dirty	bombs).	Moreover,	the	continuing	presence	of	an	un-
regulated	administrative	entity	within	Moldova’s	territory	is	also	conducive	to	
corruption	within	the	Moldovan	state	apparatus	and	the	country’s	political	and	
business	elite,	whose	members	are	keen	to	take	advantage	of	the	opportunities	of-
fered	by	the	existence	of	the	separatist	region	(below:	The	corrupt	co-operation...).	
Finally,	the	fact	that	Moldova	has	no	control	over	a	major	section	of	its	border	
and	more	than	10%	of	its	constitutional	territory	is	a	substantial	obstacle	to	
the	development	of	attachment	and	loyalty	towards	the	state	on	the	part	of	its	
citizens,	who	see	Moldova,	torn	for	26	years	by	Transnistrian	separatism,	as	an	
unfinished	project.	The	Transnistrian	problem	and	the	resulting	uncertainty	
of	borders	in	the	region	also	affect	the	perception	of	Moldova	by	its	neighbours	
and	create	a	favourable	ground	for	revisionist	debates	(often	incited	politically	
by	various	forces)	which	stoke	tensions	in	the	region	and	reinforce	the	sense	of	
the	‘provisional’	nature	of	Moldovan	statehood.	
The corrupt co-operation between the elites of Moldova 
and Transnistria
The newest example of such action concerns the purchase of energy from 
the Moldavskaya GRES power plant in Transnistria. Before 2014, Moldova, 
a country without any major power plants of its own, imported electric-
ity from Transnistrian and Ukrainian suppliers in roughly equal propor-
tions, which stimulated competition, kept prices down and guaranteed se-
curity of energy supplies. After Donbas effectively seceded from Ukraine 
in 2014, supplies from Ukraine ceased. At the same time, a new company 
called Energokapital started operating in the Transnistrian energy mar-
ket as an intermediary trading electricity produced by Moldavskaya GRES. 
The company sold gas (which it was receiving for free from Russia) to the 
power plant and they bought electricity produced at a price of US$ 0.016 
per kw/h to be further resold to Moldova, the power plant’s only customer 
other than energy consumers in Transnistria. However, the energy would 
not be bought directly by the Moldovan distributor, but instead by another 
intermediary, the Energocom company formally owned by the state. The 
transactions generated huge profits for the Transnistrian company be-
cause Energocom paid Energokapital four times the price the latter paid 
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to Moldavskaya GRES. It is estimated that in 2015 alone the Transnistrian 
intermediary made a profit of more than US$ 20 million. 
There are many indications that the beneficiaries of the scheme were 
members of Moldovan and Transnistrian political and business elites. At 
least two facts point toward this. Firstly, Energokapital is owned by a group 
of investors and companies registered in tax havens, some of which have 
links to the banking scandal described before, in the aftermath of which 
around US$ 1 billion was siphoned off from the Moldovan banking sector 
in 2014. One of the owners is the Transnistrian-registered company Bas 
Market, in which Yurii Dzetsul, close friend and aide of the Transnistrian 
‘president’ Yevgeny Shevchuk, holds a considerable stake. The existence of 
an energy trade intermediary on the Moldovan side seems to have no eco-
nomic justification and apparently only serves the above corruption model.
The second fact, which bears out the above hypothesis much more emphati-
cally, is that in 2016, when Ukraine was ready to resume electricity supplies 
to Moldova, the government in Chisinau decided to extend its co-operation 
with Energokapital. Although the company did offer a lower price than be-
fore (US$ 0.049 per kw/h), there was no economic or political justification 
for Chisinau’s decision to preserve Transnistria’s monopoly. The Ukrainian 
side had offered to supply electricity at prices similar to those proposed by 
Transnistria, yet it should be remembered that by using electricity supplies 
from Transnistria, Chisinau effectively pays twice: firstly by covering the 
price of the electricity purchased, and secondly by incurring the growing 
gas debt for which Moldova is liable from Moscow’s point of view. At the 
same time it is clear that relying solely on supplies from Moldavskaya GRES, 
a company owned by the Russian state treasury, poses a major risk to Mol-
dova’s energy security. In this context it is difficult to find any explanation 
for the Moldovan government’s decision other than the corruption schemes 
benefitting the Moldovan political elite implicated in the banking scandal.
Another	consequence	of	the	protracted	Transnistrian	problem	consists	in	the	
permanent	presence	of	Russian	 troops	 in	 the	 territory	 legally	belonging	 to	
Moldova.	According	to	various	sources,	the	size	of	the	Russian	force	ranges	
between	1,500	and	2,500	soldiers	in	two	formations	with	different	legal	sta-
tus.	One	comprises	the	Russian	troops	which	form	part	of	the	multi-national,	
Moldovan-Russian-Transnistrian	peacekeeping	force,	the	presence	of	which	
has	been	authorised	by	Moldova	under	the	Russian-Moldovan	peace	accord	
ending	the	Transnistrian	war	(signed	on	21	July	1992).	The	other	group	is	the	
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Operational	Group	of	Russian	Forces	in	Moldova	–	a	remnant	of	the	14th	So-
viet	(and	subsequently	Russian)	Army,	which	has	been	actively	involved	in	the	
Transnistrian	war	and	which	was	stationed	in	Transnistria	during	the	Cold	
War	period.	From	the	point	of	view	of	Chisinau,	the	presence	of	those	troops	
is	illegal.	The	Moldovan	authorities	have	repeatedly	called	for	the	Group	to	be	
withdrawn	from	the	territory	of	Transnistria	but	the	Russian	side	has	always	
refused,	claiming	that	their	task	there	was	to	protect	one	of	the	largest	weapons	
and	ammunition	depots	left	by	the	said	14th	Army	in	the	town	of	Colbasna	in	
northern	Transnistria.	According	to	Russia,	the	Group	can	be	evacuated	from	
Transnistria	once	the	depot	has	been	moved	or	liquidated,	but	Moscow	has	not	
taken	any	steps	to	that	end.	
The	presence	of	Russian	troops	in	Moldova	undermines	not	only	the	sover-
eignty	of	the	Moldovan	state,	which	has	not	authorised	the	presence	of	the	
Operational	Group	in	its	territory,	but	also	Moldova’s	constitutional	neutral-
ity.	All	of	this	serves	to	strengthen	the	impression	of	the	incompleteness	and	
provisional	nature	of	Moldovan	statehood.	The	Russian	military	presence	also	
sometimes	gets	used	as	an	argument	against	possible	military	co-operation	
between	Moldova	and	Western	partners,	especially	Romania	and	the	US,	such	
as	joint	exercises	in	Moldovan	territory,	which	the	Russian	side	invariably	
decries	as	provocations.	
3. The problem of Transnistria: dim prospects
It	seems	certain	that,	in	the	foreseeable	future,	the	Transnistrian	problem	will	
remain	unresolved.	The	contradictory	interests	of	the	parties,	the	absence	of	
internal	pressure	to	resolve	it	and	the	lack	of	interest	in	the	para-state	on	the	
part	of	all	the	actors	involved	will	be	conducive	to	a	continuation	of	the	status	
quo.	The	negotiations	concerning	the	Transnistrian	issue	will	continue,	with	
varied	intensity	and	undoubtedly	with	some	pauses,	but	they	will	largely	re-
main	merely	a	foreign	policy	tool	for	Russia,	the	West	and	Moldova.82	Therefore,	
most	likely	they	will	not	produce	any	tangible	results.	The	5+2	negotiations	
format	which	has	been	in	place	since	2005	will	remain	a	platform	for	resolving	
82	 The	behaviour	of	Germany	in	2016,	when	it	held	the	OSCE	presidency,	may	serve	as	an	ex-
ample	of	such	use	of	the	Transnistrian	negotiations	to	a	country’s	own	foreign	policy	ends.	
During	its	OSCE	presidency,	Berlin	tried	to	pressure	Moldova	to	make	unilateral	conces-
sions	to	Tiraspol	because	that	would	enable	Germany	to	present	itself	as	an	effective	inter-
national	player	and	would	serve	as	a	bargaining	chip	in	Berlin’s	negotiations	with	Russia	
concerning	Ukraine.	See:	http://www.europalibera.org/a/27748098.html	and	http://news-
maker.md/rus/novosti/na-berlin-kak-moldavskie-npo-splotilis-protiv-germanii-26907
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day-to-day	bilateral	problems,	because	Moscow	and	Tiraspol	are	firmly	against	
using	it	to	conduct	talks	on	the	political	status	of	Transnistria.	
Apart	from	the	political	issues,	social	and	economic	factors	also	undermine	the	
prospects	of	reunification.	Struggling	with	its	crisis	of	self-identification	and	its	
conception	of	nationhood,	Moldova	is	neither	at	present	nor	in	the	near	future	
probably	capable	of	offering	the	inhabitants	of	Transnistria	a	promising	devel-
opment	path	and	an	attractive	and	inclusive	identity	model	that	could	compete	
with	the	Russian/Soviet	identity	dominant	in	Transnistria,	and	persuade	them	
to	become	part	of	the	Republic	of	Moldova.	Struggling	with	an	unending	eco-
nomic	crisis,	Moldova	is	and	probably	will	remain	unable	to	appeal	to	the	inhab-
itants	of	Transnistria	with	improving	standards	of	living,	even	in	view	of	the	
economic	decline	which	Transnistria	has	been	experiencing	since	the	begin-
ning	of	the	conflict	in	Ukraine.	As	a	result,	the	persistence	of	the	Transnistrian	
problem	will	undermine	the	legitimacy	of	the	Moldovan	state	and	consolidate	
the	impression	of	its	‘provisional’	nature.
Nevertheless,	if	the	current	structure	of	power	built	around	Vlad	Plahotniuc	
were	to	collapse	and	pro-Russian	forces	(such	as	Igor	Dodon’s	Party	of	Social-
ists)	were	to	take	power	in	Moldova,	it	is	not	inconceivable	that	a	new	attempt	
could	be	made	at	reuniting	Moldova	along	the	lines	laid	down	in	the	Kozak	
Memorandum	(i.e.	in	a	variant	extremely	unfavourable	to	Moldova),	with	all	
of	its	key	elements	including	the	right	for	Tiraspol	to	block	Chisinau’s	foreign	
policy	decisions	and	the	sanctioning	of	Russian	military	presence	in	the	uni-
fied	Moldovan	state.	While	such	a	solution	would	likely	meet	with	considerable	
public	opposition,	at	this	stage	it	appears	to	be	much	more	probable	than	any	
other	scenario	concerning	the	Transnistrian	issue.	
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VII. WHAT WILL THE nEXT 25 YEARS BRInG 
(IF AnYTHInG)?
After	25	years	of	independent	existence,	the	social	and	political	project	that	is	
the	Republic	of	Moldova	still	remains	unconsolidated	and	in	some	way	‘provi-
sional’.	That	is	because	today’s	Moldova	is	still	searching	for	a	vision	of	itself	and	
a	path	to	take.	Because	of	the	very	serious	crisis	of	its	pro-European	orientation	
and	the	deep	divisions	within	its	society	between	the	advocates	of	integration	
with	the	West	and	those	who	prefer	rapprochement	with	Russia,	Moldova	risks	
becoming	a	borderland	country	in	a	state	of	permanent	social,	political	and	eco-
nomic	malaise.	In	such	shape,	Moldova	may	continue	to	exist	for	years	or	even	
decades,	while	increasingly	succumbing	to	internal	disintegration.	Meanwhile,	
its	demographic	situation	will	continue	to	deteriorate.	The	political	scene	(irre-
spective	of	its	particular	configuration)	will	remain	dominated	by	self-serving	
political	elites	lacking	a	vision	of	the	country’s	development	and	effectively	in-
terested	only	in	the	pursuit	of	their	own	political	and	business	interests.	
The	situation	could	change	if	Moldova’s	new	grassroots	pro-European	opposi-
tion	came	to	power.	However,	there	is	a	serious	risk	that	those	groups	would	
then	be	taken	over	within	a	relatively	short	timeframe	by	representatives	of	
the	political	and	business	establishment	seeking	to	co-opt	them.	Thus,	even	if	
power	in	Moldova	remains	in	the	hands	of	nominally	pro-European	groups,	
the	country	governed	in	this	way	may	nonetheless	edge	ever	closer	towards	the	
Russian	economic	and	cultural	space.	Most	of	the	young	ambitious	people	with	
pro-European	views	will	take	advantage	of	the	possibility	to	leave	(thanks	to	
the	visa	liberalisation	or	Bucharest’s	policy	of	granting	Romanian	citizenship).	
The	ephemeral	and	diffuse	identity	of	Moldova’s	inhabitants,	who	feel	no	attach-
ment	to	their	state	other	than	a	sentiment	for	one’s	home	town	or	village	and	its	
surroundings,	will	further	contribute	to	that	trend.	That	means,	in	turn,	that	
the	potential	for	protest	within	Moldovan	society,	already	limited	due	to	factors	
of	culture	and	identity,	will	erode	further,	decreasing	the	likelihood	of	a	social	
upheaval	which	could	realistically	hope	to	achieve	a	change	of	government.	
Despite	its	recurrent	crises,	the	economy	will	probably	continue	to	develop,	
though	the	rate	of	development	will	be	too	slow	to	offer	the	prospect	of	a	notice-
able	improvement	in	living	standards	in	the	foreseeable	future.	The	years	will	
go	by,	but	the	factors	outlined	above	will	only	conserve	the	impression	of	the	
‘transient’	nature	of	the	Moldovan	state.
Today’s	Republic	 of	Moldova	 shows	many	 characteristics	 typical	 of	 failing	
states.	Without	an	effective	and	responsible	political	class,	an	efficient	political	
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and	legal	system,	a	coherent	and	generally	acceptable	state	or	idea	of	nation-
hood,	and	finally,	without	a	stable	economy,	Moldova	has	been	unable	not	only	
to	complete	the	transformation	process	started	a	quarter	of	a	century	ago	but	
also	to	effectively	perform	many	of	the	basic	tasks	of	states.	On	top	of	this,	it	
has	no	control	over	parts	of	its	territory	and,	despite	its	neutral	status,	has	been	
struggling	with	the	permanent	presence	of	foreign	troops	within	its	territory.	
Despite	such	pessimistic	prospects	for	the	development	of	Moldova	–	or	more	
correctly	its	stagnation	–	there	seems	to	be	no	risk	that	Moldova	could	lose	its	
formal	independence	in	the	foreseeable	future.	The	main	international	actors	
in	the	region,	including	Russia,	are	interested	in	the	continued	existence	of	the	
Moldovan	state.	From	Moscow’s	point	of	view,	an	imploding	Moldova	which	
chronically	fails	to	reform	is	a	perfectly	acceptable	option.	Contrary	to	politi-
cal	declarations	coming	from	sections	of	the	Romanian	elite,	Bucharest	is	not	
genuinely	interested	in	incorporating	Moldova	into	Romania.	While	the	Roma-
nian	leadership	would	certainly	prefer	Moldova	to	become	a	modern	European	
state	pursuing	ever	closer	co-operation	with	the	West,	it	seems	that	in	order	to	
ensure	its	own	security	and	push	Russian	influence	further	away	from	its	bor-
ders	it	would	also	accept	a	minimum	variant	in	which	Moldova,	in	its	current	
political	shape,	remains	a	neutral	state	outside	the	sphere	of	the	Kremlin’s	di-
rect	influence.	Nevertheless,	the	politically,	economically	and	socially	unstable	
Moldova	as	it	is	today	does	pose	a	serious	challenge	to	both	the	European	Union	
and	Romania	because,	despite	the	huge	scale	of	financial	assistance	provided	
to	it	and	the	unprecedented	political	effort	on	the	part	of	the	EU,	the	country	
is	a	showcase	of	the	failure	of	the	Union’s	policies	aimed	at	transforming	and	
stabilising	the	former	Soviet	states	in	the	EU’s	neighbourhood.	
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